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CHAPTER 1 
NATIONAL AID COORDINATION 
 
Introduction 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)1 aim to address the needs of developing 
countries, and are scheduled to be accomplished by 2015. As the current efforts to meet these 
commitments2 do not seem to be on track to achieve this, a new international aid agenda has 
arisen. This agenda is led by development scholars and development entities, which have a 
belief that aid coordination3 should be the responsibility of the partner countries4. In addition, 
the agenda emphasizes the importance of donor harmonization5 in response to national 
strategies and priorities. The proponents of the agenda anticipate that these changes in donor 
and partner roles are essential to achieve ‘sustainable development’
6 as outlined in the 
                                                 
1 The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are a set of goals and objectives derived from the United Nations Millennium Declaration that were agreed upon by 189 
world leaders at the United Nations World Summit in New York in 2000. The MDGs are goals of development in the areas of poverty and hunger, universal primary 
education, gender equality and empowering of women, child mortality, maternal health, combating HIV/AIDS, ensuring environmental sustainability, and building global 
partnerships for development. http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals and http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/pdf/MDG%20Book.pdf (accessed November 16, 2005). 
2 United Nations, The Millennium Development Goals Report (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 2005)  
3 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) defines aid coordination as ”the planning and procurement by a recipient government of aid from its donor partners and its 
integration into national development strategies”. UNDP. Aid Coordination and Aid Management by Government: A Role for UNDP. (New York: OESP Series on Lessons 
Learned, 1996), v. 
The main international donors state in the Rome Declaration “We attach high importance to partner countries' assuming a stronger leadership role in the coordination of 
development assistance, and to assisting in building their capacity to do so.” World Bank, Rome Declaration on Harmonization (Rome: February 24 - 25, 2003), 1.  
In some literature e.g. the Paris Declaration the word alignment is used to describe the donors’ overall role in national aid coordination, which of course is to align their 
support to the national strategies. World Bank, Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (Paris: February28 - March 2, 2005), 3.  
4 Also referred to as national ownership. Ideally this means that the “partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development policies, and strategies and co-
ordinate development actions”. World Bank, “Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness,” 3. 
5 Harmonization in the Rome Declaration: “Our deliberations are an important international effort to harmonize the operational policies, procedures, and practices of our 
institutions with those of partner country systems to improve the effectiveness of development assistance, and thereby contribute to meeting the Millennium Development 
Goals.” World Bank, “Rome Declaration on Harmonization,” 1.  
6 Sustainable development is understood here according to its original definition in the Brundtland Commission from 1987; “Development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts: the concept of "needs", in particular the 
essential needs of the world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the 
environment's ability to meet present and the future needs”. http://www.adrc.or.jp/publications/terminology/top.htm (accessed November 16, 2005). 
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MDGs. In just five years, this group has taken full control over the international aid agenda.7 
The inherent dilemma residing within this approach is that developing countries usually face 
great difficulties of identifying their problems, and moreover to find efficient solutions. 
However, there has been little in-depth analysis and practical scrutiny of what problems the 
governments of developing countries actually face in planning and coordinating aid. This 
research effort demonstrates that the practical implementation of national aid coordination is 
highly complex and will take longer to achieve than expected by proponents of the new 
international aid agenda. It will be shown that the prerequisites necessary for implementing 
this agenda are not necessarily in place in developing countries. A detailed description of the 
actual challenges pertaining to national aid coordination for a developing country is essential 
for improving the practical implementation of this new approach to development. 
The thesis analyzes to what extent national aid coordination takes place, and whether 
it affects the outcome of aid programs. As most official development assistance activities are 
part of larger sector programs, this research will focus on coordination of aid “programs” 
instead of “projects”. National aid coordination is examined in the case of Egypt, looking at 
the processes and mechanisms of aid coordination by the Ministry of Planning (MoP) and the 
Ministry of International Cooperation (MIC). The Environmental Sector Program (ESP) is 
reviewed within the Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs (MSEA) as a case study to 
analyze in detail how national coordination affects the outcome of a particular program. 
Extensive interviews of government officials were carried out to identify the official 
procedures as well as the practical implementation and challenges of the national aid 
coordination in Egypt. 
                                                 
7 World Bank, “Rome Declaration on Harmonization,” 1. 
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Outline  
This study is divided into five main areas. The first chapter presents the theoretical 
framework of aid coordination, followed by a broader literature review that situates the topic 
of the thesis in a multi-faceted context. Additionally, in Chapter I, the reasons for the 
selection of the case study, as well the methodology, research problem, hypothesis and 
research questions are provided. Chapter II presents the research on the national institutions 
that deal with aid coordination in Egypt, answering in general terms whether Egypt has 
national aid coordination. Chapter III provides a case study of the “Environmental Sector 
Program”, showing the internal procedures of national aid coordination within this specific 
program. In Chapter IV provides an in-depth analysis of the sector coordination within the 
field of environment as well as the cross-sectoral national aid coordination and its impact on 
the outcome of the ESP. The aim of this chapter is to answer whether Egypt in the specific 
case of the ESP in actual fact has national aid coordination, and whether this coordination 
enhances the intended outcome of the aid program. Finally, Chapter V offers the findings 
concerning the extent to which national aid coordination exists, and whether it can support 
the accomplishment of the intended impact of an aid program in the case of the current 
research. 
 
The Research Problem 
To what extent does national coordination of foreign aid programs facilitate and support the 
accomplishment of the intended outcome of an aid program? 
 
Hypothesis and Research Questions 
To provide an answer to the research problem, this research discusses the following two 
hypotheses:   
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i. Egypt has national aid coordination 
ii. National aid coordination can enhance the intended outcome8 of an aid program in 
 Egypt.  
To present comprehensive accounts as answers to both hypotheses, specific research 
questions were formulated and used in the research. The following research questions have 
guided this research in order to answer the first hypothesis: Is there an Egyptian authority 
with the responsibility of coordinating foreign aid programs? How is the responsibility of 
coordination of foreign aid programs taken care of by this authority, officially as well as in 
practice?; Is the Egyptian authority that plans and prioritizes the overall national policies 
responsible and in charge of the coordination of all foreign aid programs, including the 
Environmental Sector Program (ESP)?; How do the Egyptian authorities plan, prioritize and, 
thereafter, coordinate foreign aid? - Is there a national holistic development strategy/plan in 
Egypt that it being used in the coordination of foreign aid? Who made it and how was it 
made?; Is national coordination done in a state forum with a participatory approach to learn 
from donors, society, international institutions; Did the Egyptian authorities make sure that 
the ESP fits into a national holistic development plan?; And finally, Has the Egyptian 
environmental authority, MSEA, coordinated and ensured that the ESP fits into a national 
holistic environmental development plan? 
The following specific research questions were used in the research in order to answer the 
second hypothesis: Is the current internal coordination in the Environmental Sector Program 
beneficial to the outcome of the ESP? If yes, how? - Does the ESP staff prioritize the 
coordination of the ESP internally in the MSEA?; Is the present environment-sectoral 
national aid coordination instrumented by MSEA beneficial to the outcome of the ESP? If 
yes, how?; Does the Department of International Cooperation in MSEA have good relations 
                                                 
8 Intended outcome refers to the objectives that the owners of a program intend to reach as a result of the output 
of the program activities. The intended outcome is stated in the program documents.  
  
 
5 
 
with the MIC and the MoP? - Does this influence how much money and to what activities 
donor funds are being used in the field of environment?; and finally; Is the present cross-
sectoral national aid coordination, instrumented by MIC and MoP beneficial to the outcome 
of the ESP? If yes, how? Does the way the ESP is coordinated at national and local levels 
draw upon beneficial elements of the participatory approach? 
 
Literature Review 
This literature review deals with the most pivotal secondary sources that will be utilized in 
the course of this research. Firstly, the literature of the theoretical framework on aid 
coordination is provided, which deals with theories of aid coordination and the impact of aid 
coordination on aid programs. Finally, a review of the literature concerning the chosen case 
study on Egypt and the environmental sector program is presented. 
 
Theories of Aid Coordination 
A framework of concepts, theories and strategies of national aid coordination has been 
collected from different development forums including the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
for bilateral donor agencies and multilateral as the European Union (EU), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB), and United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP). The theoretical framework is divided according to the different aspects of aid 
coordination, beginning with an introduction of the theoretical conceptualization of the term 
aid coordination, and its role in the international agenda. Presented hereafter is the 
theories/theorists that argue that aid coordination increases the intended impact of aid 
programs. Subsequently, different ways of beneficial aid coordination regarding both 
stakeholders and strategies are offered. Lastly, the core theory of this research is presented: it 
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discusses the role of the local government with regard to aid coordination and how national 
aid coordination can increase the impact of aid programs.  
 
Coordination of Aid and its Role on the International Development Agenda 
“Coordination occurs when two or more individuals (or organizations) with distinct skill sets 
join to work together toward a shared goal.”9 In the book Aid Coordination and Aid 
Management by Government: A Role for UNDP, the UNDP defines aid coordination as, ”the 
planning and procurement by a recipient government of aid from its donor partners and its 
integration into national development strategies.”10 The citation below serves to demonstrate 
that coordination is not a concept that is alien or new to the world of development. 
“Coordination and harmonization have become buzz-words that 
resonate through the corridors and meeting rooms of any gathering 
related to development cooperation. Coordination broadly refers to any 
activity between donors to mobilize aid resources or to harmonize their 
policies, programmes, procedures and practices so as to use those 
resources most effectively. Coordination is not a new concept in 
development. The Pearson Commission addressed the issue over thirty 
years ago in its report, “Partners in Development” (1970).”
11 
 
Aid coordination plays a significant role in the academic field of development, the rhetoric 
field and (somewhat more limited) in the practical field of development as well.  
            According to the article by Marc Claret de Fleurieu Towards more Effective 
Development Cooperation: the EU’s Coordination and Harmonization Initiative there are 
three levels of content and three degrees of intensity in coordination: 
“Three content levels of coordination: (a) policies, principles and 
priorities, (b) procedures, and (c) practices. The first is about 
harmonising goals and activities. The second is about formal 
institutional rules and regulations (including financial controls for 
disbursement, accounting and auditing). The third is less formal than 
procedures. Three degrees of intensity of coordination: (x) 
consultation, (y) cooperation and (z) collaboration. Consultation is 
                                                 
9 (www.nonprofithub.com/coordination.htm (accessed November 16 2005). 
10 UNDP, v. 
11 Marc Claret de Fleurieu, “Towards more Effective Development Cooperation: the EU’s  
Coordination and Harmonization Initiative”, The Courier ACP-EU, no. 196 (2003): 18.  
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about sharing information between parties. Cooperation involves 
discussing policies, priorities and principles in order to identify areas 
in which harmonisation is possible. Collaboration means agreeing 
procedures and practices in an effort to ensure smooth, shared 
implementation of agreed policies in line with agreed principles and 
priorities. Joint action is probably the highest form of collaboration.”
12 
 
This division of coordination is in accordance with the division used by Arne Disch in Aid 
Coordination and Aid Effectiveness13 and shows that coordination can take place at a variety 
of levels and to different extents. This categorization is being used in the context of the 
current analysis to structure and assess the different shapes and forms of aid coordination in 
Egypt. In this research, the objective is to analyze the nature of the coordination on the 
national as well as the sectoral (the environmental sector) level. That is, the focus of this 
research is not on the coordination that occurs at the international arena within international 
institutions as for example the DAC, but more directed towards the partner country level.  
 
Practical Account on the Development of Aid Coordination 
By and large, the focus on aid coordination began at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 that 
resulted in a major sustainable development strategy: Agenda 21 requested each country to 
draw up a national strategy of sustainable development.14 In 1997, the Special Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly set a target date of 2002, signifying “the formulation and 
elaboration of national strategies for sustainable development that reflect the contributions 
and responsibilities of all interested parties should be completed in all countries, with 
assistance provided, as appropriate, through international cooperation, taking into account the 
                                                 
12 Claret de Fleurieu, 18-20. 
13 Arne Disch, Aid Coordination and Aid Effectiveness (Oslo: Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999), 18. 
14 (http://members.tripod.com/sd_east_timor/contacts/Contacts_PROC.htm#_Publications_and_strategies 
(accessed November 15, 2005). 
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special needs of the least developed countries.”
15 In September 2000, the Millennium 
Declaration with the MDGs followed this global initiative and encouraged further 
coordination of aid activities. 
In 2001, the DAC Ministerial Council took an innovative path by appointing the Task 
Force on Donor Practices. In this forum, multilateral donors and developing countries 
worked together on equal terms with the OECD members, to put forward recommendations 
concerning donor harmonization. Furthermore, the international community asserted the 
desire and willingness to increase aid coordination at the World Summit of Sustainable 
Development in Johannesburg in 2002, held as a sequel follow-up to the Earth Summit in Rio 
in 1992. After the United Nations Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey in 
2002, that introduced the global partnership for development, the DAC Task Force also 
presented its recommendations on donor harmonization. These recommendations about 
donor harmonization with partner country systems were approved by the DAC Ministerial 
Council and adopted by the bilateral and multilateral donors at the High-Level Forum in 
Rome in February 2003 known as the Rome Declaration on Harmonization. Following upon 
that, and orchestrated by the French government, the World Bank, the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and other regional development banks 
held a High Level Forum entitled "Joint Progress Toward Enhanced Aid Effectiveness: 
Harmonization, Alignment, Results" in Paris in spring 2005. The Forum assessed the 
progress achieved in making aid more efficient since the adoption of the Rome Declaration 
on Harmonization and proclaimed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which stresses 
                                                 
15  “Report of the International Forum on National Sustainable Development Strategies”. International Forum on 
National Sustainable Development Strategies. Accra, Ghana, 7-9 November 2001, 
http://www.nssd.net/pdf/ifnsds1.pdf 
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the need for strengthening partner countries’ national development strategies and operational 
frameworks as well as increasing donor alignment.16  
At the latest United Nations World Summit in September 2005, the aid strategy of 
national responsibility of national development strategies was further underlined in the 2005 
World Summit Outcome:  
“We reaffirm that each country must take primary responsibility for its 
own development and that the role of national policies and 
development strategies cannot be overemphasized in the achievement 
of sustainable development. We also recognize that national efforts 
should be complemented by supportive global programmes, measures 
and policies aimed at expanding the development opportunities of 
developing countries, while taking into account national conditions 
and ensuring respect for national ownership, strategies and 
sovereignty.”
17  
 
On aggregate, there is no doubt that the scope of coordination on the partner government 
level has increased, at least in writing.  However, as Arne Disch wrote in 1999, there is still 
no clarity as to what the exact outcome of these coordination activities has been.18 These 
observations still seem to hold true today. 
 
Theoretical Explanation of the Changes of Aid Coordination 
Theoretically, there are two conflicting views in the field of development today which 
concern the readiness of the donors to actively engage in aid coordination, and the role that 
could be played by this coordination within the developmental process in the post Cold War 
era. The first view, presented in the book Allocation of Foreign Aid and Economic 
Development: New Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives edited by B. Mak Arvin, suggests 
that donors have more incentives to coordinate with each other after the end of the Cold War 
due to three factors: 
                                                 
16 World Bank, “Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness”  
17 “2005 World Summit Outcome,” United Nations General Assembly, 4. 
http://www.unfpa.org/icpd/docs/2005summit_final_outcome.pdf (accessed November 15, 2005). 
18 Disch, 7. 
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“First, attempts by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank—the two central international financial institutions 
(IFIs)— to maintain the integrity of the international financial system 
were generally supported by the assistance policies of bilateral donors, 
who provided assistance in support of IFI programs (Bird and 
Rowlands 1997; Bird and Rowlands 2001; Rowlands 2001). Second, 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), primarily through its Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC), promoted cooperation and coordination among its members in 
order to maximize their joint effectiveness and influence. Finally, the 
process of development planning promoted by the World Bank, and 
eventually embodied in the comprehensive development frameworks 
(CDFs), incorporated donors as participants and contributors in the 
process.”
19 
 
Accordingly, Arvin conceives the 1990s as being perhaps the most favorable timeframe for 
aid coordination. With the termination of the Cold War, donors are more actively pursuing a 
common “Western” framework in their dealings with the developing countries.  However, 
the counterargument suggests that the contrary effect might take place with the demise of the 
Cold War.  
“Neorealist scholars of international relations, such as Waltz (1986), 
might argue that the disappearance of the Soviet Union reduced the 
threat that had previously motivated and solidified the Western 
alliance. Instead of creating coordinating structures to strengthen their 
collective security and advance their common agenda, states within the 
Western “club” could now revert to more self-centered approaches to 
their international behavior without seriously compromising their 
security interests. Each could pursue its own narrowly defined 
interests, even at the expense of its allies.”
20 
 
Apparently, the time could be mature for both much less or much more aid coordination with 
these two divergent forces both pushing and pulling for it. This clearly highlights the need to 
determine which one of these contradictory arguments is of greatest benefit in order to attain 
sustainable development.   
                                                 
19 B. Mak Arvin, Allocation of Foreign Aid and Economic Development: New Theoretical and Empirical 
Perspectives. (Westport, CT, USA: Greenwood Publishing Group, Incorporated, 2002), 28. 
20 Arvin, 49. 
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The Influence of National Aid Coordination on the Impact of Aid Programs 
The importance of aid coordination as a factor that may increase the intended impact of 
donor funds has been demonstrated within the practical as well as the theoretical scope of the 
field of development. First of all, the numbers speak for themselves: “According to studies 
by the UNDP and other organizations, more than 60,000 donor-financed bilateral and 
multilateral projects are currently underway in developing countries.”
21 In fact, eighty-five 
percent of these 60,000 projects actually represent investments of less than $1 million each. 
However the number of reports requested and being produced about progress within each of 
these small projects renders it a lot more as time-consuming for the local government to 
administrate in comparison to a lower number of high investment projects. This means that, 
for example, in the case of Mozambique, in which there were no less than 49 aid agencies 
involved, the government had to be engaged in a huge number of annual reports and was 
obliged to provide assistance to missions concerning appraisal, monitoring and evaluation.22 
Eventually, all of these tasks become a massive burden on a developing country’s poor 
administration. Lael Brainard states it this way: “One of the best-known pitfalls of foreign 
aid is lack of coordination among donors, both at the policy-making level and at the 
operations level in recipient countries, which places substantial burdens on host countries and 
often undermines the effectiveness of assistance efforts.”
23 Subsequently, the impact of aid 
coordination on the outcome of aid projects is e.g. that it helps removing the administrative 
burden of the partner country. However, in the case of aid programs where the scale of the 
activities and their interference in policy issues is much larger, aid coordination could also be 
                                                 
21 World Bank, “Development Aid: Doing More and Doing It Better,” Noticias.info, 
http://www.noticias.info/Archivo/2005/200503/20050301/20050301_50181.shtm (accessed November 16, 
2005). 
22 Oswald, Stefan, Knut Bäse, and Frerk Meyer, “Donor Harmonisation to Increase Efficiency” D+C – 
Magazine for Development and Cooperation. Edi. 2. (2004). http://www.inwent.org/E+Z/content/archive-
eng/02-2004/tribune_art2.html 
23 Lael Brainard et al., The Other War – Global Poverty and the Millennium Challenge Account (Washington 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 4. 
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the tool to make aid interventions coherent with the national holistic development strategies 
and priorities. Coherence between the aid programs and the national development strategy 
would increase the impact of the aid program and the chances of reaching sustainable 
development. These matters were also stated as the primary concern that motivated the 
development system when writing the Rome Declaration on Harmonization.24  
             Regarding the effectiveness of aid activities, the Canadian Minister of the 
International Cooperation, Aileen Carroll stated that:  
“We do know to a large extent what makes aid effective. (…) I would 
like to touch on some key ingredients: harmonization, coordination, 
and governance. Harmonization and coordination are closely linked. 
(…) Different donor countries worked with different accounting 
systems, used different fiscal years, and occasionally stressed 
contradictory priorities. (…) I think this illustrates clearly what we 
must avoid.”
25  
 
Harmonization is in practice one of the most important phases in the process of aid 
coordination on the donors’ side, as national coordination does not have an impact if donors 
do not respect (and support) it. In actuality, Carroll touches here on the indispensable role 
harmonization plays within the context of coordination: 
“The key is (…) to harmonize our efforts so that we are moving in the 
same direction, giving consistent advice. There are various ways for 
donors to move forward on harmonization effort (…) This inevitably 
means a more effective division of labour among donors. Donors need 
to understand what each is prepared to contribute, avoid unnecessary 
overlap, and ensure greater complementarity in our programming in 
individual countries. The most effective donor coordination, naturally, 
begins with locally owned objectives.”
26 
                                                 
24 “We in the donor community have been concerned with the growing evidence that, over time, the totality and 
wide variety of donor requirements and processes for preparing, delivering, and monitoring development 
assistance are generating unproductive transaction costs for, and drawing down the limited capacity of, partner 
countries. We are also aware of partner country concerns that donors' practices do not always fit well with 
national development priorities and systems, including their budget, program, and project planning cycles and 
public expenditure and financial management systems. We recognize that these issues require urgent, 
coordinated, and sustained action to improve our effectiveness on the ground”. World Bank, “Rome Declaration 
on Harmonization,” 1.  
25 Aileen Carroll. 2005. The Canadian Minister of International Cooperation’s speech at University College, 
Oxford for a meeting on "Exploring Aid Effective and Cooperative Aid Partnerships". Global Economic 
Governance Programme. Canada’s Aid Program:The Way Forward, March 9, 2005. 
 
26 Carroll. 
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When several donor nations and organizations want to support a specific country, sometimes 
with conflicting objectives, problems of planning, coordination and capacity are likely to 
occur. This dilemma was catapulted in the field of development within the wake of the 21st 
century, and a multitude of donors, as well as partner countries, put the subject of Donor 
Harmonization on top of the international agenda in the Millennium Summit and the 
Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development.  
Indeed donor harmonization could help reduce administrative time and minimize 
effort, whilst at the same time ensure a sensible distribution of funds among regions and 
economic sectors. Also, the need for donor coordination and harmonization of environmental 
aid is recommended in the 2005 DAC Guidelines Environmental Fiscal Reform for Poverty 
Reduction.  
The next important aspect with regards to aid coordination is the beneficial strategies 
by which aid coordination could take place, and the potential role that could be played by the 
stakeholders in such a process. 
 
Beneficial Aid Coordination – The Players and the Strategies 
There are roughly three main categories of stakeholders in the field of aid coordination – the 
local government, the local society and the foreign donors. The roles of all three entities will 
be taken into account. However, as mentioned earlier, particular focus is placed on the 
essential role of the partner government. In theory, most of the latest attempts to coordinate 
aid activities at the international arena have had the same strategy concerning the issue of 
who is supposed to head the coordinating process. Most - if not all - donors seem to agree 
that the partner government should play a significant role in setting the strategies of the aid 
activities. As summarized in a quote by Jeremy Carew-Reid: 
“The donor community should be considered as participants in the 
strategy from the very beginning of the process. Yet the principal 
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lesson for donors – underlying all others – is that strategies must be led 
by the recipient country. This applies particularly to the coordination 
of donor participation.”
27
 
 
However, in practice this particular aspect of ownership of the process of aid coordination 
causes a lot of problems. Stakeholders in the developmental field in developing countries 
have many different agendas, intentions and goals, which make it challenging to find a 
common strategy of coordination. This tough challenge of practical national coordination is 
the focus of my investigations.  
          Practical national coordination is a huge task for the partner governments and to this 
day it remains a big challenge for the governments in the developing world to fill-out the role 
of the coordinating body.  
 “Yet, in order for governments to take the lead in donor coordination, 
they require considerable resources and a firm commitment to 
cooperate by the external agencies. Permanent coordinating 
mechanisms are often lacking. (…). While this interaction between the 
external players is important and should be encouraged, ultimately the 
government must be supported to exercise the leadership role in 
coordination.”
28  
 
Carew-Reid suggests some different components to ensure the success of aid coordination. 
One is that the government empowers a central Ministry with the authority to establish 
coordination mechanisms and procedures. This Ministry may be the strategy secretariat or, 
even better, the official contact point for donors, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or 
Finance. The national planning authority, with its cross-sectoral role, could in some cases 
turn out to be the best choice. Furthermore, Carew-Reid recommends that donors should 
ensure that coordination is not undermined by lack of necessary capacity. Coordination 
activities often require special skills of synthesis and facilitation that are commonly lacking 
                                                 
27 Carew-Reid, Jeremy, Robert Prescott-Allen, Stephen Bass, and Barry Dalal-Clayton. Strategies for National 
Sustainable Development: A Handbook for their Planning and Implementation. 1995. 
http://www.nssd.net/references/Reid/ch01.htm (accessed November 15, 2005).  
28 Carew-Reid. 
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in the partner governments in the developing world. In addition to the previously mentioned 
role of the government, there is a possible and desirable role that could be played by the civil 
society in coordinating a country’s aid activities. There is a common perception that local 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private sector representatives also need to be 
brought into the aid coordination process at regular intervals.  
             Last but not least, the success of effective coordination depends greatly on the 
bilateral and multilateral donor agencies. Donors could do much to ease the role of the local 
government by improving information sharing among themselves on investment portfolios 
and policies, as well as producing evaluation reports and other analyses of the situation in the 
country. Donors should seek to minimize and simplify their interventions so that 
coordination by government is less burdensome.29 Most important, development practitioners 
as well as development theorists agree that donors should support and follow national aid 
coordination.          
                  Most bilateral and multilateral donors have shifted from providing their aid in 
form of smaller projects to providing support for larger sector programs. Consequently, 
donors have to be even more aware that their influential and often policy-interfering sector 
programs complement the overall national strategy.   
“An important aspect of donor coordination is division of financial 
assistance according to the sectoral preferences of the donors. This 
issue needs to be addressed early on. At the same time, donors should 
take care to ensure that dividing assistance by sectors does not reduce 
the cohesion of the overall strategy. Donors should integrate their aid 
or lending programmes into the priorities set by the strategy. 
Regardless of the preferences of donors, support is needed for the 
process, and for priority sectors as determined through the strategy.”30 
 
Sometimes, the schedule of the process has for some reason been compressed. As a result, a 
range of projects are produced as quickly as possible - usually too rapid for a coherent 
                                                 
29 Carew-Reid. 
30 Carew-Reid 
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strategy to be developed in a participatory manner. Other times, however, the donor simply 
ignores the national strategy. Furthermore, during the phase of implementation, there is a 
great danger of slipping back into a project approach or program approach, making it more 
difficult for the country to retain control of its overall national strategy.31  
 
The Role of the Local Government in the Coordination of Aid  
Many strategies and country-level frameworks have been developed to outline how donor aid 
activities should be coordinated.  
“It is recognized that strategies are a way of improving and integrating 
social, economic and environmental policies, and building national 
capacities to develop and implement such policies. But they can fulfill 
this role only if they are nationally-driven, participatory processes, and 
this takes time.”
32 
 
           As stated earlier, for many years, there has been a lack of country ownership with 
regards to the coordination process. DAC lists the many different reasons behind this 
deficiency: “Violent conflict (…), time pressures, the need to respond to external 
requirements, the adherence to labels, development agencies wanting their own processes 
and identifiable projects, lack of transparency and accountability in promoting these agendas, 
and limited capacity in-country.”33 In practice, when the local government is not efficient in 
coordinating aid activities or disagreement between donors and government arise on how to 
set the strategy, the result is often that the local institutions get bypassed, which might lead to 
‘policy and institutional inflation’ and an associated ‘capacity collapse’.
34
 
           Different concepts of the role of partner (recipient) countries have developed during 
the last decade: one is recipient responsibility (introduced by the Norwegian Foreign 
                                                 
31 Carew-Reid 
32 Carew-Reid 
33 Development Assistance Committee (DAC). “Informal Workshop on Poverty Reduction Strategies, 
Comprehensive Development Framework and National Strategies for Sustainable Development: Towards 
Convergence” (Paris: 29-29 November 2000.    
34 Development Assistance Committee, workshop 
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Ministry), and another one is partnership (more commonly used by donors). Recipient 
responsibility gives the bulk of ownership to the partner country, as partnership is imagined 
likely to become unequal, ultimately legitimizing too much donor interference in this case.35 
As a matter of fact, there are many difficulties pertaining to giving the partner governments 
the responsibility of setting their own agendas and priorities concerning aid activities in order 
to ensure that donor funding fits into those frameworks: 
“The partnership tends to be unequal as money comes from the public 
purse in donor countries and there will always be a requirement for 
some kind of accountability. (…) It is important to respect and build 
on countries’ existing processes and strategies, and help those to 
develop, even if they are not perfect. To do this development agencies 
need to loosen their control and take a longer-term perspective. 
Development agencies may subscribe to this type of argument but 
putting it into practice is still a frontier. There needs to be a partnership 
agreement based on transparency, accountability on both sides and 
joint monitoring.”
36   
 
It is important for the donors then to take on the role of facilitators, instead of manipulators 
of national strategies. Definitely, it is a massive problem when donors support different 
initiatives in countries that do not have the capacity to coordinate them. Thus capacity 
building in strategies, planning and design, in how to analyze, how to prioritize, and 
implement programs is highly recommended.  
Additionally, there are many other factors that influence whether a partner 
government takes on its responsibility in a partnership as a responsible recipient: political 
will of the government, the willingness of donors to step back, and the organizational 
capacity in the public sector to actually implement the program. The importance of these 
factors will be obvious in the case study.37 
                                                 
35 Disch, 14. 
36 Development Assistance Committee, workshop  
37 Disch, 14. 
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Stefan Oswald states that the German development institutions will focus on capacity 
building when the partners system and institutions are not sound enough to manage full 
responsibility for development activities.  
“Some partners, however, have considerable problems concerning 
capacity and resources. Local systems are not always sound. In these 
cases, German development policy relies on capacity-building. Due to 
specific experiences in technical cooperation, Germany can come up 
with valuable support to enhance local capacities.”
38
  
 
Generally speaking, the partnership phrase has become very dominant over the last decade, 
referring to a step in the direction of a more equitable relationship between donors and 
recipients. The concept stresses the centrality of the role of the partner government in such a 
relationship. However there is, as Arne Disch writes, “a serious gap between rhetoric and 
reality regarding the content of partnership concept where the resource rich partner has a 
particular responsibility for not dominating and taking over the relationship.”
39   
 
Case study – Egypt and the Environmental Sector Program  
The analysis of the case study is based on interviews supported by academic writings on the 
political system in Egypt as well as on the country’s bureaucracy. Knowledge of these fields 
helps us understand the kind of institutions, management structures, cultural heritage, work 
ethics, capacity and legacy of administration and political culture that effect the national aid 
coordination in Egypt.  
 The book Egyptian Politics – The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule by Maye Kassem 
provides a description of the political and institutional situation in contemporary Egypt. 
Kassem describes the case of contemporary Egypt as one where the formal “democratic” 
framework does not necessarily imply a change in the fundamental nature of authoritarian 
rule under President Hosni Mubarak. The author concludes that the position of the president 
                                                 
38 Oswald. 
39 Disch, 7. 
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as the ultimate source of power and authority is intact and that this personal authoritarian rule 
has become institutionalized in contemporary Egypt.40 This centralized characteristic of the 
Egyptian political system highly affects the degree of collaboration and coordination between 
Ministries as well as the limited use of a participatory approach to aid coordination.    
 The political system in Egypt is also characterized by the prevalence of weak 
institutions and organizations. Kassem stresses that certain tactics and policies adopted by the 
state over the years have been aimed at ensuring that these characteristics are preserved.41 
The consequences of weak institutions responsible for coordinating foreign aid will be 
obvious in the case study.   
The features of the Egyptian bureaucracy are clear when compared to Max Weber’s 
ideal bureaucracy. Therefore, original texts by Max Weber in Max Weber on Capitalism, 
Bureaucracy and Religion as well as an analysis of Max Weber’s ideal bureaucracy by 
Thomas Robb McDaniel; Two faces of Bureaucracy: A Study of the Bureaucratic 
phenomenon in the thought of Max Weber and Franz Kafka is used as comparison to the 
Egyptian bureaucracy: Weber’s bureaucracy is characterized by a standardized, categorical 
(rather than individual), impersonal (rather than personal), rule governed and efficient 
bureaucracy.42 The functions of the administrators and institutions in the Weberian 
bureaucratic organization differ from the Egyptian bureaucracy and political system. The 
difference is for example that the Weberian administrator is organized in a clearly defined 
“hierarchy of offices, (…) candidates are appointed (not elected) on the basis of technical 
qualifications assessed by examination and/or training, (…) and promotion is awarded by 
superiors on the basis of achievement and/or seniority.”
43 The Egyptian bureaucracy 
                                                 
40 Maye Kassem, Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule. (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2004), 167, 186. 
41 Kassem, 49. 
42 Thomas Robb McDaniel. 1992. Two faces of Bureaucracy: A Study of the Bureaucratic phenomenon in the 
thought of Max Weber and Franz Kafka, (Michigan: University Microfilms International (UMI), 1992), 35. 
43 McDaniel, 35-6. 
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functions in a more informal way than the ideal of the Weberian bureaucracy. For example, 
qualifications that are not essential for ones effectiveness in a bureaucracy - such as former 
military rank (which in Weber’s view are irrelevant for an administrators position in a 
bureaucracy) often plays a significant role in the way the Egyptian bureaucracy functions. 
Military ranks among bureaucrats make a parallel hierarchy of offices and administrators. 
Also, as a result of the strong client-patron networks in Egypt, candidates can more easily be 
elected and promoted as a result of their connections as opposed to technical qualifications. 
Such differences between Weber’s bureaucracy and the Egyptian bureaucracy also help 
explain the shape of national aid coordination in Egypt. 
 Background information for this research regarding Egypt’s environmental/ 
developmental challenges can be found in the recent World Bank report Arab Republic of 
Egypt – Country Environmental Analysis (1992-2002) from 2005.  
 
Methodology and Approaches 
National aid coordination is, one of many variables that affect the impact of aid programs. 
The arguments for focusing on this parameter in the present study are presented in this 
chapter. It has to be pointed out that the author does not believe that all aid programs would 
be beneficial by simply reaching their intended outcome. It is also acknowledged, that even 
well planned programs may have unintended consequences because the elements involved 
are complex as well as changing during the intervention.44 Another important point regarding 
the focus of this research is that many other essential factors apart from national aid 
coordination influence the impact of aid programs - on the donor’s as well as on the partner 
country’s side.  
                                                 
44 Thomas W. Dichter, Despite Good Intentions: Why Development Assistance to the Third World has Failed. 
(University of Massachusetts Press. 2003) 290. 
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On the donor’s side, many factors play a negative role on the impact of aid programs. 
First of all, the official goals of a program might not always be the primary goal seen from 
the donor’s perspective. Donors often have other agendas and priorities than promoting 
development such as commercial, political, strategic and economic interests e.g. to increase 
trade opportunities for donor country industries.45 This often decreases the developmental 
impact of the aid program, as the developmental aspect is not the main focus in the process. 
Also the fact that donor organizations need to disburse a lot of money can shift the focus of 
some donor agencies from working towards the proclaimed developmental outcomes to focus 
on disbursements.46 Other factors that can cause a program not to achieve its intended 
outcomes are lack of knowledge of the country when designing the program, lack of know-
how in the process of implementation, poor fitting of a ‘best practice’ model to the local 
context, deficient use of the participatory approach, or unqualified people in charge of the 
program.       
 At the partner country level, many different social, political, and economic contexts 
hinder the aid programs from reaching their intended outcomes.47 For example, Rider 
declares corruption to be one of the main reasons for the outcome of aid programs to be less 
successful than anticipated.48 Lack of willingness and interests in the political system to deal 
with poverty reduction and development, lack of capacity to implement aid programs and 
lack of funding to sustain a program’s activities are some of the other local factors that can 
cause a disappointing outcome of an aid program. Many of these factors will be discussed in 
the research as they influence national aid coordination.  
In writing this thesis, advantage was taken of the availability of several primary 
sources. The primary sources included a number of national documents on coordination in 
                                                 
45 Arvin, 134. 
46 Dichter, 291. 
47 OECD. Environmental Fiscal Reform for Poverty Reduction. (DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, OECD 
Publishing. 2005), 51. 
48 Rider, Barry (ed.). Corruption: The Enemy Within. (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2003), 291. 
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Egypt, ESP program documents, as well as conducted interviews. The theoretical framework 
consisted of a variety of theories of coordination of aid from the aid literature, which were 
applied in the analysis of the empirical case study of national coordination of the ESP in 
Egypt. The methodology used was therefore deductive, since relevant theoretical work was 
tested in practice by using interviews and other primary sources. The theories were about the 
strength of national aid coordination and its constructive affect on accomplishing the 
intended impact of aid programs. The dependent variable is consequently the intended impact 
of aid programs and the independent variable is national aid coordination. The methodology 
is consequently qualitative, since the national aid coordination in Egypt was analyzed by 
using the conducted interviews and primary documents from Ministries. 
 The reasons for choosing the Danish International Development Assistance (Danida) 
funded aid program “Environmental Sector Program” in Egypt as the case study are 
attributed to the fact that Egypt portrays an example of a developing country that receives a 
massive amount of aid, yet faces enormous problems and dilemmas relating to national aid 
coordination. Because research on Egypt’s national aid coordination was very limited, an 
analysis of these problems and issues could be useful to improve the intended impact of the 
country’s aid programs. One additional reason for choosing this particular program was the 
fact that it displays an immense amount of challenges pertaining to aid coordination, 
especially when it comes to the collaboration of donors with the Egyptian authorities. Lack 
of environmental coordination by the Egyptian authorities was probably one of the reasons 
for the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs choosing to phase out the program by 2008. 
Furthermore, the ESP, which is the biggest environmental aid program in Egypt,49 is a 
complex environmental program that was designed to work on a multitude of levels. Such an 
enormous program can illustrate a large number of aspects of national aid coordination. 
                                                 
49(ESP Coordinator, EEAA) 
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Furthermore, the Egyptian Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs (MSEA) that 
implements the ESP is a crosscutting Ministry of State in Egypt. The MSEA is a relatively 
weak Ministry compared to bigger, richer, and older Ministries, which makes the MSEA 
even more dependent on national coordination as it implements most of its policies through 
other Ministries. Additionally, the ESP program was running in its second-half phase, 
meaning that many adjustments and changes of the program already had been undertaken. 
Yet, it was not finished, so it was possible to find energetic employees to interview. 
The method by which the impact of the national aid coordination on the ESP was 
analyzed was to investigate how the program was working internally and externally – that is, 
as a program in itself and as a component in Egypt’s overall environmental activities and 
policies. By examining the past and present challenges and difficulties of the program’s 
ongoing implementation it could be asserted how national aid coordination affects the 
implementation and output of the program.  
To protect the many persons that were kind enough to allow me an interview and to 
share critical observations and interpretations in the interviews, their names are kept 
confidential. In the reference footnotes, the interviewed persons are therefore referred to with 
numbers instead of names and positions. The first number of each reference indicates which 
sector or institution the interviewee is from. Table 1 below provides the key for each entity. 
The numbers after these respective initial numbers serve to distinguish between the 
interviewees. 
Ministry/Donor agency Key 
MoP 1 
MIC 2 
MSEA/EEAA 3 
Private environmental sector, environmental NGOs 4 
Donor organizations in Cairo 5 
Table 1: Key of each of the entities that interviewees can be coming from, which is used in footnote 
references. 
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The formally arranged meetings with senior officials in governmental authorities as 
well as donor organizations provided me with more than 50 hours of interviews. Many of the 
formal interviews were afterwards followed-up by informal meetings, emails and telephone 
calls to clarify unresolved issues. Senior personnel in the Ministry of State for Environmental 
Affairs, the Ministry of International Cooperation, the Ministry of Planning as well as key 
players in the donor community, civil society and the private sector provided a broad and at 
the same time in-depth practical understanding of the subject. In addition, the interviewees 
provided access to necessary empirical written material. I am very grateful for the time all 
these people devoted to me. Without their effort it would not have been possible to write this 
thesis.  
The interviews in the Ministry of Environmental Affairs were mostly conducted in 
English. Three interviews were conducted in Danish, as it was the preferred language of the 
Danida advisors and consultants. In two interviews in the MIC and the MoP, the Egyptian 
interviewees had a translator by their side, in case of any language barriers. All interviewees 
but the two that brought with them translators spoke perfect English. 
 
Scientific Precautions  
The interpretations of the oral responses to the answers that are raised in this research 
investigation with regards to the two hypotheses and the research questions have some 
limitations. First of all, the interviewees might have been less frank and honest in the 
interviews to hide weaknesses and deficiencies in national coordination in Egypt, due to the 
fact that they could be criticized by superiors for showing weaknesses of Egypt’s use of 
donor funds. Also, coming from a donor country I might have been perceived as someone 
who could have connections to or being a representative of the Danish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and therefore negative information about the conditions of national aid coordination 
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in one of Denmark’s partner countries could have negative consequences for the future 
support coming from the Danish side. I tried to avoid the anxiety by introducing myself in a 
letter to all interviewees as someone who would like to understand the scope of national 
coordination in a developing country, and not an authority that was going to evaluate. 
Furthermore, statements brought forward by the interviewees are quoted 
anonymously in this research. My supervisor, Dr. Vikash Yadav, gave the permission to 
leave the names out of the final paper after having seen the names, titles and affiliations of all 
the interviewees. This should protect the interviewees from any negative consequences. As 
previously stated, the topic of national coordination is somehow sensitive when it comes to 
scrutinizing what is working and what is not.   
 To find out if answers and responses from my primary sources were truthful, I have 
when at all possible checked the views given with other interviewees. Also, I have tried to 
find concrete proofs and examples of the issues that were dealt with in the context of these 
interviews. This was made possible based on the available national plans and ESP 
documents. The information provided by the interviewees is also either backed up or argued 
against by academic writings on specific Egyptian issues. 
 Although the topic of this research investigation is rather difficult to get a clear view 
of, it is my thought, that an independent additional research investigation would reach the 
same conclusions if doing research in the area of aid coordination in Egypt. If this kind of 
research was taken on in different countries, other kinds of dilemmas and challenges of 
coordination would show up and the detailed conclusions might thus be different. 
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CHAPTER 2 
National Coordination of Aid in Egypt 
 
In this chapter I have examined whether and how the Egyptian authorities in general 
undertake planning and coordination of aid.50 In essence, aid coordination is the planning and 
the procurement by a partner government of aid from its donors, and its integration into 
national development goals and strategies.51 The process of aid coordination is planning 
international assistance so that it supports national goals, priorities and strategies, whilst 
avoiding duplication and overlapping efforts as well as minimizing the burden of aid 
integration into recipient institutions.52 
In Egypt, the tasks and processes of aid coordination undertaken by the Egyptian 
authorities have been delegated to the Ministry of Planning (MoP) and the Ministry of 
International Cooperation (MIC). Also, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) plays a role in the 
national coordination process. However, the MoF plays a minor role in comparison to the 
Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of International Cooperation. Focus will therefore be 
on the latter two Ministries.  
 
Before focusing on the Egyptian authorities’ coordination of aid, a brief account is given of 
the extent of aid and presence of donors in Egypt. This provides an overview of the potential 
need for coordination. The needed tools for national coordination of aid include plans, 
budgets, operations, institutions, and capacities.53 In the following section, the official plans, 
strategies and visions for development in Egypt are presented, since these are the key tools 
for national aid coordination. Firstly, the Ministry of Planning (MoP) is introduced, which is 
                                                 
50 This chapter is, to the best knowledge of the author, the first overview and analysis of the Egyptian 
authorities’ role in aid coordination. Many interviewees have helped providing the full picture of a field that has 
been, more or less, untapped. It is noteworthy here that the interviewees are not responsible for the author’s 
interpretation or conclusions.     
51 UNDP, ii. 
52 UNDP, 4. 
53 UNDP, ii. 
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the primary institution for national planning in Egypt. In the second half of this chapter, the 
role of the Ministry of International Cooperation (MIC) in coordinating aid activities is 
described and analyzed. 
In each of this chapter’s sub categories, the research distinguishes between the 
official policies and formalities of the Egyptian government with regards to aid coordination 
as opposed to actual real life practices. The information derived concerning each Ministry 
was obtained both through interviews of internal employees in the Ministries as well as of 
external parties. Furthermore, secondary sources on Egypt were used to explain the state of 
national aid coordination. This research provided an overview of the official structure and 
actual activities of the Egyptian administration, focusing on the degrees of coordination 
undertaken on different administrative levels.  
 
Aid activities in Egypt  
A brief account of the extent of foreign aid and its distribution in Egypt is provided to show 
the concrete need for coordination. Total disbursement of official development assistance 
(ODA) to Egypt in 2002 was US$1,552.1 million, a drop of 4 percent as compared to 2001. 
In 2003 there was a reduction by 2 percent in contrast to 2002. Assistance per capita dropped 
to US$22.4 in 2003, from US$23.3 in 2002 and US$24.9 in 2001. This decrease over the last 
three years is partly due to the decline in total disbursements and partly due to the 1.8 percent 
annual population growth.54  
                                                 
54 Ministry of International Cooperation. Development Cooperation Report 2003. (Egypt: Ministry of 
International Cooperation, 2005), 10. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of ODA by Type of Donor Organisation, 2001-2003.55  
 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of ODA by type of donor organization. Bilateral donors gave 
the largest proportion of ODA to Egypt in 2002. Accordingly, most aid activities in Egypt are 
implemented by individual donors, increasing the need for coordination. 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of ODA Disbursement by Donor, 2003.56  
 
The concrete distribution of ODA disbursement by donor organizations is shown in 
Figure 2. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) maintains its 
                                                 
55 Ministry of International Cooperation. “Development Cooperation Report 2003”. 13. 
56 Ministry of International Cooperation. “Development Cooperation Report 2003”. 11. 
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top rank despite a 32% drop in its disbursement from 2002 to 2003, which is partly due to 
USAID’s plan to reduce aid to Egypt by 5% annually as agreed with the Government of 
Egypt (GoE).57  
 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of ODA Disbursements by Main Sectors, throughout the period 2001-2003.58  
 
Figure 3 shows the ODA disbursement to different sectors in 2003. It is difficult to assess 
whether this distribution of funds reflects national strategies or donor priorities, since the 
authorities have yet not provided clear national priorities. 
    
                                                 
57 Ministry of International Cooperation. “Development Cooperation Report 2003”. 10. 
58 Ministry of International Cooperation. “Development Cooperation Report 2003”. 13. 
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Figure 4: Distribution of ODA Disbursements by Geographic Location, 200359. 
 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of ODA disbursement according to geographic 
location in 2003. Obviously there is an unequal regional distribution of donor funds. MIC has 
requested donors to compensate for the uneven distribution in their future assistance.60  
 
Plans, Visions and Strategies for Development and the Environment in Egypt  
The governmental plans below are the tools for national coordination in Egypt. As the 
Minister of Planning stressed in the introduction to The Economic and Social Development 
Plan for 2003/2004:  
“The effectuation of development planning efforts through proper coordination and 
cooperation among all stakeholders will ensure better living conditions for Egyptian people 
and prosperity future for Egypt under the leadership of President/Mohamed Hosni 
Mubarak.”
61  
 
                                                 
59 Ministry of International Cooperation. “Development Cooperation Report 2003”. 24. 
60 Ministry of International Cooperation. “Development Cooperation Report 2003”. 11. 
61 Ministry of Planning. The Economic and Social Development Plan (2003-2004). (Egypt: 2003). 
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Governmental as well as donor-produced visions, plans and strategies for development in 
Egypt are provided below. Each document is briefly introduced with regard to development 
objectives, the function of the particular publication and their in-between relations. The 
numerous list of national plans show that the authorities in Egypt – the Ministry of Planning - 
undertake formal and structured regular initiatives to produce a tool enabling coordination of 
Egypt’s national cross-sectoral development, whereas the MSEA produces the plans for the 
environmental field. Still this does not necessary imply that proper development planning 
takes place or that the documents are used in practice. This will be dealt with in the analysis, 
in which most of the listed documents will be referred to. The list below also functions as an 
overview that shows the most recent 2004 updates concerning donors (WB, United Nations 
(UN) and the African Development Bank (ADB)) assisting Egypt in making development 
strategies.   
 
1992: “The National Environmental Action Plan” (First NEAP) 
By multiple donors and the MSEA  
This first NEAP was a consequence of the demands of donors and donor strategies and 
programs. The first NEAP has been criticized by civil society and employees in EEAA62 for 
not responding to Egypt’s real environmental problems. Accordingly, in 2002 when MSEA 
had matured another NEAP made with UNDP assistance was provided.63  
 
1997: The long-term socio-economic development plan, known as “Vision 2017” 
By the MoP. 
In the document entitled “Egypt and the 21st Century,” the GoE sets forth the general 
orientation and projected targets for the next two decades. This long-term action plan stresses 
                                                 
62 (3.10, 4.1) 
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human development, with particular emphasis on education, healthcare, and the role of 
women. Also underlined are the importance of the rule of law, the centrality of the private 
sector and civil society, the endeavor towards an information-based community, and 
conservation of water and the environment.64 The new document Vision 2022, was made 
under the former Prime Minister Dr. Kamal El Ganzouri has now replaced Vision 2017 as a 
general framework for donor interventions.65 Vision 2017 and Vision 2022 do not contradict; 
the latter vision is only an extension to the first vision and a plan for five more years.66 
Vision 2022 is referred to in the MoP plans, whereas Vision 2017 – the previous Vision 
document - is referred to in both the MIC’s DCR 2002 from April 2005 as well as in the 
latest DRC 2003 published in November 2005. It does not seem promising that the MIC uses 
the old Vision 2017 as the guide for Egypt’s long term development priorities when sources 
within the MIC have informed that the vision 2017 of the former government has been 
replaced with Vision 2022.67 
 
2001/2: “Long Term Development Vision 2022” 
By the MoP.  
This document functions theoretically as the current ‘policy framework and long-term 
development visions’ in Egypt.68 The plan was made under the current government headed 
by Prime Minister Dr. Atef Ebeid.69 The 5-year medium-term plans and annual plans are 
implemented within this vision.70 The Vision outlines the Government’s strategy for 
                                                 
64 Ministry of International Cooperation. “Development Cooperation Report 2003”, 5. 
65 (2.2, 2.5) 
66 (2.5) 
67 Ministry of International Cooperation. “Development Cooperation Report 2002”.  
68 UNDP, 29. 
69 (2.2) 
70 African Development Bank. Arab Republic of Egypt 2005-2009 Country Strategy Paper (African 
Development Bank, Country Operation Department: 2004), 21. 
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modernizing and integrating Egypt into the global economy through the process of 
diversification and private sector-led economic growth.71  
The above two tools for national coordination show that Egypt has had quite 
extensive experience in the field of planning and visions. Also, its existence means that there 
is a policy framework and long-term development visions in the country, at least at official 
level. According to senior officials in MIC both Vision 2017 and Vision 2022 are kept in 
MoP and the documents are not distributed to any Ministries.72 
 
2002: “Poverty Reduction in Egypt: Diagnosis and Strategy” 
By the MoP and the WB. 
This report provides a diagnosis of poverty in Egypt, and aims to provide the foundation of a 
future poverty reduction strategy.73 It is an example of the Egyptian planning authorities' 
willingness to collaborate with a major donor, who has experience in the field of poverty 
reduction.  
 
2002: “The Fifth Five-Year Plan74 for Socio-Economic Development (2002-2007) & First 
Year”,  
By the MoP. 
The current medium-term plan called “The Fifth Five-Year Plan for Socio-Economic 
Development (2002-2007) & First Year” is divided as follows: It starts by summarizing the 
Long-term Vision 2022 and continues by making a brief follow-up and evaluation of the 
previous Five-year plan (1997-2002) providing indicators for the changes that took place in 
the areas of concern regarding Egypt’s comprehensive development. After this the Five-Year 
                                                 
71 Refer to Appendix A for detailed objectives 
72 (2.5) 
73 Ministry of Planning and the World Bank, Arab Republic of Egypt – A Poverty 
Reduction Strategy for Egypt (The World Bank, 2004), v. 
74 (The MoP produced the first Five Year Plan in 1982). 
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Plan (2002-2007) is described, briefly outlining its strategy75 and objectives followed by a 
relatively longer part on Economic Development; Population and Human Development; and 
Spatial Development. Lastly, in the part Sectoral Development, the plan provides an 
overview of certain specific sectors. The Plan emphasizes on economic development and 
does not make strong emphasis on sustainable development as the environmental plans do.    
 
2002: “Fifth Five-Year Plan (2002-2007)” [first environmental five-year plan] 
By the Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs, Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency. 
This small document (19 pages) states the goals of the MSEA/EEAA’s summarized in the 
strategic goal: 
“Incorporating the environmental dimensions within development policy, national plans, 
programs, projects, and public practices to ensure sustainable development through 
controlling and reducing pollution sources to protect the public health, natural resources, and 
promoting environmental awareness for all categories of society.”
76 
The Plan emphasizes sustainable development.  
 
2002, Jan: “The National Environmental Action Plan 2002-2017” (NEAP) 
By the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA), UNDP, and Capacity 21 Program 
Officially, all Ministries participated in this NEAP and it became obligatory to the whole 
GoE. Critics have argued that the NEAP is not a plan, but more of a statement and a 
proclamation of intentions and wishes as there are no priorities, timelines and budgets that 
would set milestones and make it a detailed implementation plan to follow.77  
 
                                                 
75 Refer to Appendix A for details. 
76 Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs/Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency, “Fifth 5-Year Plan 
(2002-2007)”, 1.  
77 (3.12, 4.1, 4.2) 
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2003: “The Economic and Social Development Plan for 2003/2004”  
By the MoP.  
This one-year plan (the latest version of a one-year plan available in English) is designed 
within the general framework of the Fifth Five-Year Plan (2002-2007), in accordance with 
the long-term development vision until 2022. The 57 page long plan focuses on three kinds 
of development: economic, human, and spatial development and launches ten investment 
programs.78 The plan functions theoretically as the national document that provides ‘national 
priorities and strategies’.79 The focus of this document is devoted to means to seek recovery 
from the current economic slow-down.80 
The plan’s chapter on Human Development provides objectives and policies relating 
to the environment, although the environment was only mentioned once in the five-year plan 
(2002-2007). The plan says: “Environment has become a vital component in Egypt’s 
sustainable development.”
81 The main objectives in relation to the environment are: 
improving air quality; protecting the River Nile from pollution; protecting nature and 
preserving biological diversification; expanding green areas and tree plantation; and 
increasing public environmental awareness. The policies in achieving the objectives are 
based on a pro-active approach, seeking to prevent pollution and environmental deterioration. 
The first two policies mentioned to attain this is strengthening the environment management 
systems and supporting the institutional capabilities of Environmental Affairs Authority and 
its regional branches.82 
The plan’s prioritizations in the field of environment is perfectly in line with the objectives 
proclaimed in the Fifth 5-Year Plan (2002-2007) [Environment] the year before.  
                                                 
78 Subsequently, ten new programs, which were launched by the Prime Minister in 2004, seem to have replaced 
these investment programs.   
79 UNDP, 29-30. 
80 Refer to Appendix A for details 
81 Ministry of Planning. The Economic and Social Development Plan (2003-2004). (Egypt: 2003), 33). 
82 Ministry of Planning. “The Economic and Social Development Plan (2003-2004)”, 33. 
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2004, Sep: “Arab Republic of Egypt, A Poverty Reduction Strategy for Egypt” 
By the MoP and the WB. 
This document provides the outline of a strategy for reducing poverty, contributing to the 
refinement of a strategy to meet the objective “alleviation of poverty and attenuation of 
income disparities” from Egypt’s long-run development plan (through 2022).83  
This constitutes a positive example of donor alignment to national plans and agendas. 
 
2004: “Millennium Development Goals – Second Country Report”  
By the MoP and the UN. 
This report tackles how far Egypt has gone in reaching its development goals within the 
MDGs areas. Economic growth – seemingly the focus of the Five-year plan – is in this report 
regarded as “a key factor in creating a supportive environment for achievement of the 
goals.”
84  
The MIC writes in its DCR from 2002 that the MDGs represent a guiding framework for the 
development priorities and targets for all countries. Egypt’s “2017 Vision” may encompass 
some of the development concerns postulated in the MDGs however, certainly does not 
encompass all.85  
The pace of progress at achieving the MDGs varies between areas. Environmental as 
well as partnership-related MDGs are mentioned as areas where progress is comparatively 
slow. This report could play a strong agenda-setting role in the future regarding the priorities 
of GoE and MoP, as there is much focus on the MDGs from the international community. 
This might show in the coming five-year plan.  
                                                 
83 Ministry of Planning and the World Bank, v. 
84 United Nations, and Ministry of Planning. Millennium Development Goals – Second Country Report Egypt 
2004. (Egypt: 2005), 5. 
85 Ministry of International Cooperation. “Development Cooperation Report 2002”. 7. 
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2004, Dec: “Arab Republic of Egypt – 2005-2009 Country Strategy Paper”  
By The African Development Bank. 
The objective of the African Development Bank’s (ADB) assistance strategy to Egypt is to 
support the implementation of Government’s Development Agenda in the vision 2022
86. This 
could be another positive example of donor alignment to national plans and agendas. 
 
2004, Dec: “Governmental Statement to the People’s Assembly”  
By Dr. Ahmed Nazif, The Prime Minister.  
As a consequence of the vision 2017 being very general, more specific action plans remained 
essential. Egyptian Prime Minister Dr. Ahmed Nazif, in a December 2004 statement before 
the People’s Assembly, delineated a comprehensive plan to guide GoE policy. This scheme 
comprises ten inclusive developmental programs and a number of specific measures that the 
government has prepared and already has started to execute. In the DCR 2003 from 
November 2005 the MIC announces that these ten programs and targets should assist 
aligning donor interventions to GoE priorities and goals.87 The eighth program is called 
“Protection of Natural Resources” and its objective is to achieve sustainable development, 
create environmental balance and efficiently use natural wealth.88 
This speech could indicate that the agenda of sustainable development coming from 
the MSEA/EEAA and the international community is influencing the national priorities and 
plans in Egypt. It indicates that, at the official level, there is a notion of sustainability and 
holistic approaches when it comes to developmental plans and strategies.  
   
May 2005: “Report on the State of the Environment in Egypt” 
                                                 
86 African Development Bank. “Arab Republic of Egypt 2005-2009 Country Strategy Paper”,  i. 
87 Ministry of International Cooperation. “Development Cooperation Report 2003”, 6. 
88
Ahmed Nazif, “Governmental Statement to the People’s Assembly,” 30-32. 
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By the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA) (yet only available in Arabic) 
The Law 4 from 1994 states that this report should be produced annually to be presented to 
Parliament, it should work as the foundation for an action plan.  
 
2005: “Socio and Economic Development Plan 2005/2006”  
By the MoP (yet only available in Arabic)  
This is the current annual plan. 
 
Expected Plans 
The third stage of collaboration between GoE and the World Bank is expected to bring along 
a more detailed poverty reduction action plan/Anti-poverty plan, made in collaboration 
between the GoE and international development agencies.89 The donor community in Egypt 
has requested that the GoE formulate an anti-poverty plan of actions that identifies the targets 
and policy measures.90 Also, the MSEA is (at least officially) expected to publish “The State 
of the Environment Report”, which should have been published annually since 1995. The 
report should provide the necessary environmental information, on which national 
environmental policies can be based.91  
 
Ministry of Planning 
This section presents the official processes involved in governmental policy making and an 
analysis of this process in practice and the problems pertaining to it. The processes are 
essentially the responsibility of the Ministry of Planning. The three main official plans and 
subsequent analyses of them are discussed. As the MoP plays a minimal role in the execution 
of the plans when it comes to foreign aid, the next section focuses on the official financial 
                                                 
89 Ministry of Planning and the World Bank, v. 
90 Ministry of International Cooperation. “Development Cooperation Report 2002”, 7. 
91 Tarek Genena, A Consultant Report on the Country Environmental Analysis (CEA). (Egypt: 2003), 53. 
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follow up on donor activities, which is yet another responsibility of MoP. Lastly, the question 
on partnership between the donor and GoE in form of MoP is tackled, looking at the official 
policy as well as the practical implementation.  
 
The Ministry of Planning plays the most important role in the process of outlining 
developmental plans. However, the larger context or framework of the production of a plan 
involves four entities, whose functions are summarized below:  
1. Every line Ministry/agency is asked yearly by the MoP to provide proposals of 
activities that the entity would like to have included in the plan for the coming year.  
2. The MoP meets with MIC and the MoF in the so-called Steering Committee to study 
and analyze the proposals. Hereafter, the MoP consults the Cabinet discussing  
possible modifications of the plan. 
3. The Cabinet receives the plan, and in subsequent discussions between the two  
entities, amendments to the plan are made from both sides. The Ministry of Planning 
selects the appropriate alternatives and sends it to Parliament for discussion and 
approval.  
4. Finally the Parliament discusses and approves the plan92.  
 
Goals, Visions and Objectives 
The Ministry of Planning, one of the oldest government Ministries, was founded in the sixties 
by President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The Ministry has many obligations; it shall “support, 
promote and evaluate investments” and “conduct economic and financial research and 
studies required for the planning process”. The MoP’s primary role is to “prepare and follow 
up [with the national] development plan”. In a presentation produced by the Ministry, it is 
                                                 
92 Ministry of Planning, Activation of the Planning Process, (A PowerPoint Presentation by Ministry of 
Planning), slide 6. 
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stated that the three duties of the MoP are to prepare socio-economic development plans, 
follow up socio-economic development plans, and prepare studies, research and statistics.93 
To be able to keep track of all the concrete projects in Egypt, the MoP has an extensive 
internal document where the approximately 10,000 activities are listed. This document is 
referred to as the Technical Plan. 
It is the aim of this following part to describe and examine the quality of the socio-
economic development plans presented above and to discuss their viability in the context of 
the developmental equation. Note that in the following section plans will refer to the yearly 
or five-year socio-economic development plans. 
 
The Process of Making Plans 
Official Procedure  
The MoP collaborates with many different entities when producing the national development 
plan. Firstly, the MoP works closely together with two other national planning institutions to 
formulate the strategies and objectives of the developmental plan. One of these entities is the 
National Planning Institute (NPI). The NPI’s role is to conduct planning research and studies 
related to the national plan and implementation methodology, and apply these principles and 
methods to achieve the national targets.94 The second entity closely involved in the process 
of making a plan is the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistic (CAPMAS). 
CAPMAS’ role is to collect required statistics for the government. In addition to this, 
CAPMAS conducts population census and various economic and social statistics for all 
                                                 
93 Ministry of Planning, “Activation of the Planning Process”, A PowerPoint Presentation by Ministry of 
Planning, slide 2, 5. 
94 Ministry of Planning, “Activation of the Planning Process”, A PowerPoint Presentation by Ministry of 
Planning, slide 2. 
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variables.95 Both institutions are furthermore in charge of training government staff in 
national planning skills. 
Figure 5 shows a model illustrating the structure of the planning process centered on 
the MoP. The MoP has provided the “Planning Institutions Data and Information Flow 
Chart.”
96 
 
 
Figure 5: Planning Institutions Data and Information Flow Chart. 97 
 
The process of making a plan begins with the MoP consulting line Ministries 
(Executive Bodies) to deliver a so-called ‘wish list’ in October. The wish list contains all 
projects and project-proposals that each line Ministry would like to have included in the 
                                                 
95 Ministry of Planning, “Activation of the Planning Process”, A PowerPoint Presentation by Ministry of 
Planning, slide 2. 
96 Ministry of Planning, “Activation of the Planning Process”, A PowerPoint Presentation by Ministry of 
Planning, slide 3. 
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technical plan and receive funding for. Based on this and the response from the MoF 
(National Investment Bank (NIB)), the MoP makes a preliminary budget for the coming year 
with a list of all the projects it wants to implement. To make the plan, the MoP measures 
socio-economic development inputs and outputs depending on the following kind of 
indicators: basic indicators necessary to prepare the plan (e.g. saving rate and production 
structure), economic efficiency indicators (e.g. evaluation of balance of payments and of self-
sufficiency rate) and human development indicators (e.g. human development index).”
98  
The MoP, MoF, and the MIC (MOIC) then meet in the “Steering Committee”, in 
order to agree upon what projects and programs in the shape of both grants and loans should 
be put into action and thus included in the technical plan. According to the MoP, the Steering 
Committee consists of Assistants to Ministers and is the core forum where the national 
planning (prioritization of projects and programs, goals, strategies) officially takes place.  
According to all interviewees in the MoP and the MIC, this committee meets 
regularly. However, no single interviewee would/could say how often. In the Steering 
Committee, the MoP provides the yearly and five-year socio-economic development plans as 
well as the accompanying technical plan that are made in accordance with Vision 2022 
(which will be explained below). The MoF decides how many of the projects in the plan it is 
able to finance, and the MIC is thereafter supposed to get external donor funding for the last 
projects that are agreed upon but which there is not enough national funding for. Normally 
the technical plan reaches Parliament in January, and is approved by Parliament in April, in 
due time for the new fiscal year which starts in July in Egypt.99 
 
                                                 
98 Ministry of Planning, “Activation of the Planning Process”, A PowerPoint Presentation by Ministry of 
Planning, slide 8. 
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Analysis of Ministry of Planning 
After providing the structural, institutional and functional account of the national planning in 
Egypt it is important to scrutinize how the process of making plans takes place in reality. The 
quality and efficiency of the process is worth examining with regard to human and technical 
resources as well as the structural setup.  
 
Planning - Aspects of Concern  
In the following sections five main aspects of concern are investigated: the quality of data in 
the analysis in MoP; national capacity to make plans and program proposals; ownership in 
the planning process; the economic issues; and finally the information about and promotion 
of the plans. 
 
The quality of data in the analysis in MoP 
The MoP depends on a variety of indicators to make the plan.100 However, the interviewee in 
MoP said that only approximately 75% of the information provided by the line Ministries is 
accurate. Also, the information conveyed by the CAPMAS and the National Planning 
Institute is insufficient since the CAPMAS only publishes statistics every 5 years, and as 
such there are only random samples available for use as indicators in the planning process in 
the interval in between. The source at the MoP also asserted that the statistics are not always 
correct (which is common knowledge in academic circles in Cairo). In addition to this, it is 
difficult to obtain data from the private sector, which often uses different indicators, making 
the need for data correction a complicated task for the MoP. Obviously, the lack of proper 
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and regular statistics, which is the foundation of decision-making, complicates and 
deteriorates the planning process.101  
 
National capacity to make plans and program proposals 
Despite the issue of quality of data available to the MoP, one could question whether the 
needed strategic capacity in the form of knowledge and experience of developmental 
strategies is in place. In fact, the interviewees in MoP described the planning process in MoP 
as just following the priorities from the individual line Ministries.102 A more profitable 
approach to national coordination would be if a core Ministry would consult with all the line 
Ministries and identify key challenges, which should then be solved in a holistic manner, 
producing synergy between sector activities103. It is worth questioning how much beneficial 
planning actually takes place when the MoP develops the socio-economic and technical 
plans.  
In the technical plan, a number identifies each project. However, a former employee 
in the MoP stated, that a project’s title is so loose that it can contain many activities. The 
project title and its number can refer to a project’s appraisal, a project document or a kind of 
project.104 This means that it is fairly easy for the donors to achieve their respective agendas 
by having their proposed aid programs accepted somewhere in the technical plan.  
Likewise, critique from a former employee indicated the lack of specific 
correspondence between planned projects/programs in the technical plan and the socio-
economic development plans within neither the one, five nor twenty year’s plans.
105 There 
was also little information provided which could indicate and ensure that the accomplished 
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activities are in coherence with the plans.106 The source that formerly worked in the MoP did 
not expect that any real comparison between intended and accomplished activities at the 
program level took place.107      
It was very difficult to get any precise information concerning the Steering 
Committee and its functions. Outside sources describe the process as ad hoc, to some extent 
arbitrary, with no transparency in the decision-making process.108 This manner of national 
prioritization is typical for developing countries.109  
 
There is a problem of writing capacity in the line Ministries. The needed capacity to send 
proper proposals to the MoP is at times lacking. This means that projects that should have 
priority according to the line Ministry’s wishes for that reason will not be included in the 
plan by MoP because the concrete project/program is not well-presented. External 
interviewees from a line Ministry stressed this issue as one of the key problems in making 
bottom-up planning.110 One member of civil society questioned how the MoP should be 
capable of making good overall planning and coordination, when other Ministries are not 
themselves capable of proper planning.111  
Thus lack of planning, strategic and communication capacity on both sectoral and 
central governmental levels deteriorate the national coordination of aid activities. 
 
Ownership in the planning process 
The question arises whether the Egyptian government has ownership of its aid priorities at 
all. The overall frameworks and priorities of the UN represented via the MDGs, in addition 
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to the strategies of the WB, the IMF and OECD DAC very much influence the national 
development agenda in developing countries. In Egypt, the priorities of the ODA are in fact 
shaped by such external entities. For example, the Millennium Development Goals Second 
Country Report issued by the UN and the MoP illustrates that the international community to 
a large extent sets the priorities in Egypt. These priorities are likely to be followed by 
national authorities because of their focus by the international donor community. Already, 
MIC states in the DCR 2003 that there has been a 35% increase in the total ODA 
disbursement to MDGs from 2001 to 2003.  
At the same time, according to the MIC, the recent years of donor assistance show 
signs of aid disbursement increasingly aligning to local needs and priorities determined by 
partner countries. This means that the donors are shifting away from setting policies for 
recipient countries, and towards building partnerships with governments, civil society, and 
other stakeholders.112 In the MIC’s Development Cooperation Report 2002, the MIC writes: 
“For Egypt, development trends are shaped primarily by its national objectives but also 
influenced by major donor priorities.”
113 The donors’ priorities vary over time according to 
political, economic and social concerns at the particular time. However, the era where 
individual donors set different priorities for partner governments is likely to have been 
substituted by an influential international aid agenda – mostly shaped by donors. 
Several positive developments in the case of Egypt are to be emphasized. The report 
by the MoP and the WB “Arab Republic of Egypt, A Poverty Reduction Strategy for Egypt” 
and the report by The African Development Bank “Arab Republic of Egypt – 2005-2009 
Country Strategy Paper” clearly illustrate the tendency of single donors aligning to national 
priorities. Both reports intend to support the implementation of GoE’s Vision 2022.  
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Thus, it appears that while the international donor community has great influence on 
Egypt’s aid allocation, there is simultaneously a tendency of donors aligning to national 
visions. 
 
Economic Issues 
When asked about the biggest problem for the MoP in the planning process, a source in the 
MoP stated that the weakest link in the chain of aid prioritizing in Egypt is the lack of 
sufficient domestic financial support of foreign projects and programs.114 Often donors 
require that the Egyptian state place its own money in an 80% donor funded project to create 
local ownership and responsibility for the particular project. However, this condition makes it 
hard for the Egyptian state to obtain the most needed projects from donors. The lack of 
national resources can easily be envisioned to deteriorate a planning process of aid. A highly 
prioritized program may not be implemented because the national part of the funding cannot 
be provided.  
 This conditionality of national funds being allocated to aid programs hereby shows its 
infliction on the degree of ownership of national planning.  
  
Information about and Promotion of the Plans 
According to interviews of senior staff in MoP, it is clear that the MoP formally is 
responsible for preparation and follow-up on a development plan. However, no interviewees 
outside MoP and MIC said they could sense that national plans actually existed, and if so that 
they were indeed being used. All interviewees from the donor community, the civil society, 
and the private sector were entirely unaware of the existence of the annual and five-year 
plans. Apparently, the level of knowledge with regards to national coordination is very low, 
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which seems to be an indicator of low coordination and partnership in practice. This is also 
an example of the general lack of transparency in the Egyptian political and administrative 
system. The procedures within the highest ranks of the public administration are non-
transparent and no one outside these circles seems to be consulted with respect to defining 
what the country’s needs are. Accordingly, no one knows what to expect from the 
government. It is therefore also more difficult to hold the responsible people accountable. 
Many interviewees referred to the political side of the administration as very closed, 
consequently making it difficult for anyone to judge whether the allocation of funds is based 
on solid reasons.115  
On the positive side, it is important to stress that the MoP has indeed produced a 
variety of information kits pertaining to its activities, including presentations on the structure 
and functions of the MoP. Also, the MIC issued the DCR 2003, which focuses on the 
national coordination and harmonization, showing an increased awareness of the importance 
of these issues. The future regarding aid coordination by the Egyptian authorities looks 
brighter – if the written words mean that more coordinating activities will follow by both 
Ministries.116 
When the Cabinet receives a plan, and discussions between the MoP and the Cabinet 
on the modifications of the plan arise, the stronger Ministries get the most projects included 
in the plan according to a senior member of staff in the MIC117. This means that information 
about prioritizations and efforts of coordination are not only needed in the general public but 
also within the political system so that the priorities of all Ministries are known and all 
Ministries back up the final overall priority setting agreed upon. 
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Follow-up 
Follow-up118 is an important aspect of national coordination. In fact, it is as important as the 
planning process. Typically, it is impossible to accomplish everything planned. In Egypt, the 
MoP is responsible for the financial follow-ups on national plans. Furthermore, the MoP is 
responsible for ensuring that the funding from the donors has been provided, such that 
governmental money can be channeled as agreed upon.  
 After a plan has been approved, the MoP is required to follow up on the approved 
plan. The MoP needs to follow up on the actions of Ministries and agencies, the Cabinet, and 
the Parliament. At the same time, the MoP is expected to present the follow-up to the same 
aforementioned entities.119 In the MoP’s Five-Year Plan from 2002, there are 20 pages of 
follow-ups on the previous plan. It is, again, outlined in very general terms, mainly focusing 
on macro-economic indicators that have changed due to internal and external factors. 
Consequently, the follow-up document on the developmental performance during 2002/2003 
is difficult to assess. The document could have been much more focused, as the plan was 
more elaborate than a 5-year plan. However, the five pages of follow-up is just a brief macro-
economic overview of the past year. 
Overall, there are approximately 10.000 projects taking place, which are 
commissioned by the Egyptian government (excl. private sector). All projects should be 
officially examined/followed-up on quarterly with each follow-up lasting for about a 
month.120 Hence according to sources in the MoP, a third of the time allocated to a project is 
spent on follow-ups, reviews, and evaluations that the line Ministries consequently send to 
                                                 
118 (The Egyptian authorities use the term follow-up as a broad synonym for the different kinds of assessments 
of ongoing as well as finished activities. It has been unclear what kind of evaluations, reviews or monitoring 
activities it refers to) 
119 Ministry of Planning, “Activation of the Planning Process”, A PowerPoint Presentation by Ministry of 
Planning, slide 6. 
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the MoP.121 These considerable follow-up procedures are more wide-ranging than one would 
expect. Perhaps the format of these official follow-up procedures has remained like it is 
because the Ministries do not actually implement the follow-ups every time they are asked to.  
 
Participatory Approach  
Efficient and proper planning often needs collaboration with the entities that are 
knowledgeable of the area of concern, and who often take part in the implementation of the 
plan. In the above sections, it was shown how the MoP collaborates with other governmental 
bodies. In this section it is examined to which extent the Ministry collaborates with the civil 
society and the private sector.    
In a presentation that the MoP has made to inform outsiders of the work of the 
Ministry, it is stated that “Egypt will combine three types of planning procedures: central 
planning (planning by commands and state domination), indicative planning (depends on 
achieving the aspired targets by adopting a package of economic indicators) and 
partnership122 planning.”123 Moreover, the role of the state is described as “a partner in the 
development process jointly with the private sector and NGOs, catalyst for steering, 
supervisor, facilitator, pioneer and financier.”
124 Also, according to the recent plans it is 
formally announced that partnership planning will play an increasingly important role in the 
future.125  
In the preface of the plan “The Fifth Five-Year Plan for Socio-Economic 
Development (2002-2007) & First Year”, it is additionally asserted that partnership planning 
                                                 
121 (1.1) 
122 Participation is explained as a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over 
development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affects them Ministry of Planning, “Activation of 
the Planning Process”, A PowerPoint Presentation by Ministry of Planning. 
123 Ministry of Planning, “Activation of the Planning Process”, A PowerPoint Presentation by Ministry of 
Planning, slide 2. 
124 Ministry of Planning, “Activation of the Planning Process”, A PowerPoint Presentation by Ministry of 
Planning, slide 12. 
125 Ministry of Planning, “Activation of the Planning Process”, A PowerPoint Presentation by Ministry of 
Planning, slide 11. 
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is done in accordance with the participatory planning concept, increasing the role of the 
private sector in the making of as well as the execution of the plan. Furthermore, in the 
description of the background of the five-year plan 2002-2007, it is being declared “the 
private sector has participated – in an institutional way in the preparation of the draft and in 
determining its general trends.”
126 It is also stated that the five-year plan seeks to “Activate 
the role of the private sector and NGOs through participatory planning and securing the 
proper investment climate.”
127 In fact, the argument for using this participatory approach 
stems from the MoP’s recognition of the increasing role played by the private sector that 
contributes with 60% of national investments and 70% of GDP.128 Additionally, in the 
December 2004 Government Statement to the People’s Assembly, it is listed that one of the 
working conditions and principles for the implementation of the ten developmental programs 
presented is to support sincere partnership between the government and the private sector.129 
Thus, there are surely positive steps towards participation, at least at the official level. 
Nevertheless, one more element of the planning process that deviates from the 
structural/formal description is the participatory aspect. 
According to an interviewee in the MoP, meetings are held with approximately 20 
NGOs and representatives from the private sector (Heads of Chambers) every 2-3 months. 
The aim of these meetings is to make an effort to incorporate these entities into the planning 
process.130 However, partaking in the planning process is not felt among the civil society and 
the private sector.131 Also, an interviewee representing the donor community said that 
partnership between the GoE and donors is lacking in practice, as communication is 
                                                 
126 Ministry of Planning, 3, 9-14. 
127 Ministry of Planning, 39. 
128 Ministry of Planning, 35. 
129 Ahmed Nazif, Governmental Statement to the People’s Assembly. (Speech by the Prime Minister) (Egypt: 
The Cabinet, Information & Decision Support Center (IDSC), 2004, 6. 
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scarce.132 From what was discussed above, and according to all interviews, it is clear that in 
practice the partnership between the GoE and the stakeholders in the development process is 
weak133. The centralized political system in Egypt can to a large extent explain the GoE’s 
limited use of a participatory approach.  
 
Centralized Government  
Limited of use of a participatory approach often goes hand in hand with an overly centralized 
government, as the one portrayed by the Egyptian political system. As Saad Eddin Ibrahim 
puts it in 2001 “The State (...) has yet to fully emerge from a form of centralized rule, (...) in 
which the entire policy revolves around an omnipotent ruler.”
134 Kassem, concludes in her 
book from 2004:  
“The Presidency during Mubarak’s tenure remains the ultimately 
source of power and authority, as was the case with his predecessors. 
Advantageous laws and an extensive patronage system, combined 
effectively, have not only hindered the balance of power within the 
formal governmental branches, but also assured the preservation of 
personal authoritarian rule for Egyptian presidents for over half a 
century.”
 135   
 
This centralized rule, the top-down flow of commands and information as well as the general 
lack of delegation of responsibilities might explain the limited use of the participatory 
approach. The Egyptian government has confirmed its willingness to open up to greater 
citizen participation and to advance the democratic process. At the same time, the emergency 
law continues to limit full participation of the general public in the political process.136  
  
                                                 
132 (2.4, 3.12, 5.3) 
133 (5.3, 4.2) 
134 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Egypt, Islam and Democracy – Critical Essays. (Cairo: The American 
University in Cairo Press, 2003, 267). 
135 Kassem, 43. 
136 United Nations, and Ministry of Planning. Millennium Development Goals – Second Country Report Egypt 
2004. (Egypt: 2005), 5. 
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Ministry of International Cooperation 
This section will examine the role of the MIC in national coordination of aid in Egypt. 
Firstly, the MIC is introduced regarding its goals, visions and objectives as well as its 
structure and functions. The focus is hereafter on the main responsibilities of the MIC: 
execution of the national plans regarding foreign aid and follow-up on the developmental 
outcome of the aid programs.  
 
Goals, Vision and Objectives 
In July 2004, Egypt established the Ministry of International Cooperation (MIC). The MIC 
was created based on Presidential Decree 201 of the same year that a new Cabinet was 
appointed. Ever since “international cooperation” was introduced in 1982 as a ministerial 
entity, the job and responsibility had fallen under the domain of other Ministries.137 The year 
2004 was accordingly the first time it was a separate fully-fledged Ministry with a separate 
minister. The MIC has its own “Minister of International Cooperation”; Dr. Fayza Abu El-
Naga.138  
 Between 1987-1996, the function of international cooperation was managed in a 
“Ministry of State for International Cooperation”. This meant that the Prime Minister was 
responsible for the Ministry, as he was responsible for all the other “Ministries of State”. As 
such, the Minister of Ministry of State for International Cooperation could not make 
decisions without consulting the Prime Minister.139  
                                                 
137 (Previously, the tasks of international cooperation had been under the Ministry of Investment Affairs (1982-
1983), the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (1984-1986), the Ministry of State for 
International Cooperation (1987-1996), under Ministry of Economy and International Cooperation (1996-1997), 
under Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (1997-2000), and the International Cooperation Sector 
– Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2001-2004). There were many reasons for placing the job under the above-
mentioned ministries; the task of international cooperation was placed according to the main goals of foreign aid 
at the particular point of time Ministry of International Cooperation. Ministry of International Cooperation, A 
timetable of the International Cooperation domain’s placement within other ministries in Egypt since 1982. 
(Egypt: Ministry of International Cooperation; 2.1; 3.9).  
138 Ministry of International Cooperation, Press Release. (Egypt: Ministry of International Cooperation, 2004). 
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 According to Presidential Decree 303 of year 2004, the new MIC is responsible for 
“The development and support of economic cooperation relations between the Arab Republic 
of Egypt and other states as well as international and regional organizations.”
140 The 
responsibilities of the Ministry as mandated by Decree 303 include the preparation of 
agreements for loans, grants, and financial guarantees, and the allocation of ODA, 
guarantees, and facilities.141 These tasks are handled by the MIC in cooperation with 
organizations, authorities, and institutions involved in economic co-operation.142 According 
to an official press release, the MIC is established “in appreciation of such a Ministry’s 
prospective vital role in driving and executing Egypt’s Development Plan for the upcoming 
phase.”
143 Subsequently, the main functions of the MIC strategy to fulfill its mandate include 
acting as the national coordinator between government sectors, Ministries, and foreign 
organizations in order to secure foreign resources required by the national technical 
development plan.144 Secondly, they are to follow up on the developmental progress of 
projects and programs, from inception to impact assessment.145 
 
Structure and Functions 
The MIC is divided into regional departments. In addition to this, there is a separate 
department only dealing with USAID because USAID is the dominating financial source of 
projects/programs. Furthermore, there is also a sole department with the sheer task of dealing 
with multilateral agencies. The department for European Assistance therefore administers the 
                                                 
140 Ministry of International Cooperation, “Press Release”. 
141 For details see Appendix B 
142 Ministry of International Cooperation. “Development Cooperation Report 2002”, 3. 
143 Ministry of International Cooperation, “Press Release”. 
144 For details see Appendix B 
145 Ministry of International Cooperation. “Development Cooperation Report 2002”. 3-4. 
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Danish aid.146 According to a key employee in the MIC, each department in the Ministry is 
supposed to deal with its own projects and programs.147 
In the preparation of agreements for loans, grants, and financial guarantees, the MIC 
needs to follow certain guidelines. Firstly, all projects and programs that the MIC is trying to 
get donor funding for, need to have prior approval by the MoP.148 The MIC then negotiates 
funding, and makes mutual agreements with donor countries/agencies. Secondly, presidential 
and cabinet approval is needed prior to negotiation for loans. Furthermore, for loans there is a 
roof of maximum US$ 1.5 billion per year to ensure ability of the Egyptian state to pay back. 
However, the process is different for grants that have no financial implications for the 
Egyptian system. During the negotiation period for grants, there is therefore no need for 
either presidential or cabinet approval. The negotiations and finalization of the agreements 
may thus be completed before approved by the cabinet and the president, and before a final 
parliamentary ratification.149 The drafts of the agreements are thereafter sent to the relevant 
line Ministry that heads the implementation. The MIC is responsible for contacting line 
Ministries and providing information for the respective entities.150  
 
Analysis of Ministry of International Cooperation 
Execution of Plans 
Official Procedure  
There are various procedures in use during the MIC’s execution of the five-year development 
plan. According to a senior employee in the MIC, the most often used procedures among four 
kinds of coordinating procedures, applies when the MIC contacts donor communities, 
proclaiming what projects it wishes to implement. A senior official at MIC stated, that the 
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MIC asks donors what needed support they can help providing according to the donors’ 
expertise, priorities, strategic preferences and respective interests in e.g. supporting their own 
companies.151 
Second method used by MIC to execute developmental plans is to submit the need for 
finance to the Development Association Group (DAG). Subsequently, representatives from 
the MIC explained that the Ministry regularly holds meetings with the DAG, where a certain 
Minister requests funding from the members.152 
A third way of coordinating aid activities occurs when the support initiative comes 
from donor agencies themselves.153 The donor’s offer (either a project or program) is then, if 
possible, fitted into the national plan. The MIC checks whether there is already funds 
transferred to the proposed goal and whether the donor’s idea for funding is a priority of the 
GoE.154  
In addition, Egypt is also allowed to obtain loans from financial institutions such as 
the World Bank or the African Development Bank, according to the status of its membership 
and participation within these institutions. This aid is also handled and channeled by the 
MIC. 
The MIC states in its DCR 2002 that although donors have priorities of their own 
with regards to ODA allocation, it is essential for the recipient country to ensure optimum 
utilization of foreign assistance.155 In fact, efficient allocation of ODA is attained when 
assistance allocations as a whole match the development priorities and needs of the country. 
This means that, officially, the MIC is aware that the ODA needs to be coordinated. 
However, in the DCR 2002 the Ministry does not describe how ODA was coordinated to 
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match exact development priorities, or what the precise priorities are for Egypt when this is 
done.   
 
Practical Implementation 
The stipulated role of the MIC in coordinating aid activities is very difficult to implement in 
practice. The challenges are immense the three main procedures described above meet many 
obstacles when put into practice.  
The coordination that should be secured when the MIC contacts a donor does not 
seem to be effective under real life conditions. The senior head of a bilateral donor agency in 
Cairo showed an example of this process during the interview. The interviewee had, before 
the interview took place, received a letter from MIC offering the donor agency to choose 
from a number of listed projects that the MIC sought funding for. Each project was described 
in a few pages that were enclosed with the letter from the MIC. The head of the agency 
explained that the agency had very different competences than the ones needed to fund and 
implement the listed projects. Accordingly, he did not appreciate this strictly top-down 
approach by the MIC. The letter was therefore put aside. This left the head of this donor 
agency uncertain with regard to why he received this letter; why his agency had not first been 
asked about its competences, and on what basis the MIC had picked these concrete projects 
as the ones to be implemented.156 The interviewed Head of this donor agency was therefore 
confused, not enlightened, and no coordination was achieved.   
 The second approach by the MIC is to contact the DAG that since August 2001 has 
functioned as a donor coordination forum under the UN Resident Coordinator. The activities 
in DAG are discussed in the last section of this chapter; prerequisites for national aid 
coordination.  
                                                 
156 (5.3) 
  
 
58 
 
 The third method that is followed by the MIC when coordinating ODA is when the 
donor approaches the MIC with a funding offer. When such an approach is followed, it 
seems as if the only coordination taking place inside the MIC is to ensure that funding is 
obtained to implement the technical plan.157 A senior top official in the MIC said (after many 
attempts of trying not to answer the question) that there is no independent developmental 
planning taking place within the MIC. The interviewee’s justification was that planning was 
the responsibility of the MoP and that the MIC’s only role was to get funding for projects 
already accepted and included in the technical plan in accordance with the five-year socio-
economic development plan. Logically speaking, it seems rather inefficient when the 
executing Ministry does not have the necessary tools to carry out its work. The tools (the 
national plans) are so loose that it is difficult for the MIC to accommodate donor priorities 
while at the same time ensure that national priorities are met. With the lack of sufficient 
knowledge and a proper overview of aid activities in the country, one cannot expect the MIC 
to be able to undertake the role of the coordinator properly.  
In certain instances the line Ministries bypass the MIC when seeking an external donor to 
fund a project. As a result, the MIC is not involved in the initial planning of donor relations 
with line Ministries until the final official agreement has to be signed. This furthermore acts 
as a potential obstacle for proper aid coordination to take place. 
 
The above findings show, that the degrees of national coordination executed by MIC can be 
characterized as consultation with donors. This is the least extensive level of coordination 
where information is being shared between parties. Preferably, coordination would take the 
shape of a multifaceted process where also cooperation with donors involving discussions 
                                                 
157 A former staff member in the MoP said that there was no doubt that the MIC should have a copy of the 
MoP’s plans to be able to react properly to other ministries and donors (2.2). However people inside the MIC 
said that they contact MoP for a certain project to be accepted in the plan every time a donor offer a certain 
project (2.1, 2.5).   
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with donors of policies, priorities and principles are taking place in order to maximize the 
outcome of aid programs. Also, coordination in the form of collaboration with donors, that 
is, agreeing on procedures and practices in an effort to ensure smooth, shared implementation 
of agreed policies would be a central facet of national coordination.158 Consequently, it must 
be concluded that the procedures of the MIC are not yet implemented and followed to an 
extent that would enable the MIC to fulfill its stipulated goals.   
 
Follow-up 
Official Procedure 
As stated in the list of MIC responsibilities and functions, MIC is to follow-up on the 
progress of projects and programs, from initiation to impact assessment.159 The interviewees 
from inside the MIC confirmed, that the employees recognize the responsibility of following-
up on all projects.160 The Centre for Project Evaluation and Macro-economic Analysis 
(PEMA) under the MIC is responsible for these tasks. Supposedly, in the future, annual 
DCRs shall show the status of a follow up on ODA disbursements on macro-level according 
to national priorities.  
 
Practical Implementation   
Inside the MIC, the follow-up mechanism is portrayed as weak since there is insufficient 
capacity to manage the task of following up on programs’ developmental impact. Most 
outsiders described the follow-up as non-existent. An outsider was, after having been in 
touch with the MIC, of the impression that the MIC reviews are restricted to procedural 
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matters, and do not address substantial issues. It does not focus on coordination between 
donors, but on procedural or financial issues.161  
The Center for Project Evaluation and Macro-economic Analysis (PEMA) evaluates 
projects after they have been completed. This renders this follow-up setup fairly unhelpful 
during the implementation of any projects and unable to redirect financial resources to the 
most successful parts of the program. The follow-up that takes place in PEMA, however, 
serves to pivot capacity building in the unit, as it gains additional experience of how projects 
should be designed and implemented to accomplish the intended impact. According to senior 
personnel in the PEMA, there is a need for additional capacity to follow-up on projects. 
However, according to the person in charge of PEMA there has been a significant progress in 
the center for the last 12 months, starting July 2005, such that with time the PEMA – if 
granted more resources – could become a useful national follow-up unit.162  
There are definitely also institutional weaknesses in the follow-up process, as the 
Minister is not demanding technical memorandums on a regular basis. The staff only 
produces evaluations on request by the minister.163 Hence, the structures do not encourage 
the employees to follow-up continuously.   
In the DCR 2002, the MIC describes how the ODA is allocated sectorally and 
geographically on the macro-level.164 In the document, it is briefly described how some of 
the sectors that receive the most donor funds have either reached more or less ODA than 
expected. In the document there is no categorical prioritization of the different sectors. For 
example, both the educational and the environmental sectors are given “highest priority”. In 
this section, it could have been useful to provide the ODA disbursement according to some 
clear national priorities for the ODA. However, the DCR only provides a very general 
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statement of previous distribution as well as general policy recommendations to GoE, donors 
and implementing agencies.165 Hopefully, future DCRs will provide follow-ups on 
disbursement according to national priorities and provide an overview of the allocation, as 
the donors might very likely want such priorities for the upcoming period.    
Nonetheless, one task of the MIC that seems to work fine is when the MIC takes on 
the role as problem-solver handling complaints from donors and informing the respective 
Ministries, that they cannot obtain funds from donors due to dissatisfaction. If Ministries do 
not improve, the MIC informs the Prime Minister. Also, the line Ministry can inform the 
Prime Minister that the MIC themselves cannot obtain the funding applied for; usually this 
information is channeled smoothly and helps donors implement their aid activities in 
Egypt.166 
 
In 2002, the Development Cooperation Data of Egypt (DECODE) unit in the MIC produced 
the first report called the “Egypt International Cooperation Report - 2001”. Before this 
volume, there was no comprehensive database on aid in the Ministry. The next report for 
2002 was produced in April 2005, and the one for the year 2003 was launched in November 
2005, while the date for the launch of the newest and updated version for 2004 has not yet 
been set. This production of DCRs represents a great progress in the information available 
from within the MIC. It also shows that until now, updated information has not been 
available in the ranks of the MIC. Accordingly, the Ministry does not have the basis and the 
overview to coordinate foreign aid activities properly. The civil servants in the Ministry are, 
according to insiders in the MIC, not adequately trained, which means that they lack 
knowledge and professionalism.  
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It is fairly clear, that the earlier kind of aid scheme, where donors implemented and 
evaluated their own projects with their own apparatus, gave the national authorities fewer 
incentives to promote the capacity to follow-up. However, since the national structures are 
now beginning to play an actual role, they need time to start up and get running. The latest 
progresses of DCRs seem to indicate a more constructive future of the MIC regarding 
coordination and following-up.   
 
Issues pertaining to Execution and Follow-up 
During the research some specific aspects showed to be essential for the coordinating role of 
the MIC, these are discussed in the following.   
 
A new Ministry – a new Structure of National Aid Coordination 
Indeed, one must allow the MIC some additional years to operate before a fair evaluation can 
be executed. It is a new Ministry that needs to build up its competences over the years to 
come. At the same time, if the government really wants a strong MIC that follows up on 
projects and programs and ensures aid coordination, it should support MIC with more funds, 
higher salaries to attract good researchers etc. An uplifting recent development is the newly 
published DCR 2003 from November 2005 that has chosen coordination and harmonization 
as main topics. In this report, the public is being informed on the initiatives done by GoE, 
especially the MIC, in an effort to increase donor coordination. These initiatives – the DAG, 
the DCRs etc - are also mentioned in the present report. 
In spite of the positive developments, the basic legitimacy of this new Ministry is 
worth questioning. An interviewee stated that the creation of the MIC is an example and a 
result of the Egyptian system’s way to react when it identifies a problem – they create 
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something new.167 As a consequence of the lack of coordination, the government created a 
new Ministry: the MIC. However, as concluded by an interviewee “The creation of the MIC 
does not automatically solve the problem that all the other Ministries do not collaborate.”
168 
It might have been more effective if the MIC task was taken care of by MoP that is already in 
charge of planning and have developed experiences within strategy making.169 Trying to 
make double capacity building in the MIC and in the MoP may not be worthwhile and 
justified170, one interviewee argued. At the same time, one key senior official in MIC did not 
find anything flawed with the overall structure in which MIC finds itself or the way the 
functions were implemented by the Ministry171. This was stated in spite of the fact the 
interviewee also commented that there were a multitude of issues that needed to be resolved 
within the MIC. 
 
The Practical Role of the MIC 
When asked the question of whether Egypt executes any aid coordination, a former manager 
in a Ministry answered: “There is no (or very little) national aid coordination, there is no (or 
very little) local aid coordination and there is no (or very little) sector aid coordination – 
because the system is wrong”. He defined the MIC as a “bureaucratic paper-shifting organ” 
that is not strong enough to stand alone and which is only capable of taking complaints. He 
summarized his assessment of the MIC by stating, “It could not be any worse - there is no 
coordination.”
172 By and large, outsiders generally viewed the MIC’s role as minimal. 
Another person, representing civil society, summarized the situation this way; “My 
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conviction is that it does not make a difference with the MIC or not.”173 These comments 
from line Ministries and civil society must make one wonder how much coordination the 
MIC does indeed accomplish. 
  
Centralized Decision-making Process 
One of the main causes resulting in the shortcoming of clear-cut sector targets, policies, and 
strategies might be the relatively high degree of centralization in Egypt’s decision-making 
process, in which decision-making powers are rarely conveyed to lower levels of civil 
servants. The implementation and use of the plans in coordination of aid is (to the extent it 
takes place) very centralistic and top-down. This may explain the vague answers of some 
interviewees in the MoP and the MIC when they were asked specific questions. It became 
clear, that they were focused on the planning or formal coordination that takes place on their 
level. However, they had often not thought about whether and how their planning could 
effect implementation in practice. The MIC would greatly profit from and create more 
interest in its operation by improving their communication with the line Ministries, donors 
and civil society.  
 
Lack of Information 
An interviewee inside the MIC declared “sometimes one finds some similar projects close to 
each other that are financed by different donors. The lack of previous coordination is due to 
MIC’s need for more information.”
174 The staff in the Ministry said they needed full 
information to facilitate coordination and take the right decisions.175 When Egyptian 
authorities do not know the country’s needs, they cannot say ‘no’ to new donor programs. 
This hampers national planning and coordination. Egypt should be able to express which 
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programs are needed and not accept other offers. However, this certainly does not yet 
happen. A member of the private sector strongly believed that Egypt is not prepared to 
manage national coordination, as it is simply neither prepared nor able to tell the donors what 
the country’s needs are.  
According to a source in the MIC, the Ministry has asked a donor to provide a 
Geographical Information System (GIS) in technical assistance so that the MIC can get an 
overview of the developmental projects and programs in the country176. Also, the UNDP and 
the EU has helped the MIC with tools and capacity to execute its functions. This means that 
the MIC is getting help to improve its tasks, which seems to be a very positive trend.  
 
Lack of Competences  
The different needed competences with respect to development strategy, writing of program 
documents, and methods of evaluation are lacking in the MIC.177 Most of the staff within the 
Ministry cannot see the differences between different projects or programs, an outsider 
said.178 A senior official in the MIC backs up this point by saying that when it comes to the 
evaluation of projects, MIC personnel needs to learn how to distinguish between good and 
bad projects. The senior official in the MIC said they were in the process of learning - the 
willingness was there - but the knowledge and skills were still missing.179 Indeed, if the 
plans were outlined in proper detail and the aid capacity were present inside the MIC, the 
Ministry would be able to fulfill its role of “..driving and executing Egypt’s Development 
Plan”. However, this goal has not yet been achieved, as there is no capacity to execute the 
plan properly in the first place.  
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Lack of National Coordination: also the Donors’ Fault 
There are many examples of donors not willing to be responsive to the needs formulated by 
the country’s own authorities. Also donors are often not interested in joint projects or 
programs. In addition to this, unpredictability is a problem for the national coordination 
authorities. A senior member of staff in the MIC raised this question in an interview “How 
do I know if we get 5 or 50 million LE? And how do we plan and coordinate, if we do not 
know?”
180 Also, the problem is that donor commitment is established and defined well in 
advance of the donor activities actually being initiated.181 Basically very few factors are 
predictable. These are some of the external factors challenging national aid coordination in 
Egypt. However, the research of this thesis is on how the partner country’s authorities fill out 
the necessary prerequisites for managing national coordination.  
 
Prerequisites for National Aid Coordination in Egypt 
The previous sections tackled the prerequisites for donor coordination on the partner 
country’s side. These prerequisites are formulated by the UNDP:
182 
1) A clear policy framework at the national level to ensure a long-term development 
visions are in focus when national priorities and strategies are decided upon; 
2) A system of medium-term rolling development programs is required with budget 
estimates tied to sector strategies, programs and projects; and 
3) A clear division of responsibility between core and line Ministries. 
4) A governmental forum to secure efficient government-donor partnership needs to be 
established. 
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182 UNDP, vi, 29-30. 
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The following discussion presents an analysis of the extent to which Egypt fulfills the above-
mentioned prerequisites for national coordination. The Vision 2022 is supposedly 
functioning as the ‘policy framework and long-term development visions’ and is referred to 
in the five-year and the one-year plans. In practice, the existence of this Vision 2022 
document means that there is a policy framework and long-term development visions in 
Egypt. However, it has been difficult to document whether this vision functions well as the 
policy framework and long-term development vision since it is only being referred to and yet 
not made available. At any rate, as judged from the summaries of this vision document, it 
appears unlikely that it meets the requirements defined by the UNDP.183 A comprehensive 
vision would ensure that national governance could undertake widest possible participation 
in decision-making. Furthermore, an ideal vision includes incentives to ensure and qualify to 
which extent society moves towards implementing the vision, and means in the form of 
regulations and service deliveries to optimize the goals stipulated in the vision document.184 
Vision 2022 does not contain such information. 
This conclusion is supported by the fact that none of the interviewees mentioned 
either the former or the current vision documents. This indicate that only a minority of the 
people who would be expected to be responsible for implementing of the Vision document 
are aware of its existence. According to officials in the MIC, the MoP keeps the vision 
document within its own Ministry, and does not distribute it to line Ministries. The 
argumentation for the rational behind this decision is that the line Ministries are solely 
supposed to implement and follow-up the five-year plans.185 
                                                 
183 A UNDP definition of a policy framework and long-term development vision includes for example how the 
population’s future living conditions and opportunities in the country shall be affected by socio-economic and 
political means; what the political structures of participation are; and the roles that should be instrumented by all 
the different groups in society in order to achieve this vision. UNDP, 29.  
184 UNDP, 29. 
185 The MIC has a long technical version of the previously mentioned five-year plan “The Economic and Social 
Development Plan for 2002-2007”, which contains all the activities accepted by the MoP on its more than 2050 
pages (2.5). 
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The Five-year plan for socio-economic development fills out the formal and 
theoretical role as a medium-term plan. However, just as it was the case with the 20-year 
vision document mentioned earlier, it does not fully meet the UNDP standard requirements 
for a five-year plan. Such a medium-term plan, according to UNDP, must include budget-
estimates tied to sector strategies, programs, and projects. When such information is lacking, 
the experience of UNDP is that the actors outside the implementing institutions cannot define 
or find their own roles and contributions. For donors, these concrete programs are necessary 
as a starting point to channel any scheme of aid to a country.186 
Egypt’s five-year plan is without any budgetary estimates tied to programs and 
projects of specific sector strategies. The strategies mentioned in the five-year plan are very 
general and are not prioritized. Therefore the donors in Egypt have heavily criticized this 
lack of medium-term program planning.187 According to the Development Cooperation 
Report 2002, donors have expressed concern that the GoE has not yet formulated clear-cut 
sector targets, policies, and strategies – apart from the broad development objectives and 
priorities already indicated. If these existed, they could surely guide donors and help pivot 
the entire scheme of aid coordination.188 As a matter of fact, in the DCR 2002, which briefly 
tackles the coordination of ODA disbursement, it is written that the donors request that the 
GoE make more clear-cut sector strategies, policies, and targets to guide the donors’ 
disbursements. The reply by the MIC in the DCR 2002 on this request was that “The 
initiatives taken by the MIC in this regard aims at addressing this issue”. However, the 
precise nature of these taken initiatives was not specified anywhere in the response. The 
report goes on stressing that better coordination between the MIC and donors is essential to 
ensure maximum utilization of funds. While decentralization should reduce administrative 
                                                 
186 UNDP, 30. 
187 Ministry of International Cooperation. “Development Cooperation Report 2002”. 
188 Ministry of International Cooperation. “Development Cooperation Report 2002”. 4. 
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and management costs, it is mentioned that this should not undermine the central 
coordinating role of the Ministry.189 
In conclusion it can be said that it is simply unclear from the MoP’s Vision 2022 and 
its five-year socio-economic plan what the main priorities of the GoE are. Consequently, this 
means that it is complicated for the MIC to execute the developmental plans, thus fulfilling 
its role as aid coordinating body.  
 
The role of the Steering Committee with regard to prioritizing the wish lists of the line 
Ministries is not at all transparent. Therefore, the third prerequisite for aid coordination does 
not seem to be fulfilled. 
According to UNDP, the greatest weakness pertaining to aid coordination today is the 
absence of a dialogue between the government and the various donors at the country level.190 
Indeed, partnership is a central part of national coordination. In practice the coordination 
does not take place if the GoE and the development stakeholders do not have consultations, 
cooperation, or collaboration regarding policies, principles and priorities, procedures and 
practices.191 Inspired by the Paris Declaration in 2005, which Egypt has signed,192 the senior 
staff in the MIC proclaims that the Ministry is trying to fulfill this commitment by 
establishing a Committee of MoP, MoF, MIC, line Ministries and donors. These parties have 
indeed already met on a few occasions. At these meetings each donor supposedly provides 
the others with a proposal and each representative gives his/her opinion in person, concerning 
aid disbursement. Obviously, the MIC could have a very important function as coordinating 
body of such meetings and thus fulfill their main task.193 However, this series of meetings are 
                                                 
189 Ministry of International Cooperation. “Development Cooperation Report 2002”. 32. 
190 UNDP, vi. 
191 Claret de Fleurieu, 18-20. 
192 (Egypt is additionally a signatory to the Rome Declaration on Aid Harmonization from 2003. Ministry of 
International Cooperation. “Development Cooperation Report 2003”, 4. 
193 (2.2) 
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not yet fully institutionalized and thus do not yet fulfill the role of a governmental/donor 
forum for coordination of aid.   
In developing countries, the lack of such an efficient forum reflects a lack of the 
necessary capacity. Ministries of finance and planning need to have devised a medium-term 
development strategy, and line departments must be capable of conducting the necessary 
sector policy dialogues. When these elements are not present, it is difficult if not impossible 
for the authorities to establish such an aid coordination forum.194 
In Egypt, the UN Resident Coordinator has assessed that these necessary capacities 
were not in place and has therefore set up the Donor Association Group (DAG) and provided 
a matrix containing the donors’ contribution to all ten development programs/areas as 
defined in the previously mentioned speech by the Prime Minister in 2004. The DAG 
consists of two groups: the large donor group with a representative from about 50 embassies 
or organizations that provide the most aid to Egypt. There are no representatives from civil 
society, private sector or NGOs. Moreover, there are 8 DAG subgroups divided into different 
fields of development. Most sub-groups have two chairs, often one from a donor agency and 
one Egyptian official working in a key position within the respective field. The sub-groups 
are supposed to meet every month where they attend a presentation by a government official 
or someone from the academia.  
The purpose of the DAG meetings are obviously to attempt to compensate for the 
MIC not taking on the responsibility of national aid coordination, as well as Egypt not having 
a Poverty Reduction Strategy that could potentially guide the donors. In fact, a representative 
from the DAG executive Secretariat explained that the GoE is doing its best to coordinate 
                                                 
194 UNDP, vi. 
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between donors, but is obstructed by not having the needed human resources and funds to 
undertake the task properly.195  
The coordination operations of the DAG meetings take place at different levels. In the 
plenary DAG, where all the Embassies and organizations are present, the coordination effort 
can be characterized as being on a consultation level.196 Conversely, in the DAG thematic 
sub-groups, the coordination is more aligned to the government and line Ministries and the 
kind of coordination taking place could be defined as being on the level of cooperation. The 
third and most extensive level of effective coordination collaboration only happens in some 
of the most active sub-groups and it is still only on the agenda for others.197  
 According to a key official at the Royal Danish Embassy in Cairo the best 
coordination of aid activities in Egypt happens in the DAG. Unfortunately, Egyptian 
authorities do not have the ownership of the coordination that takes place in DAG. The DAG 
Secretariat under the UN Resident Coordinator would have liked to see a national ownership 
of aid coordination, but this cannot happen as long as the necessary capacity has not been 
developed in the MIC. 
 
The lack of national coordination in Egypt is not solely a problem that could be solved by 
institutional support and capacity development, despite the fact that it could appear to be the 
case at the first glance. In addition, a willingness at the presidential and ministerial level to 
allocate the necessary national resources to the MoP and the MIC is absolutely necessary 
before these prerequisites can be fulfilled. 
 
                                                 
195 (5.2) 
196 (5.2) 
197 (5.2) 
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Conclusions 
Officially, Egypt does have national aid coordination. The MoP is the Egyptian authority 
with the responsibility to coordinate foreign aid programs as accomplished by planning and 
financial follow-up. The MIC is responsible for executing the plans and developmental 
follow-up. Thus it is not the same authority that is responsible for preparing and executing 
the plans.  
In practice, the MoP produces a long-term vision, medium-term plans and annual 
plans: However, the plans are by and large so general that they do not provide the necessary 
details for priority setting at the MIC as needed for implementation. Donor strategies indicate 
that some donors align their official approaches to the MoP’s national visions and plans. This 
means that the MoP does indeed to some extent foster national coordination by producing 
national vision and strategies. Furthermore, on the strategic level as well, the MoP actively 
collaborates in producing reports on poverty reduction with donors such as the WB and the 
UN, thus consulting and cooperating with donors. Unfortunately, the impact of these efforts 
is severely reduced by the centralistic nature of the MoP operations. This results in a low 
level of participation of non-governmental stakeholders in the planning process.  
The MIC, which has the task to mediate contact to donors, uses the five-year plans 
when coordinating with donors. However, the coordination is insufficient as it only involves 
scarce consultation with donors. As the plans are not very detailed, donor-proposed activities 
can easily be fitted into the plan, making the notion of national donor coordination somewhat 
useless. The financial follow-up by the MoP seems to be working, whereas the MIC’s 
follow-up on impact is very limited.  
 
This research investigation has demonstrated that there is a consistent discrepancy between 
the official policies and the practice regarding national aid coordination in Egypt. Sometimes, 
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as in the case of the Steering Committee, it has not been possible to elucidate what is the 
reality of national coordination of aid in Egypt. The prerequisites for national aid 
coordination as listed by UNDP are therefore according to this research concluded not to be 
fulfilled in Egypt. The long and medium term planning provided by the Egyptian authorities 
is simply not adequate to serve as efficient tools for the MIC coordinating foreign aid 
activities. Also, clear division of responsibility between core and line Ministries is deficient 
due to a lack of transparency with respect to decisions and procedures in the Steering 
Committee. There is no national-led forum for coordinating aid in Egypt and the overall 
strategies, priorities and programs are not formulated based on a participatory approach with 
donors, private sector and civil society entities. It is thus virtually impossible to ensure 
smooth and shared implementation of policies agreed upon by the government and donors. 
 
This research investigations shows that Egypt has major difficulties in deciding on foreign 
aid priorities and administration and with respect to having the ownership of the aid 
activities. In this context it is important to note that agencies like Danida now has decided to 
gradually shift parts of its development assistance to partner countries to budget support as a 
replacement for program support. It is clear from this research that a country like Egypt 
would need many more years of capacity development and institutional strengthening before 
it is able to prioritize, plan, coordinate as well as follow up on foreign assistance. At the 
moment the planning process at the top of the system is non-transparent. Previously the 
national plans, strategies and priorities have been too general, and the donors have not 
known, understood or followed a scheme of national coordination. With certainty, Egypt 
could benefit a lot from receiving capacity building to the MoP and the MIC before receiving 
direct budget support.  
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It is known that Denmark phases out its aid to Egypt by 2008 so the question of 
Danida shifting to budget support in Egypt is not realistic. However, had Denmark not 
decided to withdraw its assistance to the country, and Egypt in stead had received more 
capacity building in the years to come, the country might had been able to profit from budget 
support in the future. Had Danida begun to give budget support to Egypt these years, it must 
be envisioned that inefficient use of its resources in Egypt would have become a major issue 
in the years to come. The political consequence of this could be that the Danish government 
decides to reduce its foreign aid. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Environmental Sector Program - and its Internal National Involvement  
 
The general conviction among the interviewed environmental stakeholders in Egypt was that 
foreign aid programs do not have a satisfactory impact on improving the environment. It 
must therefore be relevant to investigate whether this is due to a lack of national coordination 
between institutions in the field of environmental policy. This research will focus on the 
Environmental Sector Program (ESP) in Egypt and investigate whether insufficient national 
coordination has limited the intended impact of the program. This chapter investigates the 
features of national involvement in the ESP and how it affects the intended outcome of the 
program. Firstly, an overview of environmental aid to Egypt is provided, showing the 
broader context of the ESP. Secondly, the case study of the Environmental Sector Program 
will illustrate how national involvement in the program can affect the outcome of the 
program. 
 
Account on Environmental Aid to Egypt 
A recent World Bank study on cost assessment of environmental degradation, 
estimates the damage cost to be LE 10-19 billion per year (or 3.2-6.4 percent of GDP).198 The 
environmental situation is worsened by the rapid population growth, which damages Egypt’s 
national resources.199 This estimate additionally stresses the need for efficient environmental 
foreign aid and national aid coordination is one of the factors that possibly can increase the 
impact of the environmental aid to the country. The latest official data available from the 
MIC from 2003 shows that the donors’ total disbursement for targeting MDG 7 
                                                 
198 United Nations, and Ministry of Planning. “Millennium Development Goals – Second Country Report Egypt 
2004”, 41. 
199 United Nations, and Ministry of Planning. “Millennium Development Goals – Second Country Report Egypt 
2004”, 42. 
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(environmental sustainability) amounted to US$383 million, which is a 7 percent increase 
from 2002.200 During the same period, the number of environmental development projects 
operating decreased form 233 to 209. In 2003, the main donors contributing to Goal 7 were 
the African Development Bank (ADB) with 24 percent, followed by the USAID with 20 
percent and the European Investment Bank (EIB) with 15.7 percent. With regard to the 
environmental MDG, donors have committed a net budget of US$8.98 billion until the year 
2009.201 Concerted or joint initiatives, including “basket funding” have, so far, been rare in 
the sector of environment.202  
In Figure 6, the chart shows the distribution of ODA disbursements by MDG in US$ 
million during the period 2001-2003. The donor funds allocated within the environmental 
field in Egypt are relatively high compared to the other areas of the MDGs.   
 
Figure 6:  Distribution of ODA disbursements by MDG, 2001-2003, US$ million.203 
 
                                                 
200 Ministry of International Cooperation. “Development Cooperation Report 2003”. 39. 
201 Ministry of International Cooperation. “Development Cooperation Report 2003”. 39. 
202 “First Joint Annual Sector Review Agreement, 09 April 2003 between The Government of the Arab Republic 
of Egypt and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark for the Environmental Sector Programme (ESP)”. 
(2003), 3.  
203 Ministry of International Cooperation. “Development Cooperation Report 2003”. 33. 
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All interviewees from the government’s environmental sector stated that Egypt has received 
a considerable amount of funds compared to the improved environmental impact that the 
assistance brought about.204 For example, Danida has spent somewhere around 300 million 
LE on environment aid to Egypt since year 2000. According to some managers in EEAA, 
this high investment did not result in the expected and desired improved environmental 
outcome.205 A similar opinion was expressed by a manager at the MIC responsible for 
coordinating USAID’s environmental aid to Egypt. This interviewee thought that the 
relatively modest accomplishments achieved using USAID support in this area were 
disproportionate with the allocated funds.206 One explaining factor of the limited outcome of 
the foreign environmental aid programs could be lack of coordination. But it should also be 
remembered that environmental issues are typically complex and difficult to resolve.  
Figure 7 shows the disbursements of ODA by geographical allocation in 2002-2003 
weighed against the regional standards of environment as defined by the percentage of 
Egyptian households with access to piped water and sanitation in 2001 in different regions. 
The MIC uses access to piped water and sanitation as an indicator of environmental 
conditions. However, it can always be debatable whether this measure is adequate and 
sufficient. The graph shows some selected governorates, stated to be medium- and low-
ranking governorates that were targeted by ODA. However, the MIC also acknowledges that 
the governorates of Menoufia, Assyout, Matrouh and South Sinai (which are not included on 
the graph) had the lowest access to piped water and sanitation and yet received the lowest 
percentages of ODA disbursements. The MIC recognizes that this knowledge of a 
disproportionate distribution of environmental aid should be reflected in future re-allocations 
of ODA to increase efficiency of resources.207  
                                                 
204 (3.7) 
205 (2.2, 3.10) 
206 (2.2) 
207 Ministry of International Cooperation. “Development Cooperation Report 2002,” 39. 
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Figure 7: Disbursements of ODA by Geographical Allocation (2002-2003) versus Households with Access to 
Piped Water and Sanitation (2001) in Egypt.208 
 
The Environmental Sector Program 
During the 1997 annual consultation between the governments of Denmark and Egypt, it was 
agreed that future environmental co-operation between the two countries would be structured 
as Sector Program Support (SPS).209 Danida first introduced this kind of assistance strategy 
in 1994 to ensure that Danish support would be harmonized with the sector policies of the 
different partner countries regarding mutual cooperation.210 Before 2001, Danida had been 
giving project support to Egypt in the fields of environment, water, and energy, but by 
January 2000 the SPS was appraised. January 1st, 2001 was the starting date for the 
Environmental Sector Program (ESP), where the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency 
(EEAA) under the Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs (MSEA) became cooperating 
agency in Egypt with Danida. The total budget of the SPS program, including the already 
                                                 
208 Ministry of International Cooperation. “Development Cooperation Report 2003,” 39. 
209 “Sector Program Support” replaced the previously used “Project Support” 
210 Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DMFA from now on), Final Sector Programme Support Document - 
Danish Support to the Environment Sector. Egypt. (Denmark: DMFA, 2000), 1. 
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ongoing projects, was DKK 432.1 million equal to US$58 (DKK 7.44 = US$ 1) spread over 
the period 2001 to 2006.211  
The developmental objective212 of the ESP is to contribute to the efforts of the Egyptian 
government to improve environmental conditions, and furthermore to develop environmental 
management capacity of institutions by provision of frameworks of compliance with 
environmental regulations.213 This goal is to be achieved through effective implementation of 
environmental management and improvement activities at the local level. Also, the ESP aims 
at supporting the EEAA’s strategy for rationalization of its services and functions as well as 
providing institutional support to two selected governorates, Aswan and Beni Suef. 
Furthermore, the ESP aims at assisting Egyptian industry in improving compliance with 
environmental regulation through a focus on implementation of cleaner production 
systems.214  
 
Structure of the ESP 
The ESP consists of several components and support activities, some of which have 
changed during the course of the program. In June 2005 the components within the program 
were SDEM (EMU, DEM, EMG), ACI, CEM, and EIMP. The Decentralized Environmental 
Management (DEM) component is responsible for setting up Regional Branch Offices 
(RBOs) that lead to a decentralization of the environmental management in Egypt. The 
Environmental Management in the Governorates (EMG) component, however, is expected to 
set up Environmental Management Units (EMUs) in the Governorates. Collaboration on 
rules and cooperation takes place between RBOs and EMUs. The EMU component is a pilot 
project that had the purpose of establishing the EMUs to show that for a fairly small amount 
                                                 
211 DMFA, “Final Sector Programme Support Document - Danish Support to the Environment Sector,” x. 
212 For details see Appendix C 
213 (DMFA, “Final Sector Programme Support Document - Danish Support to the Environment Sector,” viii. 
214 (DMFA, “Final Sector Programme Support Document - Danish Support to the Environment Sector,” viii. 
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of money the EMUs could be set up, and decentralization achieved.215 The new structure of 
the ESP stipulates Support to Decentralized Environmental Management (SDEM).216 This 
entity is thus made responsible for the three abovementioned components under a common 
planning, budgeting and work-planning framework. This system was introduced to augment 
and enhance coordination and effective use of Danida funding within the three 
components.217 The Achieving Compliance in Industry (ACI) component’s development 
objective is to improve compliance with the environmental legislation through cleaner 
production in a number of Egyptian industries.218 The Communication in Environmental 
Management (CEM) component provides support in the form of increased communication 
and awareness within EEAA, the RBOs and EMUs, which is necessary for the other 
components intended activities to take place.219 The Environmental Information and 
Monitoring Program (EIMP) component aims at enhancing knowledge and understanding of 
environmental quality and pollution sources and their interaction via primarily supporting the 
Environmental Quality Department within EEAA.220 The Fertiliser and Ferrosilicon Plant 
(KIMA) component that was designed to prevent and control pollution from the KIMA 
fertilisers and ferrosilicon plants was removed from the ESP in 2003.221 
A senior official at the Royal Danish Embassy in Cairo has the overall responsibility 
of the ESP. Inside the program itself, which is implemented in EEAA, the highest level of 
responsibility of the ESP is placed in the Program Coordination Committee (PCC) of which 
                                                 
215 (3.12, 3.14, Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency and Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Adjusted 
Sector Programme Support Document – Danish Support to the Environmental Sector, (Egypt: 2005), 20.  
216 The SDEM now contains the EMU (12 EMUs), DEM (that does the RBOs), and the EMG (EMUs) that all 
are described in “Draft Final Component Description”. Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency and Danish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Draft Final Component Description - Support to Decentralisation of Environmental 
Management (SDEM). (Egypt: 2005). 
217 Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency and Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Adjusted Sector 
Programme Support Document – Danish Support to the Environmental Sector”, 25. 
218 Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency and Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Adjusted Sector 
Programme Support Document – Danish Support to the Environmental Sector”, 25-30 
219 Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency and Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Adjusted Sector 
Programme Support Document – Danish Support to the Environmental Sector”, 30. 
220 DMFA, “Final Sector Programme Support Document - Danish Support to the Environment Sector,” 79. 
221 DMFA, “Final Sector Programme Support Document - Danish Support to the Environment Sector,” 89. 
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the chair is the Minister of MSEA. This committee meets 2-3 times every year. The Program 
Steering Committee consists of the governors of Aswan and Beni Suef, a representative from 
the Royal Danish Embassy in Cairo, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) from EEAA, the 
ESP coordinator (Egyptian), Chief Technical Advisor (foreign), a representative from MIC, 
and a representative from Department of International Cooperation (DIC) in MSEA.222 Until 
2004, the Program Steering Committee (PCC) was under the supervision of the Program 
Support Unit (PSU) responsible for all components. However, due to the second review 
mission in October 2004, the PSU became a Program Management Unit (PMU) that monitors 
SDEM, gives support to EEAA’s strategy, the Environmental Protection Fund (EPF), budget 
support to CEM (communication) and EIMP (information).223 The Program Management 
Unit (PMU) consists of a (local) Program Coordinator and this person’s counterpart (a 
foreign Chief Technical Advisor) and a (local) Technical Coordinator. The PMU is 
accountable to Danida for monitoring and follow-up. Also, the PMU is responsible for 
helping EEAA on a strategic level, e.g. making the NEAP into an Action Plan, delegating 
responsibility to magistrates, and improving communication flow in EEAA.224  
In addition, every component has a local manager who has an advisor by his/her side. 
Thus the program is designed with two managers in each leading position; an Egyptian and a 
foreign advisor. This means that there are two Program Coordinators responsible for the 
entire ESP and two managers of each of the components. The advisors are meant to develop 
the capacity of the Egyptian counterparts, yet the Egyptians are supposed to be the 
responsible part, leading the implementation.  
The ESP’s structure as well as its internal flow of information is conducive to 
national involvement and coordination. There seems to be a satisfactory flow of information 
                                                 
222 (3.5, 3.12)  
223 “Second Joint Sector Review, Environmental Sector Programme Egypt. Review Aide Memoir”, October 
2004. 
224 (3.12) 
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from the ground level of the program (the components and the SDEM) to the PMU and the 
PCC, as well as structured interaction and internal coordination. The relations between the 
mentioned levels of management in the ESP can be found in Appendix D.    
 
Account of the Environmental Sector Program 
The first program document and the introduction to EEAA staff of the ESP was donor driven. 
This became clear from interviews with experienced Danida employees as well as local 
members of staff in EEAA. According to some local staff members, the first time they were 
made aware of the program, it was presented as an already made and finalized program.225 
Some local managers were indeed consulted about the program. Yet, it was their impression 
that Danida made the final decisions without their involvement.226 Also, the first program 
document was too difficult to grasp due to the program’s complexity, the numerous sub-
structures and abbreviations used. In addition, the first program document was written using 
Danida terminology, and although translated from English into Arabic227 the language made 
the local staff members in EEAA alienated and disconnected from the new program.228 
According to senior staff in EEAA, most employees were confused in the beginning and the 
introductory courses of the ESP were insufficient to make the Egyptians feel ownership of 
the program.  
On the positive note, this research investigation strongly indicates that the situation 
has improved and that there is now generally a great satisfaction with the current proceedings 
used by Danida. It appears as if the current officials are able to accommodate the local staff 
members and involve them in a constructive way. This is a clear shift in comparison to the 
                                                 
225 (3.8, 3,14) 
226 (3.8)  
227 (The language policy of Danida has been changed and all documents are now translated into unproblematic 
Arabic. Danida uses some of the best translators although some in MSEA find them too expensive (3.14) ). 
228 (3.8, 3.14) 
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initial phase where some local staff members in EEAA felt looked down upon, pushed and 
given order by the Royal Danish Embassy in Cairo and Danida. 
The donor driven characteristics of the initial phase of the ESP have caused a 
subsequent delay in the phase of program implementation. The current Danida staff greatly 
regrets that the program was rushed through in 2000/2001. However, due to disbursement 
pressure there was no other alternative available at the time.229 One member of staff in DIC 
said that this is an example of Danida’s focus on results instead of being process-oriented.230 
Owing to a greater effort by present Danida staff at the embassy and in the program, the 
apathy among the EEAA staff during the first couple of years with a consequent low program 
output has now been replaced by progress. In October 2004, the implementation had begun 
and the program finances were beginning to be spent. The staff in EEAA now understands 
the program, feels a higher degree of ownership, and thereby makes a lot more progress than 
previously with regard to the implementation of the program.231 
At the High Level Negotiations in 2003, it was decided to phase out the program in 
the year 2008. This decision shortened the period available to embed the program into the 
relevant national structures, and made the time for the phasing out approach much sooner 
than planned. The Danida advisors are now in a difficult situation. They need to push the 
program forward at the same time ensuring its self-sustainability by letting local staff take on 
increased responsibility. Due to dissatisfaction, the latest Review Mission (2005) resulted in 
a memoir being written jointly by local and foreign consultants. The recommendations in this 
“Aide Memoir - from a Joint Review of the proposed Reshaped ESP April-May 2005” were 
that the ESP document should be modified232 so that the ESP includes elements of strategic 
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Environmental Sector” from 2005, and in the “Draft Final Component Description – Support to Decentralization 
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support to different EEAA departments, support to the Environmental Protection Fund, a 
ceasing role of the PMU at the end of the program period, and increased clarity about 
division between EEAA, RBOs and EMUs.233 The PCC approved these changes August 
22nd 2005. In summer/fall 2005, the PMU started making an exit-strategy, where the 
procedure for the EEAA taking over the responsibility of the funding and the implementation 
of the ESP is described.234  
 
Analysis 
Counterparts 
Some interviewees from EEAA pointed out that the set-up of two managers in the same 
position in the program as the only right way to implement an aid program. However, others 
said that this is an impossible construction creating conflicts and unclear leadership.  
The double-staffed positions are meant to foster capacity development of the EEAA 
and to demonstrate that the program is nationally owned and driven. However, certain 
challenges obstruct the actualization of this scheme. The local private consultancy 
EcoConServ’s report Donor Assistance to Egypt in the Field of Environment from June 2005 
contains a summary of the findings from a survey on donors and Egyptian counterparts and is 
a good account of the lessons learned during the last ten years of cooperation in the field of 
environmental aid. One finding is that there is no equal standing between donor and 
counterpart in the design phase of aid programs. This has also been seen to be the case with 
                                                                                                                                                        
Foreign Affairs, Adjusted Sector Programme Support Document, Danish Support to the Environment Sector, 
Egypt. (Egypt: 2005); Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency and Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Draft 
Final Component Description - Support to Decentralisation of Environmental Management (SDEM)”. . 
233 Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency, and Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Adjusted Sector 
Programme Support Document, Danish Support to the Environment Sector, Egypt. (Egypt: 2005), 1-11. 
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the ESP. The Egyptian counterparts state in the survey that this is one of the main difficulties, 
concluding that “..Counterparts are viewed as recipients and not real partners”.
235 
In reality, it depends on the situation whether the Egyptian staff member or the 
foreign advisor make a certain decision. Some local staff members mentioned that often 
when an Egyptian takes the lead, the foreign advisors are correcting him or her. It is difficult 
for the Danida advisors to hand over the full responsibility e.g. when the issue is money 
expenditures. Some Danida advisors still request to sign all checks that might as well just be 
signed by local staff. Another key element of the ESP that is dominated by the donor 
becomes apparent when a program is to be reshaped. Danida staff seems to be more 
enthusiastic than the Egyptians. The Egyptians, in many cases, view this process as too time 
consuming, too focused on written documents and small details, and with far too many 
meetings and workshops involved.236 This means that the resulting overall strategic changes, 
as the formation of the SDEM, ends up as a mostly donor driven process. 
The management system in Egypt is, as mentioned earlier, very centralized with 
orders normally coming form above. This has cultivated an organizational culture where 
middle and lower rank staff members are not used to make decisions and to take on 
responsibility. Consequently, there is a tendency of local staff members to prefer that the 
Danida advisors make the final decisions, so that they do not have the responsibility when 
something goes wrong. However, on a positive note, most interviewees in EEAA are of the 
impression that the ESP in general is lead, coordinated and influenced by local staff.237  
 The alternative to the structural set-up with counterparts in the ESP is that the 
management becomes purely Egyptian or purely Danish/international. If it were purely 
Egyptian, the changes that the ESP seeks to achieve in the EEAA would probably not have 
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been initiated due to lack of funds, and technical and human resources. Nonetheless, had it 
been purely done by Danish and international development officials – which some local staff 
members would have preferred – the activities would not be sustainable when the Danida 
support is phased out. It seems as if the current structure is appropriate as well as challenging 
and time-consuming. The basic understanding that great patience is necessary to achieve the 
build-up of capacity development and institutional development seems to have been a bit 
lacking. The ESP would have increased its chances to achieve the intended impact and to 
become sustainable, had it been given more time.  
Alternatively, had the ESP started off in the design phase with equal input from 
Danida staff and local staff, it would have seemed more plausible that the role of Danida 
advisors could have been toned down over the years. Conversely, due to the lack of EEAA’s 
participation in the initial phases of the program (and the slow start of the program itself) and 
due to Danida’s pulling out before time, the program is in a phase where the Danida staff 
feels a need to coordinate and push the program, because the time for the exit strategy is 
getting close. While conducting the interviews in July/August 2005, the preparations of an 
exit strategy were finally on the agenda. It shall be a demanding, however, not impossible 
process, to make the ESP sustainable when the Danida funds run out in 2008. The Egyptian 
authorities could have demanded that the initial phases of the program had been instrumented 
in close coordination with national authorities. Just an upfront decision would have increased 
the overall outcome of the ESP. 
 
Capacity Development 
The capacity development that takes place as a major element of the ESP is also a factor of 
different opinions among the staff in EEAA. Most interviewed employees within and outside 
the EEAA said that judged upon the actions of the Ministry it is difficult to argue that the 
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capacity development is working.238 One local member of staff in EEAA thought that 
capacity development was a bigger success for Danida in the past when the agency trained 
local lower/middle rank staff, compared to now when Danida attempts to develop the 
capacity of managers/leaders.239 Some local and international staff members in EEAA and a 
former manager of EEAA said that it is almost naive of Danida to believe it can change the 
overall Egyptian management style. It has shown to be very difficult and would require a lot 
of concerted initiatives to achieve.   
One aspect that certainly complicates the capacity development is the well-known 
fact that the two cultures – the Danish/Scandinavian and the Egyptian/Arab lie far apart from 
each other on a cultural spectrum.240 Edward Hall’s theory of “Low versus High Context 
Cultures” and Melton Bennett’s theory of “Individualistic versus Collectivist Societies” 
shows that the Egyptian and Scandinavian culture could be placed towards each end on such 
continuums. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in Cairo has 
published two books on these matters. One book explains the Canadian culture to Egyptians, 
and the other provides the Canadian aid workers with the values of the Egyptians. CIDA 
produced these books after the management realized that lack of cultural understanding 
negatively influences the implementation of aid programs. Without going into detail, it is 
clear from the two books that each culture has their own working styles, learning styles, way 
of communicating at work and preferred relationships with colleagues.241  
These cultural differences mean, that what is the appropriate management style in the 
view of the local manager might be viewed as the wrong way of doing things by the 
international counterpart.242 One divergence is that some Danida staff prefer that the 
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Egyptian counterparts talk openly of all kinds of structural, management, and efficiency 
problems at meetings, whereas the Egyptian part would rather not be so frank and critical in 
forums where superiors are present.243 The foreign advisors would in general - in an attempt 
to solve problems – prefer to talk openly about the challenges faced, whereas the Egyptians 
generally have a tendency not to expose problems at open meetings. The Egyptians respect 
the levels of hierarchy to a much larger extent than persons coming from an anti-authoritarian 
Scandinavian culture would generally do. Therefore, it is not comfortable for an Egyptian to 
mention ground-level problems in front of a higher ranked manager. The Egyptian staff 
members do not always find that superiors accept and understand problems on the ground-
level, and the consequence of this lack of understanding can be that ground-staff gets blamed 
and punished for their openness.244 On the other hand, Western workers have a tendency to 
worry about whether they meet the expectations of their superiors if actual problems are 
being hidden or toned down.  
Concerning capacity development, national coordination could also have played a 
constructive role; if the MIC or MSEA had focused their negotiations with Danida to achieve 
a longer-term assistance from Danida, the gradual results of capacity development would 
have had more time to make the intended positive impact. 
 
Findings and Conclusions 
The initial phase of the ESP did not encourage national ownership of the program, as it was 
donor-driven. However, the program’s placement in EEAA during the phase of 
implementation is conducive for national involvement. Also the set-up of the ESP has 
continuously been adjusted to enhance internal coordination. The execution of the ESP by a 
national authority and national staff facilitates an ongoing alignment of the program to 
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national priorities. The arrangement of counterparts on the managerial positions in the 
program supports national involvement in the decision making process. Still the influence of 
national authorities and staff on daily operations and on the coordination of the ESP could 
have been much stronger, had the capacity and institutional framework been at place in the 
MSEA. The set-up with counterparts does foster capacity development. However, the 
expected managerial and institutional changes in EEAA will take a long time to achieve. The 
intended national ownership of the ESP nevertheless increases the chances of the program 
being nationally well coordinated as well as sustainable. There is a need for increased 
capacity and organizational restructuring in EEAA before national involvement to the 
greatest extent possible helps the ESP reaching its intended outcome. 
In the following chapter, it shall be scrutinized whether/how Egyptian authorities have 
coordinated the ESP both on a sectoral level (by MSEA) and on a cross-sectoral level (by 
MoP and MIC). It shall be evident whether the national sectoral and cross-sectoral aid 
coordination has supported or delayed the ESP in reaching its intended outcome. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Environmental Sector Program – and its Sector and Cross-Sector National 
Coordination 
 
Does sector and cross-sector national coordination of the ESP have an effect on the program 
reaching its intended outcome?  This chapter argues that national coordination by the 
Ministry of State for of Environmental Affairs, the MoP and the MIC could have played a 
much stronger role in coordinating the ESP, had the mentioned institutions been better 
equipped for executing their respective responsibilities.   
 
Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs, Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency 
Firstly, the Ministry is introduced and its goals, visions and objectives are presented. 
Thereafter, the functions and structure of the Ministry is described and the biggest challenges 
for national environmental aid coordination by MSEA are discussed. Hereafter follows 
accounts of MSEA’s official as well as practical use of national environmental development 
strategies, follow-up procedures, and use of a participatory approach. Lastly it is being 
scrutinized whether the MSEA has coordinated the ESP.   
 
The environment came on the national agenda in Egypt in the 1970s/80s because of an 
increased international focus on environmental issues and activities and consequently by the 
local civil society245. The Minister for Public Sector Industries, that simultaneously was the 
Minister of State for Local Development, was also appointed Minister for Environmental 
Affairs.246 In the 1980s and onwards there were only laws on environmental issues related to 
protected areas as well as irrigation and agriculture. It was not until 1994, when Law 4/1994 
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for the Protection of the Environment247 was introduced, that the first comprehensive 
environmental law was put into action.248 Law 4/1994249 established the Egyptian 
Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA) that initiated its operations in 1995 as affiliated with 
the Cabinet of Ministers. In 1997, the Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs was 
established and the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA) became its executive 
body. The EEAA is the central government institution for promoting sustainable 
development and environment in Egypt.250 In June 1997, Egypt's first full time Minister of 
State for Environmental Affairs was assigned as stated in the Presidential Decree no. 
275/1997. From thereon, the new Ministry focused, in close collaboration with the national 
and international development partners, on defining environmental policies, setting priorities 
and implementing initiatives within a context of sustainable development.251 
The Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs (MSEA) and more specifically its executing 
body, the EEAA, is the entity responsible for the coordination of environmental programs on 
a sector level. In the following section, the official objective and strategies of the MSEA and 
EEAA is presented. Subsequently, it shall be analysed whether and how the MSEA/EEAA 
has played a coordinating role in the case of the ESP.     
 
                                                 
247 Law 4/1994, has a greater role with respect to all governmental sectors as a whole. The law has been 
designated as the highest coordinating body in the field of the environment that will formulate the general policy 
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the standards to be used in planning for their development (http://www.eeaa.gov.eg). 
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249 (See Genena 2003 for a brief analysis of the law and its implementation) Tarek Genena, “A Consultant 
Report on the Country Environmental Analysis (CEA),” (Egypt: 2003). 
250 “Agreed Minutes of the Development Cooperation Consultations between The Kingdom of 
Denmark and The Arab Republic of Egypt, (Egypt: 3-7 May 2003), 2.  
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Goals, Vision and Objectives 
The EEAA has three main objectives; the strategic objective aims at introducing and 
integrating environmental dimensions in all national policies, plans, programs relevant to 
protection of human health and management of natural resources. The medium-term 
objective is to preserve the natural resource base, national heritage and biodiversity within a 
context of sustainable development. The short-term objective is to reduce current pollution 
levels and thereby to minimize health hazards and to improve quality of life.252 
 
Functions 
Official Procedure 
The principle functions253 of the EEAA are to formulate environmental policies and prepare 
the necessary plans for environmental protection and environmental development projects, as 
well as to follow-up on their implementation, and to undertake pilot projects. Furthermore, 
the agency is the national authority in charge of promoting environmental relations between 
Egypt and other States, as well as regional and international organizations.254 
As with every other line Ministry, the MSEA sends its prioritised program proposals to the 
MoP every year. Furthermore, regarding foreign aid programs, the EEAA designs programs 
in collaboration with donors or send program proposals to the MIC to apply for external 
funding. In general, the MSEA communicates through MIC if they need additional funds, 
new projects to be financed, extension of projects, and if there are problems of 
implementation.255 Moreover, the MSEA collaborates with donors and other line Ministries 
when executing the national as well as the donor funded programs.  
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Practical Implementation 
In practice, the formulation of environmental policies and the preparation of the necessary 
plans for environmental development projects in EEAA take place in the department of 
“Foreign Relation & Technical Cooperation” (from now on called Department of 
International Cooperation (DIC)), the “Planning and Follow-up Unit” and the “Financial 
Affairs Unit”. Finally, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) reads all the projects after which 
the recommended projects are shown to the Minister.  
 The CEO is responsible for the environmental coordination. Yet it seems that this is 
more a formal procedure that is not sufficiently followed in practice within the MSEA. Few 
of the interviewees in EEAA seemed to be concerned with the actual requirements and 
managerial procedures. According to five different interviewees in EEAA and a former 
EEAA manager, the Planning and Follow-up Department does not have the needed capacity 
and management structures in place to prepare the necessary plans.256 As explained by the 
interviewees, the Planning and Follow-up Department is one of the weakest in the agency, 
and therefore the DIC has become the driving force in environmental coordination.  
 
Structure 
Official Procedure 
The Minister of State for Environmental Affairs is directly accountable to the Prime Minister. 
This is partly due the fact, that the MSEA is not an implementing Ministry but a coordinating 
Ministry, whose role is to ensure environmental policies are implemented through other 
relevant Ministries.  
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Figure 8 below provides an overview of the EEAA organizational structure257. The 
chart is eleven years old, from 1994; however, a new organizational chart was announced in 
August 2005 but not yet approved by the central authorities. The fundamental structure is not 
changed in the new organization but approximately 48 new departments have been added.  
 
Figure 9: Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA) Organization Chart.
258
 
 
The chart shows that the EEAA contains a Planning and a Follow-up Department, which is 
the department responsible for the National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) and the 
planning of future projects in MSEA. Just below this department on the chart, one finds the 
Department of International Cooperation entitled “Foreign Relations and Technical 
Cooperation”. This department is responsible for obtaining the needed external funding in 
MSEA through MIC. The MIC is also the external link to the MoP, responsible for delivering 
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project and program proposals that the MSEA would like to have accepted in the yearly 
technical plan, which is the responsibility of the MoP. Furthermore, at the bottom left corner 
of the chart one finds a department entitled “Financial Affairs” that manages the internal 
financial aspects in the Ministry. According to interviewees, the relevant technical 
department for a certain project prepares the project documents or proposals together with 
Department of International Cooperation and the Department of Planning and Follow-up 
(different views in MSEA exist regarding this procedure).259  
 
Practical Implementation 
It was impossible to get clear-cut information about the structural procedures for 
communication between the departments in EEAA, which seems to be a symptom of weak 
official coordination within the agency. Genena stated in the country environmental analysis 
from 2003, that the relationships between the different departments of the EEAA need to be 
more formalized.260 
From interviews with staff within the MSEA, past employees, and outside stakeholders, it 
became apparent that the Ministry is known to be one of the more complicated Ministries to 
work within as well as to collaborate with. This reputation is partly derived from previous 
chaotic periods with lack of effective management and good organization.261 The structure of 
the MSEA is still to this day a mix of the political and executive branches. This has been 
criticized by many interviewees as limiting the civil servants’ focus on scientific knowledge 
in the executive branch. The executing branch is supposed to function as a non-political, 
scientific and technical agency, yet the politicians in MSEA interfere with their work.262 It 
seems as if consistency of work progress and the institutional memory in the EEAA suffers 
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under the ongoing political changes taking place in the GoE.  At the same time, the EEAA is 
known as a good agency compared to the agencies of other Ministries, as its employees are 
active, responsive and interested in programs.263  
 The fact that the Planning and Follow-up Department is weak means that the planning 
authority inside the MSEA is not capable of fulfilling its function of contacting other line 
Ministries to make them fund and/or implement environmental policies. Also when DIC 
contacts the MIC to obtain external funding, internal staff members in DIC acknowledge that 
the quality of the projects could be made better. This issue will be discussed in the section on 
DIC264.   
One local senior staff member of EEAA was fascinated by planning and cited 
different scientist within the field of sustainable development. This interviewee saw a great 
need for improved environmental planning according to a system including: needs, budgets, 
the element of sustainability, the roles of NGOs, donors, civil society and the national 
budget. He told that recent debate on sustainable development strategies has led to a proposal 
for EEAA to be the coordinator of a sustainable development strategy with other Ministries 
in Egypt. This proposal is currently awaiting the approval of the Prime Minister. 265 
This encouraging initiative to ensure sustainability in Egypt can pave the way for 
more  staff being trained to meet the technical challenges faced to run the Ministry, as well as 
to ensure sufficient funds and implementation of more up-to-date laws.266 According to Law 
4, the EEAA is officially already the coordinating body for sustainable development in 
Egypt. However, these recent developments involve making the MSEA the leading Ministry 
of national sustainable development strategies. If this comes through, this would 
simultaneously provide the Ministry with increased authority to ensure implementation of 
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environmental policies. At the time of the interview, the CEO had approved an “Institutional 
Framework for Sustainable Development”,
267 which could open the door for a “National 
Strategy for Sustainable Development” (NSSD) that through its national enforcement could 
foster coordination in environmental and sustainable developmental matters in Egypt. 
However, according to a senior staff member in EEAA, there needs to be an increased 
dissemination of environmental knowledge at highest level for any coordination progress to 
happen. 268   
It is crucial for the overall cross-sectoral national coordination of environmental aid 
that the MSEA knows its priorities. As stated by a former EEAA manager: “Outsiders cannot 
judge what a country needs, a sectoral Ministry knows best.”269 Consequently, if the MSEA 
does not know what it wants or needs, then national environmental aid coordination becomes 
very complicated. Some interviewees were therefore of the opinion, that it would be 
unreasonable to expect MoP to be able to plan and coordinate environmental aid when the 
plans and priorities from the sector Ministry are of such low quality as in the case of the 
plans provided by the MSEA.270 The MoP builds its plan upon information from line 
Ministries, following (formally at least) the line Ministries’ priorities and plans. This bottom-
up mechanism is indeed essential for good planning. However, the MSEA is one of many 
examples of line Ministries that does not have the competences to implement this 
communication mechanism.271  
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Issues pertaining to Coordination of Environmental Aid 
 
Listed below are the different factors, that the author, on the basis of the current 
research investigations, have identified as the main challenges for national environmental aid 
coordination by MSEA. They are concerned with the national commitment to ensure 
environmental sustainability, capacity in the field of environment, management culture and 
leadership, parallel structures within the bureaucracy, the relationship between MSEA and 
other line Ministries and finally ministerial and bureaucratic structure. 
 
National Commitment to ensure Environmental Sustainability 
In Egypt, the MoP and the UN both assessed the possibility of attaining the environmental 
MDG target of environmental sustainability as a “potential” probability. Actually the 
country’s ‘state of supportive environment’ (that indicates the commitment and the priority 
that environment gets in Egypt) was evaluated as “fair”. This assessment was better than the 
two worse alternatives “weak but improving” and “weak”. On the other hand, it was not 
assessed as “strong”, the highest state of supportive environment.
272 Only one other area of 
the MDGs (HIV/AIDS) receives a worse assessment of state support, which shows the 
somewhat difficult conditions that the MSEA is working under.273       
 
Capacity in the field of Environment  
The Millennium Development Goals Second Country Report made by MoP and the UN 
assesses the Egyptian capacity in the different fields of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). MDG number 7 is the environmental Millennium Development Goal, which aims 
at “Ensuring Environmental Sustainability”. The three targets of the MDG 7 are: 1) 
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integrating the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programs, and 
reverse the loss of environmental resources; 2) halve, by 2015, the promotion of people 
without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation; and 3) have achieved, 
by 2020, a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers.274 
The authors of the report have assessed Egypt’s “Monitoring and Evaluation 
Capacity” within the field of the environmental MDG as the second weakest area of capacity 
out of the 9 areas of MDGs. Only the 9th MDG - developing a global partnership for 
development – had slightly less capacity in Egypt than the environmental field.275 The field 
of environment was thereby the second weakest field within the 9 MDGs concerning data 
gathering capacity, quality of survey information, statistical tracking, statistical information 
policy and monitoring and evaluation. This supports the view of the critics cited above.276  
The MoP/UN concluded in the report “Millennium Development Goals – Second 
Country Report, Egypt 2004” that the major challenge of ensuring environmental 
sustainability (the overall goal of the ESP) is “Strengthening environmental institutions and 
enforcing a sound environmental behavior.”
277 
Data on Egypt’s environment exists and is mainly provided by donors as the WB and 
the UN.278 However, according to Tarek Genena’s A Consultant Report on the Country 
Environmental Analysis (CEA) from 2003, there is a serious deficiency in data and 
information regarding health impacts of environmental problems as well as cost benefit 
analyses of different environmental challenges and priorities.279 The EEAA is in need of 
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regular data and information gathered by the monitoring activities within the agency.280 This 
means, that it is actually difficult for the MSEA to devise plans even if the budget and the 
people knowledgeable with respect to planning issues were available. The EEAA suffers 
from serious shortages of human resources both in quantitative and qualitative terms.281 As a 
consequence, the most efficient staff including the Minister is always being overloaded. 
There is a strong need for better human resources as well as an organizational structure and 
culture that uses the knowledge available in the system.282 There is a high turning over of 
staff in EEAA because of political and financial reasons.283 The competent and well-trained 
staff members are attractive to the private sector, where they can easily increase their value 
on the job market.284 The staff is therefore tempted to move away from the EEAA, which 
risks lowering the human capacities inside the agency.  
One aspect that the author believes could increase environmental capacity in EEAA 
would be if the agency were better at preserving documents and ensuring efficient archives 
that would make it easy to retrieve documents internally as well as for external users. This 
could increase the institutional memory of important success stories. Some employees within 
the DIC uttered that the frequent turnover causes the lack of institutional memory and the 
inefficient use of experiences gained during work with former plans. When staff is not used 
to using and following a plan, it cannot be a surprise that making a helpful plan becomes 
difficult.285 EcoConServ’s research of the donors and Egyptian counterparts’ experiences in 
the field of environmental management also leads to the conclusion by the Egyptian 
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counterparts286 that it is a constraint that there is “no building on previous experiences” in the 
project preparations phase.287 
 
Management Culture and Leadership 
A strong leader with a controlled organizational apparatus underneath is a suitable and 
common characterization of the management and leadership styles in the public sector of 
Egypt. Along the same lines – as viewed by staff in MSEA - a superior in EEAA typically 
decides and dictates what needs to be done in the departments beneath his own. 
Consequently, everyone underneath the superior is waiting for orders and many interviewees 
referred to the problem of passiveness and not daring to initiate activities themselves. 
Because of this lack of influence in the overall process, some employees in the EEAA 
become indifferent to the impact of the aid programs as a whole, resulting in little concern 
with work of colleagues in other departments.288 
Ideally, coordination comes from discussions, sharing of information and 
collaboration between levels and departments as well from a strong feeling of ownership 
among the employees. The knowledge flowing upwards in the system is also restricted under 
the current management structure. It is customary that a sub-manager does not discuss any 
problems directly with managers in other departments. This structure restricts and 
complicates the internal flow of knowledge in the EEAA. According to some interviewees, 
inside EEAA this results in collaboration most commonly taking place within the 
possibilities of the bureaucratic structure, which is not necessarily the most efficient 
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approach. Employees are hesitant to attempt alternative approaches, since their superiors can 
interpret this as criticism.289 
In this organizational culture, the director can interfere all the way down to the lowest 
ranks of employees, making it unclear what are his/her main responsibilities. This leaves the 
CEO with an excessive workload. Due to the structure of the EEAA, as seen in Figure 10, 
nineteen people are referring to the CEO. This structure means that the politically responsible 
– the CEO – would most likely have too little time left to pay attention to long-term planning 
and strategies. 
 
Another issue that interviewees found problematic with regard to the current leadership was 
the selection of ministers in the field of environment. In an interview, an environmental NGO 
representative and a former EEAA manager stated that the problem of environmental aid 
coordination factually lies on the ministerial level, through the process of the selection of the 
Minister of State for Environmental Affairs him/herself. Indeed, from all the interviews made 
it became clear that there has been much dissatisfaction with the Prime Minister’s former 
appointments to the position of Ministers of State for Environmental Affairs. The point of the 
interviewees were that, as long as an incompetent person can become a Minister and turn 
everything upside down, it is hard to reach the Ministry’s goals, visions and objectives.
290 
Ministers have in general not acknowledged the plans of their previous counterparts and, 
instead, they mostly attempted to alter such plans, also before having been properly briefed 
by senior staff in MSEA.291 One environmentalist said in frustration of the history of 
leadership in EEAA “You can’t blame the Ministers for what they do or don’t do. But the 
procedures for the selection of the Minister of State for Environmental Affairs must be done 
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with certain relevant criteria.”
292 The source stressed the importance of the Prime Minister 
selecting the Minister for Environment with criteria such as the person’s experience with 
international, national, and local environmental issues. As it is now, most of the ministers are 
often one-sided and not well rounded when it comes to environmental awareness, 
management skills, and personality.293  
 
Parallel Structures within the Bureaucracy 
Military ranks create their own kind of structure that sometimes suspend/contradict with the 
bureaucratic structure. An employee that attained a high title in the army as Marshal, Major 
General or General can due to his rank in the military take on a more powerful role in a 
Ministry than the person would be entitled to based on his relevant skills even without any 
protests from colleagues.294 
 
MSEA and other Line Ministries 
According to the international agenda, the Rio Summit and Agenda 21, all Ministries need a 
strategy for sustainable development – and this strategy will without a doubt impinge on a 
multitude of areas. The environmental concerns are thus the responsibility of most Ministries 
and not only of the Ministry of environment. The participants on the Summit of Sustainable 
Development in Johannesburg in 2002 agreed, that all countries must have a strategy of 
sustainable development implemented by 2005. This is also what some senior officials in 
MSEA are trying to set up.295   
There are different views of whether the MSEA fulfills its mission of environmental 
development not being an implementing Ministry with its own funding. Some interviewees 
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inside the EEAA said that the MSEA has failed its coordinating role, as it has not managed to 
coordinate the other Ministries. It requires a more developed and less hierarchical structure to 
have a Ministry of environment that coordinates. Until the communication between the 
Ministries is improved, the MSEA is unlikely to achieve an efficient promotion of the 
environment. However, other members of staff stated that a Ministry of environment 
functions better when it implements through other Ministries, as the environment is a cross-
cutting issue that should be integrated into other relevant Ministries.296  
It is difficult for the MSEA to implement and follow-up a certain scope of policies, 
when it is relatively weak compared to the other line Ministries that are older, bigger, and 
richer and rather more respected and established in the realm of the Egyptian government.297 
Also, people in other Ministries need to be more aware of environmental issues if the tasks of 
the MSEA are to be implemented. It would be beneficial if the Ministries would look at the 
environment as a benefit instead of a cost.298 According to a high official in MSEA, every 
line Ministry in Egypt has a department of environment299 that helps the MSEA execute 
environmental policies. Conversely, an official from DIC stated that only approximately six 
Ministries have established internal departments for environmental concerns.300 These 
departments are helpful for line Ministries to understand the needs of the environment and 
help the EEAA integrate environmental concerns in the work plan of their respective 
Ministries.301 
According to Salwa Sharawi Gomaa, the author of the book from 1997 
Environmental Policy Making in Egypt, the MSEA has clear policy goals. The problem is 
that some of these goals are undermined by conflicting policies in other Ministries and 
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agencies that were supposed to implement the environmental policies.302 The author’s 
description of the MSEA in 1997 is generally much more positive than the view of this 
research’s interviewees. This difference might be explained by looking at the leadership in 
the MSEA at the time Gomaa conducted her research, which was, according to many 
interviewees, the best period regarding the leadership of and management in the EEAA.303 
Gomaa’s point, nevertheless, stresses the need for a common view among decision makers 
on environmental issues. 
Therefore, one could argue that, in order for the MSEA’s goals to be achieved, the 
Ministry should be allotted much more political power by the state itself. A coordinating 
Ministry needs a proper status, sufficient respect, and the ability to exercise law enforcement 
mechanisms.304 It would, for example, be useful if more funds were given to the MSEA for it 
to distribute to implementing Ministries. Another option is for the other line Ministries to be 
able to receive funding earmarked for environmental initiatives.305   
 
Ministerial and Bureaucratic Structure 
An important structural obstacle is that a staff member in an Egyptian Ministry need to 
obtain a protocol signed by the Minister to be allowed to communicate with a staff member 
in another Ministry. This protocol needs to be elaborated upon by the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) that clarifies what the Ministries can discuss. Every time a new Minister is 
appointed, all the protocols written by the former Minister are discarded and new ones needs 
to be established and implemented. This consequently results in a very low level of 
communication between Ministries as the time-consuming/administrative protocols in effect 
function as an incentive not to make a connection to another Ministry. The procedure 
                                                 
302 Gomaa, “Environmental Policy Making in Egypt”, 58. 
303 (3.1, 3.10, 3.12, 4.1, 4.2) 
304 (3.2, 3.3, 3.12, 4.1) 
305 (3.2, 4.1) 
  
 
106 
 
hampers and limits the internal collaboration, continuity, coherence and long term planning 
and coordination between Ministries that otherwise could foster holistic developmental 
planning.306 
On top of this, the fact that political and executive branches of Ministries are 
sometimes mixed with each other also makes it difficult for the technical experience inside 
the Ministries to play its rational and intellectual role. Different interviewees inside EEAA 
thought that the Minister’s secretariat would be better placed if situated separately from the 
executing branch of the MSEA. When the implementing agency is mixed with political 
agendas, this influences the technical assessments.307 
 
National Environmental Development Strategies  
The MSEA has currently two plans for coordination of environmental aid programs; a long 
term “National Environmental Action Plan 2002-2017” and a five-year plan. There is no one-
year plan for the environmental field in Egypt. There have currently been produced seven 
Governmental Environmental Action Plans (GEAPs) in Egypt, and in the future regional 
environmental action plans (REAPs) are expected to be produced.308 These action plans are 
supposed to guide stakeholders e.g. donors in their formulation of environmental aid 
programs.  
Gomaa has examined the first NEAP and paid attention to three key elements: its lack 
of priorities, the lack of initiative concerning the impact of the growing population on 
environmental degradation as well as the relation between poverty and the environment. 
Gomaa concludes, “Consequently the NEAP became more like a shopping list of projects to 
be presented to donor countries than a National Environmental Plan to solve the country’s 
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basic problems.”309 The second NEAP (2002-2017) that appeared after the design of the ESP 
in 2000, is also, but to a lesser extent, a donor-led report made by EEAA in collaboration 
with UNDP and Capacity 21.310   
However, in 1998, the Minister of State for Environmental Affairs issued a seven-point 
directives framework “Egyptian Policy Framework for the Environmental Sector” that is 
seen in Table 2. 
 
Practical Implementation 
The first NEAP provided an agenda for the MSEA and donors. However, it is questionable to 
which degree other Ministries viewed the plan as reflecting their priorities.311 When it comes 
to coordination with other line Ministries, the updated NEAP has not worked the way it 
should either.312 One environmentalist outside MSEA held the view, that line Ministries need 
to meet and coordinate before the line Ministries would feel the need to implement 
environmental policies.313 The internal authority of the NEAP in MSEA is also relative and 
unclear. When a new Minister was appointed after the second NEAP had been launched, he 
did not respect the plan and changed the priorities. This is an example of the plan aligning to 
the system, instead of the system aligning to the plan.  
The donors interviewed did not perceive the NEAP as an ideal plan or strategy. This 
reflects a different view of what a plan is supposed to contain and provide. Most donors view 
the NEAP as a background document.314 Some of the reasons for this assessment were: 
“There is no commitment in this document; it does not have a schedule, national resources, 
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an action plan and priorities.”
315 Another environmental stakeholder stated: “It does not have 
a plan of relations with donors or a strategy of relations to geographic areas that donors 
should help with.”
316 One very critical former employee in EEAA said: “It is mostly a 
dream” and “In Egypt a plan on paper is never implemented.”
317 It was not possible for me to 
be ascertained by staff in EEAA, that the plan was not changed when a donor comes with a 
certain new idea and funding offer.318  
According to local staff, however, the updated NEAP is very useful. A couple of local 
staff representatives assigned the plan as their bible. However, the expatriates call it a wish 
list of limited use. At any rate, the NEAP has, in general, not had the greatest success with 
regards to coordinating environmental aid programs as well as environmental activities in 
other Ministries. The report by EcoConServ concludes, based on both donor and Egyptian 
perspectives, that there is a need for a vision and a strategy for the environment in Egypt.319 
Also, Genena states in the 2003 consultant report, that even after the updated NEAP, there is 
a need for a vision and a strategy that prioritize environmental problems, a need to achieve 
consensus between key institutional players, and to assign clear roles and responsibilities, to 
set quantitative goals and a follow-up mechanism as well as a guide to donor support.320  
Capacity development is crucial in relation to the NEAP. Donors could with great 
results help to review and update the NEAP without taking ownership. Many interviewees 
have mentioned that the NEAP desperately needs to be transformed into a real action plan 
that could be used in practice.321 As the agenda and approaches to the environment are 
different within and outside Egypt, it would be of great use for donors to participate in a 
dialogue with MSEA on environmental strategies. One Egyptian environmentalist was of the 
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opinion, that the environmentalists in the West have new and different concepts and 
approaches to the environment than those of Egyptian environmentalists. Therefore, the 
donors are in a position where they would be able to share new concepts of environmental 
programs and ideas with the Egyptian environmentalists.322 
 
Follow-up 
Official Procedure 
Officially, it is stated on the EEAA web page that the agency needs to conduct follow-up of 
its projects, which is the responsibility of the department “Planning and Follow-up” within 
the EEAA. In the MSEA, the CEO of EEAA is in dialogue with all high level managers 
about results and future plans at a monthly or every two months basis.323 Every third month, 
the CEO meets with a group of managers and collectively evaluates the current projects and 
programs. According to top-officials in the EEAA, the Planning and Follow-up Department 
supposedly discusses the status of financial disbursement every 6 months, and the Minister 
meets with Directors of projects every half a year. Every three months, an impact assessment 
is made to managers in EEAA.324 
 
Practical Implementation 
The follow-up is a task that needs to be undertaken by the line Ministries. According to staff 
in EEAA and sources outside the Ministry, the lack of follow-up is one of the biggest 
weaknesses of the MSEA.325 According to a senior staff-member in the ESP, there is no 
follow-up in the MSEA, stating that “It is relatively easy to produce something that looks like 
a plan. However, follow-up that requires evaluation tools is much more difficult to carry 
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out.”
326 In the opinion of a senior local staff member in MSEA, it is relatively new for the 
Egyptians to work with planning, which naturally means that follow-up is also a new 
concept.327 
The follow-up approach in EEAA was described as ad hoc, reactive and unstructured. 
Staff members in MSEA were of the opinion, that the reason for the poor follow-up was lack 
of capacity. The interviewees were concerned with the absence of the necessary skills 
required to evaluate and follow-up on a development program as well as of the lack of 
knowledge on how to structure ones time, and lack of knowledge of developmental and 
environmental programs.328 Furthermore, in a follow-up an assessment is necessary, which 
makes it a much more demanding and subjective task than making plans. This adds to the 
difficulties faced by the personnel within the EEAA. 
If the EEAA’s follow-up mechanism had worked properly, it would have ensured that 
the ESP as a whole (like each of its components) as a part of this exercise would have 
acquired a developmental objective that would have made it possible to evaluate the 
program. It could have been a useful scheme of national coordination, if the EEAA had set 
up certain standards and rules of evaluation and follow-up procedures for donor-funded 
programs. This could have helped increasing the impact of the ESP. From the beginning of 
the program, there was no log-frame made regarding ESP as a whole, but only of its 
subcomponents. No impact-assessment has therefore been conducted on the ESP; only 
performance (output/outcome) has been reviewed. However, most recently, strategic 
indicators for impact assessment are in the process of being prepared. In 2004, the “Review 
and Adjustment of Program Indicators” focused on future indicators used in an impact 
assessment of the overall program. All of the components of the ESP do have log-frames, 
however, not with developmental objectives and immediate objectives that could be used in 
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the follow-up process. In the summer of 2005, the components were indeed provided with 
development objectives. So progress is indeed being made.    
 
Participatory Approach 
Official Procedure   
The field of environment planning would benefit from participation of the civil society that 
knows of local environmental issues and thereby can contribute to the planning process. In 
the “Report on the State of the Environment in Egypt” published in 2005, it is stated that the 
report is done in consultancy with NGOs. Also, “The National Environmental Action Plan 
2002-2017” (NEAP) stresses that it was prepared with a participatory consultative process 
favorable to sustainable development. The section of the report on the consultative process, 
within which the plan was made, looks impressive. However, interviewees from outside the 
MSEA say that there was no real partnership between the MSEA and all the environmental 
stakeholders. The Fifth Five-Year Plan on environment does not mention a participatory 
approach. Nevertheless, in High Governmental Committees within the governorates, the civil 
society is supposed to play a role. 
 
Practical Implementation  
The “Report on the State of the Environment in Egypt” published in 2005, states that the 
document is written in consultancy with NGOs. However, a representative from one of the 
oldest and largest environmental NGOs had not been notified of its commencement before it 
was finished. The interviewee proclaimed, that the Ministry uses the phrase ‘participation of 
others’ in the report for PR purposes, as recipients accept a report much better if it says it has 
been made in collaboration with non-governmental entities. However, according to this 
director of an environmental NGO, the reality was that the NGOs had only been informed not 
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involved. The aforementioned representative cannot feel there is a real scope of partnership 
between the EEAA and NGOs. In the mid 1980s and 1990s, there was indeed an actual sense 
of partnership between the two entities. However, after the mid 1990s and till 2005, the 
partnership was not any longer institutionalized329. Interviewees outside the EEAA believe, 
that realistically the staff in MSEA could and should be participatory in their approach330. 
The widespread conviction amongst these sources was that EEAA’s hierarchical structure 
does not appreciate influence from civil society. Whether inside or outside the Ministry, the 
majority of the interviewed sources assured that no one in EEAA would understand why 
people from the outside should be asked or involved. This phenomenon makes sense in the 
light of the abovementioned top-down and centralistic government of Egypt. The 
participatory approach then becomes an alien way of thinking for many civil servants. No 
procedures are in operation to specify how information derived from a participatory approach 
should be used by or communicated within the organization by the civil servant.   
These findings regarding scarce participation by EEAA are supported by 
EcoConServ’s report from 2005. Their research among the donor community shows, that the 
donors believe that targets groups often are not sufficiently integrated into the design process. 
Furthermore, donors evaluated that there is an “initial resistance to participatory planning” 
within Egyptian counterparts in the phase of implementation331. The ESP’s EMG and EMU 
components are supposed to support decentralization of the EEAA through a participatory 
approach. The GEAPs are made in working-groups with a participatory approach. This is, in 
effect, an unusual example of a bottom-up approach in the field of environment in Egypt332.   
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Sector-coordination of the Environmental Sector Program  
Official Procedure and Practical Implementation 
The ESP has been coordinated after the overall national environmental priorities in the 
“Egyptian Policy Framework for the Environmental Sector”, which was launched by the 
Minister of State for Environmental Affairs in 1998333. Danida has according to its first 
program documents from 2000 until 2005 been looking at the Egyptian Policy Framework 
for the Environmental Sector when designing and adjusting the program.334 The alignment of 
the ESP’s goals and objectives to the “Egyptian Policy Framework for the Environmental 
Sector” can be seen in Table 2.335 When looking at the Table, it becomes clear that the design 
of the SDEM and ACI components, helped and facilitated by the support activities (CEM and 
PMU), focus on assistance to three specific goals of the Egyptian Policy Framework for the 
Environmental Sector. The three goals of the GoE that the ESP supports are; 
“Implementation of Law 4/94 for the protection of the environment; Support to institutional 
capacity development in the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency, its RBOs and EMUs in 
26 governorates; and lastly Support to sustainable environmental management systems.”
336 
Factually, Danida’s alignment to national priorities show that MSEA executed national 
coordination on Danida’s initial three phases of formulating program support through the 
Egyptian Policy Framework for the Environmental Sector. The MIC and the Danish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs formally agreed upon the ESP in 2001. However, the first program 
document was according to all sources interviewed (inside MSEA/EEAA and Danida) a very 
donor driven document where only the official objectives of MSEA played a coordinating 
role. 
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The alignment of the ESP’s goals and objectives to the “Egyptian Policy Framework 
for the Environmental Sector” shows that national environmental coordination has taken 
place. However, this is not to say that the Egyptian authorities made this happen, as Danida’s 
own policy was to follow priorities of partner countries when designing the ESP. According 
to a senior staff member, the EEAA could not really support and modify the ESP in the initial 
phase of the program, as the ESP came into being in a stage of awakening in EEAA after a 
predominantly donor-driven era.337 However, according to a senior local staff member, the 
ESP fits well into the NEAP, and there is coherence between the EEAA’s strategy and the 
goal of the ESP.338  
The environmental “Fifth 5-Year Plan (2002-2007)” by MSEA/EEAA, which has 
come after the construction of the ESP, emphasizes sustainable development. The goals of 
the ESP are also coherent with the strategic (and broad) goal of the MSEA listed in this plan. 
The ESP’s developmental objective is furthermore in direct support of MDG 7: Ensure 
Environmental Sustainability,339 which demonstrates that the MDGs also have guided the 
donor when formulating the aid program.   
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Department of International Cooperation in the Ministry of State for Environmental 
Affairs 
The Department of International Cooperation inside the MSEA plays the most important role 
as coordinator between environmental activities. Therefore it is important to scrutinize 
whether this department has had an effect on the ESP. 
To promote coordination between donors inside the EEAA, UNDP initially funded a 
project where a department denoted the Technical Cooperation Office for Environment 
(TCOE) was set-up in the MSEA. This department was in 1998/1999 restructured and 
renamed the Department of International Cooperation (DIC). At this occasion the technical 
staff from the original department left the DIC for other departments in EEAA, leaving only 
planning, negotiating and administrative staff. This restructuring phase greatly reduced the 
environmental know-how of the department.   
 
Sector- coordination of the Environmental Sector Program  
Official Procedure  
The MSEA is according to Law 4/ 1994 responsible for the coordination of environmental 
projects in Egypt. It is the role of the DIC to make sure that the environmental programs, like 
the ESP, fits into the NEAP ensuring synergy with other programs. The DIC’s main task is 
managing the donor proposals in the MSEA that are either produced in collaboration with the 
departments in the EEAA or sent from donors through the MIC. According to officials within 
the DIC, the department is meant to brief the MIC of what the environmental sector within 
the country needs the most.340 This link from the DIC to the MIC is supposed to transfer 
ground level-knowledge on the environment upwards in the system. According to top 
                                                 
340 (3.1) 
  
 
 
117 
 
officials in the ESP, the role of the DIC is also to interfere in programs, involve other 
departments, and produce environmental strategies.341 
 
Practical Implementation  
According to a couple of interviewees, the DIC plays the most crucial role in the 
coordination of environmental aid to Egypt, also in the case of the ESP. Compared to the 
engagement found in the other departments of the EEAA, single staff members in the DIC 
have acquainted themselves very well with all environmental activities implemented by 
MSEA. These employees have thereby been able to improve the national coordination of 
environmental aid. The key staff in the DIC has been collaborating regarding the reshaping 
of the ESP, such that it does not overlap with other environmental projects and programs.342  
At the same time there are problems pertaining to the role of the DIC as coordinating 
body in the MSEA. Key employees both inside and external to the DIC stated, that the DIC 
does not have a strategy for what is needed from donors.343 This makes the coordination 
insufficient as donors in contrast often have strong priorities when approaching the MSEA, 
and in negotiations with DIC, these are supposed to be modified and fitted into the national 
environmental strategy.344 
In practice, the DIC seems to prioritize coordination quite highly. However, insiders 
in the EEAA, external to the DIC, say that these intentions burst due to the fact that the 
meetings of the DIC are often very inefficient. The meetings are often slowed down by 
needless attendance of irrelevant staff members resulting in the agenda being slowed down 
and important communication being delayed.345 Another factor that often delays the 
commencement of meetings is the lack of attendance or late arrival of key participants. As 
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such, this high degree of participation, which one would assume to be positive, in fact 
weakens the national coordination. It is a problem that there are no taskforces where only the 
relevant people within a certain issue can meet and discuss and coordinate.346 The reason for 
the long lists of participants to each meeting was described as a consequence of the Egyptian 
culture, where it is not polite to exclude individuals. The meetings are prolonged further, 
because the decision-making process is very slow at these meetings. 
Furthermore, when the DIC conducts a coordination meeting and reaches certain 
decisions, there is no mechanism that would actually ensure that these decisions are followed 
and implemented. If these managerial elements were improved, the Egyptian impact on the 
coordination of environmental programs would increase. 
 The people working in the DIC are mostly educated within administrative fields, and 
do not have sufficient technical or environmental knowledge.347 It is therefore, crucial for the 
success of the DIC coordination of environmental activities, that DIC receives technical 
information from other units in the EEAA. Some interviewees have indicated that more 
environmental knowledge in the DIC would enhance the utilization of the department. It 
would appear to be both the responsibility of the DIC and the other units in the EEAA, that 
the coordinating entity receives the necessary information. If the DIC does not know what 
priorities to tell the MIC or the donors, the bottom-up structure of national coordination does 
not function properly. In fact, a representative from the DIC said that the department ensures 
that it receives information on a yearly basis.348 However, according to EEAA staff, the DIC 
is still in need of a better understanding of the environmental priorities in the EEAA to be 
able to manage the environmental programs efficiently.349 A very clear strategy would have 
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made the DIC capable of coordinating aid activities with the current capacity. However, as 
the NEAP and the five-year plan lack clear priorities, the DIC fails to fulfill its role.  
  Staff in the DIC furthermore affirms that there is a need for raising the quality of 
project proposals from the EEAA departments, so that the donor community more easily 
becomes interested in funding them when approached by the MIC.350 Sometimes, the DIC 
staff hesitates to involve the MIC, only doing so after the donor has agreed to fund a certain 
environmental project in EEAA. The DIC does this, based on the opinion that DIC knows 
which donor is most experienced in the particular activity. The fact that DIC directly contacts 
donors and thus circumvents the MIC is frustrating for the MIC. MIC would argue that in 
these cases they might have been able to attain cheaper funding from another donor351. 
However, as long as the MIC does not have any specialists in the field of environmental aid 
(as will show later in this chapter), the DIC will often have more technical information 
available on appropriate donors as well as the needed environmental activities than is 
available within the MIC. This situation clearly would give rise to conflicts, which would 
further inhibit collaboration between these entities.  
There are different views within the EEAA regarding the kind of coordination that 
should be undertaken by the DIC. Some staff members in EEAA external to the DIC would 
like to see the DIC’s role strengthened, such that it could receive more funding through the 
MIC. However, representatives from the DIC hold the view that the DIC should not be 
managing the affairs of the MSEA but rather play a coordinating role352. Moreover, most of 
the insiders in the DIC are of the opinion, that time constraints are a main problem in their 
department and admit that time is not properly managed, and therefore it seems more logical 
that others, for instance ESP managers, to handle the coordination in the MSEA353. It would 
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be a problem though, if international consultants were to coordinate aid activities, since this 
would not be national coordination and therefore most likely be less sustainable.  
According to the interviews it seems as if the Danida advisors already have spent a lot 
of time briefing and coordinating between people. The permanent staff appears to be less 
concerned with the overall picture and devote their attention to their own department or main 
task in opposition to the program or the Ministry’s function as a whole.354 Thus, Danida 
advisors asserted that they have to coordinate despite the fact that their main role is to 
implement the program. If they do not ensure that coordination takes place, initiatives to 
coordinate are simply not taken at a regular basis and in an efficient manner.355 As previously 
stated in this research investigation, the narrow focus of the Egyptians is likely to result from 
the organizational culture and public sector characteristics of strong top-down leadership. 
This takes away incentives from employees to consider more than their own narrowly 
defined interests. ”Who would think of the bigger picture if one’s opinion was never listened 
to anyway?” one local staff replied when asked about the causes for this characteristic.356  
One staff member of the EEAA would prefer if representatives from DIC (as well as 
from the Planning and Follow-up Department) participated in the meetings between ESP 
components and the PMU, in order for the staff at the two departments to increase their 
understanding of the mechanisms in the ESP. Such joint meetings could provide a good 
forum and serve as capacity development in environmental problem solving and follow-
up.357  
In Appendix F, details are given of the procedures of coordination between the DIC 
and the PMU and between the DIC and the MIC. The former connection could provide the 
DIC with ground level knowledge from the implementation of the ESP. The latter link 
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between the DIC and the MIC could facilitate upward transfer of sectoral knowledge to the 
cross-sector coordinating authority. Also, this link is where the cross-sectoral strategies can 
trickle down into practice on the field of environment, which is dealt with in the section of 
the MIC’s coordination of the ESP.  
 From this research it seems reasonable to conclude that higher focus on capacity 
development of senior civil servants in the DIC should have greater priority in foreign 
environmental aid.  
 
Ministry of Planning 
Cross-sectoral national coordination of the Environmental Sector Program  
Official Procedure and Practical Implementation 
A key official at the Royal Danish Embassy in Cairo, EEAA representatives and 
environmental stakeholders stated that it was unlikely that the MoP and GoE had followed 
the NEAP in its cross-sectoral planning.358 Along the same lines, Genena stated “The extent 
to which these policy directives [The Egyptian Policy Framework for the Environmental 
Sector by the Minister of State for Environmental Affairs] represent a common and 
coordinated GoE approach to environmental management, as opposed to the Minister of 
Environment and EEAA’s view, is questionable”.
359  
 
The general impression from the present research as well as the literature previously referred 
to360 is that environmental policy decisions are not made at the highest levels of government 
and therefore they do not have the necessary support to be implemented.  
                                                 
358 (3.12, 3.14, 4.1, 4.2) 
359 Tarek Genena, “A Consultant Report on the Country Environmental Analysis (CEA),” 52. 
360 Gomaa, “Environmental Policy Making in Egypt”, 69; Tarek Genena, “A Consultant Report on the Country 
Environmental Analysis (CEA),” 52-53; United Nations, and Ministry of Planning. “Millennium Development 
Goals – Second Country Report Egypt 2004”, 8, 41-44. 
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With regard to the MoP’s plans and strategies, the environment has been mentioned 
in the cross-national plans. Nonetheless, neither the objectives of the “Long Term 
Development Vision 2022”, nor the pre-requisites for achieving the objectives mention the 
environment.361 However, in the medium term plan “The Fifth Five-Year Plan for Socio-
Economic Development (2002-2007) & First Year”, environment is the last item on a list of 
what the plan seeks to achieve when fostering economic development which is to “preserve 
and protect the environment from all sources of pollution”.
362 It is surely a positive feature 
that the environment is mentioned once (although at the bottom of a list). Still, if this is the 
only mention of the environment in the plan it is quite vague, and without any prioritization 
asserted. Also, if the MoP had incorporated the strategic goal of the MSEA’s Fifth 5-Year 
Plan (2002-2007) [for Environment] into “The Fifth Five-Year Plan for Socio-Economic 
Development (2002-2007) & First Year”, the latter would have emphasized the 
environmental dimensions within the whole plan e.g. with regards to agriculture, health, and 
tourism. Yet the socio-economic plan emphasizes economic development and does not make 
strong emphasis on sustainable development as the environmental plans do.363 The one-year 
plan “The Economic and Social Development Plan for 2003/2004”, produced by the MoP, 
has a chapter on Human Development that provides objectives and policies relating to the 
environment. The plan says: “Environment has become a vital component in Egypt’s 
sustainable development”.
364 The main objectives in relation to the environment in “The 
Economic and Social Development Plan for 2003/2004” are perfectly in line with the 
objectives proclaimed in the Fifth 5-Year Plan (2002-2007) [Environment] the year before.365 
                                                 
361 Ministry of Planning, 4-9. 
362 Ministry of Planning, 39) 
363 Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs/Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency, 1. “Fifth 5-Year Plan 
(2002-2007)”, 1, and Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs, UNDP and Capacity 21, The National 
Environmental Action Plan 2002-2017. (Egypt: 2002) 
363 (3.12, 4.1, 4.2) 
364 Ministry of Planning. “The Economic and Social Development Plan (2003-2004)”, 33.  
365 (The main objectives in relation to the environment in “The Economic and Social Development Plan for 
2003/2004” can be found in Appendix H). 
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This is a very positive step towards integrating environmental plans into cross-sector 
planning. However, the line Ministries as mentioned in chapter two are only responsible for 
implementing the five-year plan. It is therefore detrimental that the environment is not a 
recurrent issue in all sectors in this plan.  
In practice, the MoP could not find the ESP in the internal technical plan. However, 
updated data on actions by Danida between 2002- 2005 existed in the database of financial 
follow-ups in the MoP. If the ESP was not actually included in the technical plan of concrete 
projects, then it is an apparent error.366 
A promising indication of GoE’s stronger commitment to the field of the 
environment, materialized in 2002 when President Mubarak called a top level ministerial 
meeting to discuss an Environmental Strategy for Egypt.367 Also, the speech to the People’s 
Assembly by the Prime Minister Dr. Ahmed Nazif in December 2004 provided an 
environmental program named “Protection of Natural Resources” that had the objective to 
achieve sustainable development, create environmental balance and efficiently using natural 
wealth.368 This speech could indicate that the agenda of sustainable development coming 
from the MSEA/EEAA is influencing the national priorities and plans. It shows that there is a 
notion of sustainability and holistic thinking when making plans and strategies, at least on the 
official level. An optimistic perspective would therefore be that the MoP would position the 
environment as a cross-sectoral issue in the upcoming five-year plan for 2008-2013. 
  
                                                 
366 The MoP demonstrated how they had all environmental programs in Egypt in their big technical plan where 
environmental projects were divided into projects/programs implemented inside and outside the MSEA. It was 
not possible during the meeting in the MoP to gain access to the plan with the help of an Arab translator, as it 
seemed to be an internal governmental document. 
367 Tarek Genena, “A Consultant Report on the Country Environmental Analysis (CEA),” 53. 
368 Ahmed Nazif, “Governmental Statement to the People’s Assembly,” 30-32. 
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Ministry of International Cooperation  
The MIC is the responsible national authority for aid coordination in Egypt, therefore the 
MIC’s role in coordinating the ESP is offered. 
 
Cross-sectoral National Coordination of the Environmental Sector Program  
Official Procedure  
At the time of the formation of the ESP, the responsibility of international cooperation was 
under the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (1997-2000). Conversely in 
2001, when the ESP was actually started, international cooperation in Egypt was the 
responsibility of the International Cooperation Sector in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(2001-2004). During the ESP’s current phase of implementation, the MIC is responsible for 
its coordination. 
Due to the fact that there is no department in the MIC responsible for environmental 
aid, as the Ministry is divided into regional areas, the Danish desk within the Department for 
European Countries is responsible for the connection between the MIC and the DIC. 
Therefore, the MSEA’s DIC collaborates with several different departments in the MIC 
where donors support the environment. There is consequently no focal point through which 
the DIC staff in the MSEA can channel the environmental priorities. In general, no simple 
body is clearly responsible for coordinating environmental aid programs in Egypt. 
Paradoxically, the MIC’s responsible person for coordinating all USAID to the environment 
does not have access to the NEAP.369 When this person receives the separate proposals from 
donors, it is therefore unknown whether/how prioritization takes place. It also appears as if 
sectoral strategies are almost unknown and only modestly used in coordination of foreign 
environmental aid with other sector strategies, which is due the fact that the MIC is not 
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divided into sectors. It therefore seems plausible, that the extent of environmental 
coordination that takes place in Egypt is carried out in the DIC within the ranks of the MSAE 
and not on the highest national level in the MIC. 
It was not possible to arrange an interview with the responsible party for the ESP in 
the MIC. Due to this specific interviewee’s insecurity of whether this research investigation 
would bring out confidential information, he chose not to take part in an interview on the 
MIC’s role in the coordination of the ESP.370  
The person responsible for the ESP at the Royal Danish Embassy in Cairo stated that 
the national authority of international cooperation had been used as partner when the ESP 
was initiated. The MIC had later been used successfully when there were problems of 
smaller-scale mis-use of funding in the ESP. The MIC then took contact to the Minister in 
MSEA and this always solved the problems371.  
 
Conclusion 
National Sector and Cross-sector Coordination in the different Phases of the ESP 
The national coordination of the ESP according to official policy and actual implementation 
is illustrated in Table 3 below. The table is structured after the policy cycle defined by 
Premfors,372 where the policy phases are classified as: problem identification, alternative 
solutions, recommendations, decision-making, implementation, and evaluation.373 The author 
has added a last phase; “feedback”, which is essential for the acquired knowledge of the 
evaluation (in Egyptian terminology follow-up) phase to be utilized. 
The ESP has already gone through most of its policy phases, since it is currently in 
the phase of implementation. The role played by national coordination in all of these phases 
                                                 
370 However, the role played by the MIC in coordinating and follow-up on the ESP became apparent after 
interviews with other employees in MIC as well as outsiders dealing with the MIC. 
371 (3.14) 
372 Rune Premfors, Policyanalys. (Studenterlitteratur: Lund, 1989), 44. 
373 Premfors 
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is summarized on the foundation of the abovementioned descriptions and analysis of the 
roles of MSEA, MoP and MIC. National authorities would affect all policy phases if the 
national coordination were to work efficiently. 
Table 3 shows that in the phases of problem identification, alternative solutions, 
recommendations, and decision-making, the ESP has been nationally coordinated after the 
“Egyptian Policy Framework for the Environmental Sector”, which was launched by the 
Minister of State for Environmental Affairs in 1998.374 The strategic aim of Danida was to 
design a program that would on the same time meet the development objectives of Danida 
and be fully consistent with the environmental policy, priorities and ongoing initiatives 
within Egypt.375 In the same phases, the MoP should have ensured that this sector strategy 
created synergy with other sector strategies by making environmental concerns visible within 
the strategies of other sectors. However, in practice this overall holistic cross-sectoral 
development planning does not seem to take place. The MIC was stipulated to play a 
coordinating role in the initial phases of the program to ascertain that the program would fit 
into national strategies and other donor activities, but this also did not seem to take place in 
practice.  
In reality, most employees working on the ESP in EEAA are Egyptian and at this particular 
time of the program’s implementation it seems as if most Egyptians feel ownership of the 
program. This implies that the Egyptian environmental authorities and staff are able to follow 
the program closely and to influence its coordination. National authorities (the EEAA) are 
thereby responsible for the implementation of the program, yet Danida still has the final say 
in the decision-making. 
                                                 
374 Tarek Genena, “A Consultant Report on the Country Environmental Analysis (CEA),” 52. 
375 (DMFA, “Final Sector Programme Support Document - Danish Support to the Environment Sector,” 3, and 
as someone currently working in the ESP for Danida confirmed, “Danida would like to fulfill and follow the 
needs and wishes of a partner country”, 3.12, 3.14) 
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Evaluation is officially the responsibility of the MSEA and the donor, whereas the 
MoP has an obligation of financial follow-up along with the MIC that is obliged to follow-up 
on the developmental impact of the program. The MoP follow-up on Danida’s disbursement 
of funds. However, the MIC does not appear to fulfill its role of evaluating the program. 
Danida has regularly evaluated on the components, and are currently setting up indicators 
such that the whole program can be evaluated according to its intended impact.  
In the last phase; feedback, it is ensured that evaluations are used in the particular 
program as well as in future programs. This task is the responsibility of the MSEA, MIC, and 
the donor. The feedback mechanism works as intended in Danida where Joint Sector 
Reviews and Aide Memoirs have resulted in adjustments and restructuring of the program. 
Conversely, in the case of the MSEA and the MIC, the feedback mechanism seems 
insufficient.  
 
The Influence of National Aid Coordination on the ESP  
Some interviewees in the EEAA stated that national coordination in certain phases of 
the ESP were more important than in others, for the ESP to reach its intended impact. At the 
same time, other senior staff members stated, that national coordination was equally 
important on all stages.376 
It seems reasonable to say that national coordination was important in the start-up 
phases (problem identification, alternative solutions, recommendation, and decision-making) 
where the program is shaped. At this initial stage of the program, it is crucial that people 
communicate to form the most needed and best fitted program. It is equally important, that 
everyone involved feels ownership of the program, are convinced of the basic ideas and the 
validity of the program. The Planning and Follow-up Department inside the EEAA is 
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responsible for this part of national coordination. It is clear that in this phase of the ESP the 
donor was in control when it came to the degree of the influence that the staff members in 
EEAA had on the program design. Barely any more than the goal of the program was made 
in coherence with the formal strategy of MSEA, which nevertheless is a formidable example 
of national coordination.  
In addition, another interviewee was of the opinion that the national coordination in 
the exit strategy was of utmost importance. This view was based on the fact that if there were 
no national interference and authority over the exit phase of the program, the national 
authorities would not feel enough responsibility to carry on without the presence of the donor 
agency.377  
 
Many improvements of national coordination could take place within the MSEA. It would be 
beneficial if the NEAP were made more operational by the Planning & Follow-up 
Department. Also, the Department of Financial and Administrative Affairs could have helped 
to the outcome of the program by securing a technical organization that would have been 
beneficial to the implementation of the program. The rules and procedures for 
communication within the EEAA could have been improved through the CEO office and 
Department of Administrative Affairs. The Ministers office could improve the ESP by 
providing services to the Minister, assisting him in making balanced decision and 
prioritizations378. Additionally, it is also important that the IT department assists the EEAA 
in providing informative communication to outsiders about the program. The Planning and 
Follow-up Department could play an increased role in following up on the ESP. The DIC 
could also play an essential role in coordinating all the environmental programs. If the donors 
perform these tasks themselves, the know-how, the experiences, and the overall coordination 
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capacity will eventually disappear when they pull out of the program in Egypt. Consequently, 
many aspects of national coordination could have increased the ESP’s chances of reaching its 
intended impact.      
 
Insufficient National Aid Coordination 
Both the bottom-up mechanism of national coordination (from MSEA to the cross-sectoral 
level) and the top-down mechanism (from MoP/MIC to the line Ministries) do not work 
efficiently when it comes to environmental planning of the ESP. In the case of the ESP, it 
was the sectoral priorities that made the donor align the program to national priorities. The 
environment-sector national aid coordination in the form of the Egyptian Policy Framework 
for the Environmental Sector by MSEA has shaped the ESP, as Danida has aligned to these 
national priorities. Nevertheless, no cross-sectoral national activities seem to have helped the 
program reach its intended impact.  
 
Skilled and Efficient National Aid Coordination can enhance the Outcome of Aid Programs 
in Egypt 
The national aid coordination instrumented by MSEA has been beneficial to the outcome 
of the environmental aid program, since the Egyptian Policy Framework for the 
Environmental Sector harmonizes donor efforts. In addition, the senior DIC staff makes sure 
that the environmental programs are well aligned. The DIC plays a central role in 
coordinating the ESP in relation to other environmental programs. The DIC seems to have 
good relations to MIC. However, it does not appear as if the skills, tools and level of 
environmental knowledge regarding national coordination is sufficient in any of the national 
entities, least of all in the MIC.   
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 Cross-sector planning or coordination by the Egyptian authorities has not helped the 
ESP reaching its outcome as the socio-economic plans in practice have not incorporated or 
enforced environmental sustainability as a goal for all sectors. One of the aims of the ESP is 
to strengthen the environmental awareness and standards in Egypt. The ESP has attempted to 
make the MSEA capable of this mainly through ensuring that environmental policies are 
implemented in other line Ministries. The fact that the national socio-economic or technical 
plans have not made environment a cross-cutting issue in all sector policies has made this 
outcome of the ESP difficult to achieve. Nationally given incentives to incorporate 
environmental concerns into the sector policies were almost non-existing in the other 
Ministries.  
According to interviewees, the national aid coordination was not sufficient on the 
governorate or regional level due to the fact that the administration of the country needs to be 
decentralized before the local institutions can start coordinating. A few interviewees said that 
the aim of decentralization through Danida’s ESP was too ambitious as there is a need for 
political decentralization before actual decentralized decisions can be taken.379     
Consequently, capacity development in the field of environment as well as in the field 
of planning and evaluation, followed by a restructuring of the MIC, could be the most useful 
improvements for national coordination of environmental aid in Egypt. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Findings and Conclusions  
 
 The new agenda in the field of development states that national coordination together with 
donor alignment to national priorities are the two key elements to ensure that the Millennium 
Development Goals are achievable. Yet, the inherent dilemma of this approach lies in the fact 
that the partner country faces great difficulties in carrying out efficient aid coordination. 
Nonetheless, it is supposed to be the responsible entity. The donor countries on the other 
hand have the necessary resources to carry out efficient aid coordination. However, this 
would directly counteract the key purpose of its presence: sustainable development.  
This research effort has investigated and analyzed the national coordination of aid in 
Egypt through in depth analysis of the performance of the responsible national authorities: 
the MSEA, the MoP, and the MIC. The central question that emerged is whether the 
necessary prerequisites are in place in the Government of Egypt to administer the task of 
national coordination. With the outset in the Environmental Sector Program initiated by 
Danida the sectoral and cross-sector coordination in Egypt was found to be deficient, as the 
prerequisites for national coordination formulated by the UNDP were not in place. 
The main findings of this research investigation are that the kind of national 
coordination that is present in Egypt is mostly sporadic, ad hoc, and does not seem to be 
taking place in accordance with a particular holistic developmental strategy. Moreover, the 
people responsible do not manage it with the required skills.  
 
Lessons learned for the Government of Egypt 
Everyone that was asked the question “Is national coordination one of the answers to more 
effective aid programs?” has answered positively along the same lines. Here, the rationale is 
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that the GoE should have a complete overview of where funding is most needed compared to 
outside agencies.  
The goal of the ESP is to contribute to the efforts of the Egyptian government within 
the environmental sector to improve environmental conditions, to develop environmental 
management capacity of institutions and to provide frameworks of compliance with 
environmental regulations380. If environmental planning by the MSEA were implemented by 
the other relevant line Ministries (e.g. industry, agriculture, water) these goals would be more 
easily achieved. However, the deficiency of internal coordination between sectors in Egypt 
counteracts the environmental efforts.  
On a cross-sectoral level, the national coordination of aid apparently does not help the 
ESP reaching its outcomes. At this point of time, the individuals most knowledgeable about 
the environmental issues in Egypt do not plan and coordinate. Preferably, the MoP, MoF, 
MIC, MSEA and the Ministry of Local Development would meet regularly in a focus group 
(e.g. a Environmental Executive Board) to enable enforcement of environmental 
considerations in all line Ministries in Egypt.381 Increased planning, monitoring, training and 
evaluation by the MoP and the MIC would improve the impact of aid. “Institutional 
development is key to successful coordination since this establishes national rules of the 
game that are managed by national authorities and which all actors must follow.“
382  
The GoE should deal with the environment as an asset to reach further socio-
economic development and not deal with it as a liability. If long-term strategies were to be 
made, then the reduced cost of environmental degradation would show that the environment 
could be an asset not a burden.383  
                                                 
380 (DMFA, “Final Sector Programme Support Document - Danish Support to the Environment Sector,” viii.  
381 (3.11) 
382 Disch, 8. 
383 World Bank, “Arab Republic of Egypt – Country Environmental Analysis (1992-2002)”, ix. 
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A central question that remains is whether there is the necessary motivation in the 
very top of the Egyptian government to meet the necessary preconditions for efficient 
national planning and coordination.   
 
Lessons learned for Donors 
The key effort of the donors should be to improve capacity development in the Ministry of 
Planning to strengthen national coordination in Egypt – since the MoP has the responsibility 
for the planning. This would build the foundation for the coordination between the relevant 
Ministries in the GoE.  
Egypt surely needs capacity development while retaining the ownership of the 
planning and coordination of aid activities. Therefore, the trend of donors aligning to national 
priorities, giving the partner country responsibility for the activities is a constructive 
framework for providing assistance. Thus, donors must provide a longer-term commitment 
so that national planning and coordination authorities can plan ahead with some sense of 
predictability. 
Key questions that donors could ask themselves are: what kind of government capacity is 
required for effective and accountable aid coordination and management to be sustainable? 
How can governments acquire sufficient capacity to coordinate and manage aid, replacing 
(although at times insufficient) donor coordination by national ownership? Which 
instruments are available for donors to build capacity for aid coordination and management? 
What is needed for a partner country to increase its capacity in the area of aid 
coordination?384 
 With the new aid agenda stressing the need of the partner country to take the 
dominant role, it is important that the donors do not overlook and ignore the countries with 
                                                 
384 UNDP, 7. 
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the weakest institutions, just because they cannot as yet be trusted the obligation of planning, 
coordination and implementation of aid activities. A consequence of such priorities would be 
that the countries, which need aid and development the most, would suffer from decreasing 
donor funds.  
One of the newest trends and goals on the international aid agenda is that donors 
should try to work towards providing aid in the form of budget support to the national 
governments in the developing world. However, this research shows that a developing 
country like Egypt – albeit a middle-income developing country - needs to improve the 
national planning, coordination and follow-up capacity, as well as institutions, before being 
able to make efficient use of increased funding through budget support. 
 This research investigation also shows that further development within the structural 
parameters of democracy, good governance, accountability, freedom of speech at work, the 
structure and functions of the bureaucracy, and transparency is needed before budget support 
would be an efficient way of providing aid. In addition to this, the political climate needs to 
be open towards discussing poverty reduction in public, and making a Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PRSP) or a national sustainable development plan.385  Key tools that could be 
improved are for instance the availability of accurate national statistically reliable data, 
management skills, know-how of making plans, follow-up and evaluation. 
It seems to be a step in the right direction to work towards budget support. Yet, this 
could take a decade or two of capacity development, institutional strengthening and 
democratization before this kind of aid would be successful. Development takes time and the 
international community needs to be patient.386 This is exactly the dilemma of national 
coordination – donors would like the partner countries to be in charge of national 
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coordination, nonetheless the time-consuming process that this will take is not always 
welcomed.   
The donors need to be able to adjust their way of support according to the political 
developments in the partner country. Flexibility by the donor agencies becomes a key issue, 
so that the population of a partner country can continue to receive the promised assistance 
although there are negative set backs in the country’s governance. If donors decide to give a 
fixed amount of assistance in either project, program sector or budget support this would 
hinder the right combination of the three kinds of assistance to an individual country. 
Shifting some of the development assistance between project, sector program support and 
budget support does not necessarily leave out the poor countries that are not yet ready for 
receiving a particularly kind of support.    
The trend is that improvements in the area of national aid coordination do indeed take 
place. The positive findings of this study are not the particular state of national coordination 
but rather the fact that national coordination has been placed on the agenda in Egypt. With 
time the country will increase its aid coordination capacity if the responsibility and thereby 
ownership of the aid activities continue to be national.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
137 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Aid Coordination 
 
Books/Chapters in Books 
Arvin, B. Mak (ed.). 2002. “Allocation of Foreign Aid and Economic Development: New 
 Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives”. Westport, CT, USA: Greenwood Publishing
  Group, Incorporated.  
 
Brainard, Lael et al.. 2003. “The Other War – Global Poverty and the Millennium Challenge 
Account”. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press 
 
Cassen, Robert, and others. 1994. “Does Aid Work?”, Oxford University Press: New York.  
 
Cox, Aiden 2000. “European Development Cooperation and the Poor”. New York, NY USA: 
Palgrave Publishers.  
 
Degnbol-Martinussen, John. 1997. “Society, State and Market: a Guide to Competing 
Theories of Development”. London : Zed. 
 
Forster, Jacques, and Olav Stokke. 1999. ”Policy Coherence in Development Co-operation”. 
 Frank Cass.: London  
 
 
Articles 
Marc Claret de Fleurieu. 2003. “Towards more Effective Development Cooperation: the 
EU’s Coordination and Harmonization Initiative”, The Courier ACP-EU, no. 196, Pp. 
18-20. 
  
English, Linda. 1994. ”Financing Aid Education in Africa: Need for Improved Aid 
 Coordination”. Africa Development – Afrique Et Developpement, Vol. 19, Iss. 4, 
Pp.97- 111.  
  
Oswald, Stefan, Knut Bäse, and Frerk Meyer. 2004. “Donor Harmonisation to Increase 
 Efficiency” in D+C – Magazine for Development and Cooperation. Edi. 2.  
 
Ross, David J.. 1990. “Aid Co-ordination: Summary”. Public Administration & Development 
(1986- 1998). Chichester. Vol. 10, Iss. 3; Pp. 331.  
 
van de Sand, K.. 1996. “Towards More Donor Coordination? OECD Prepares for 21st 
 Century.” Development and Cooperation, Iss. 5, Pp. 22– 25.  
 
Walt, G. and others. 1999. “Health Sector Development: From Aid Coordination to Resource 
 Management”. Health Policy and Planning. Oxford: Sep 1999. Vol. 14, Iss. 3; Pp. 
  207- 218.  
 
Whittington, D., and C. Calhoun. 1988. “Who Really Wants Donor Co-ordination?” 
 Development Policy Review Vol. 6. Iss. 3, Pp. 295– 309.  
 
 
  
 
 
138 
 
Declarations 
World Bank. 2005. “Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness – Ownership, Harmonization,  
Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability”. Joint Progress Towards Enhanced 
Aid Effectiveness – Harmonisation, Alignment, Results. Paris High-Level Forum 
(February 28 - March 2, 2005). Paris. 
 
World Bank. 2003. “Rome Declaration on Harmonization. High-Level Forum on 
Harmonization in Rome (February 24 - 25, 2003). Rome. 
 
Reports 
Barry, A. J.. 1988. ”Aid Co-ordination and Aid Effectiveness - A Review of Country and 
 Regional Experiences”. OECD Development Centre.  
 
Disch, Arne. 1999. ”Aid Coordination and Aid Effectiveness”. Evaluation Report 8,99, Econ 
 Centre for Economic Analysis UD, Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Norway.  
 
UNDP (prepared for UNDP’s Bureau for Policy and Programme Support by Poul Engberg- 
 Pedersen). 1996. ”Aid Coordination and Aid Management by Government: A Role 
for UNDP”. OESP Series on Lessons Learned: New York.  
 
Overseas Development Institute for DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness “Incentives 
For Harmonisation in Aid Agencies”  
 
OECD. 2005. “Environmental Fiscal Reform for Poverty Reduction”. OECD Publishing.   
 
OECD Development Assistance Committee. 2001. “Poverty Reduction”. Organisation for 
 Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).  
 
OECD. “Harmonising Donor Practices for Effective Aid Delivery”  
 
United Nations, General Assembly. 2005. “2005 World Summit Outcome” United Nations 
 General Assembly. 
 
United Nations. 2005. “The Millennium Development Goals Report 2005”. United Nations 
 Department of Public Information: New York. 
 
World Bank. 1999. ”Review of Aid Coordination and the Role of the World Bank”. World 
 Bank. 
 
Seminars (attended) 
Ulandsfagligt Selskab (in English: Society of Third World Issues). 2005. “Den Nye 
Bistandsdagorden - Tilpasning  og Donorharmonisering” (in English: “The New Aid 
Agenda – Alignment and Donor Harmonization”). 28.09.2005, Copenhagen.  
 
Speeches 
Aileen Carroll. 2005. The Canadian Minister of International Cooperation’s speech at 
 University College, Oxford for a meeting on "Exploring Aid Effective and  
Cooperative Aid Partnerships". Global Economic Governance Programme. Canada’s 
 Aid Program: The Way Forward, March 9, 2005. 
 
  
 
 
139 
 
Cd Roms  
CD-ROM for “Development, Coordination of International Assistance: Proceedings of a 
 Seminar”. 1993), organized in Paris by the Technical Centre for Agricultural and 
Rural Cooperation and the United Nation Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization, 1992. Wageningen, Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural 
Cooperation.   
 
Web pages 
http://www.nssd.net 
http://topics.developmentgateway.org   
http://topics.developmentgateway.org/aideffectiveness/ 
http://www.aidharmonization.org/ 
http://www.oecd.org/ 
http://millenniumindicators.un.org 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals 
http://www.idsc.gov.eg/English/index.asp 
   
The Role of the Partner Government in Aid Coordination 
 
Books/Chapters in Books 
Carew-Reid, Jeremy, Robert Prescott-Allen, Stephen Bass, and Barry Dalal-Clayton. 1995. 
 “Strategies for National Sustainable Development: A Handbook for their Planning 
and Implementation”.  
 
Cling, Jean-Pierre, Mireille Razafindrakoto, and François Roubaud (ed.). 2003). ”New 
 International Poverty Reduction Strategies”. Routledge.  
 
Stokke, Olav (edi). 1996. “Foreign Aid Towards the Year 2000: Experiences and 
Challenges”. EDDI Book Series: London.  
 
Articles 
Hafez, Sanaa, and Mariam Ahmed. “Working with an Egyptian Partner”. Canadian 
International Development Agency: Egypt. 
 
Samoff, Joel. 1999. “Education Sector Analysis in Africa: Limited National Control and even 
 Less National Ownership”, International Journal of Educational Development, Vol. 
19, Iss. 4-5, Pp. 249-27.2.  
 
Reports 
African Development Bank. 2004. “Arab Republic of Egypt 2005-2009 Country Strategy 
 Paper”. African Development Bank, Country Operation Department  
 
OECD. 2005. “Environmental Fiscal Reform for Poverty Reduction”. DAC Guidelines and 
 Reference Series, OECD Publishing.  
 
Forums 
“Report of the International Forum on National Sustainable Development Strategies”. 
2001. International Forum on National Sustainable Development Strategies. Accra, 
Ghana, 7-9 November 2001.  
  
 
 
140 
 
Workshops 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC). 2000. “Informal Workshop on Poverty 
Reduction Strategies, Comprehensive Development Framework and National 
Strategies for  Sustainable Development: Towards Convergence”, Paris 29-29 
November 2000.    
 
 
Aid Coordination by Egyptian Authorities, Empirical Documents provided by Egyptian 
Authorities 
 
Ministry of Planning 
 
Ministry of Planning. 2002.“The Fifth Five-year Plan for Socio-Economic Development 
(2002- 2007) and First Year”.  
 
Ministry of Planning. “Socio-Economic Development Plan (2005-2006)”. In Arabic  
   
Ministry of Planning. 2003.“The Economic and Social Development Plan (2003-2004)”.   
 
Ministry of Planning and the World Bank. 2004. “Arab Republic of Egypt – A Poverty 
Reduction Strategy for Egypt”, The World Bank. 
 
Ministry of Planning. “Activation of the Planning Process”, A PowerPoint Presentation by 
 Ministry of Planning.  
 
Ministry of Planning. 2005. Internal documents about the follow up on the ESP from the 
 Ministry’s database.  
 
Ministry of Planning. 2005. Arabic document about evaluation and follow up 1. 
 
Ministry of Planning. 2005. Arabic document about evaluation and follow up 2.  
 
United Nations, and Ministry of Planning. 2005. “Millennium Development Goals – Second 
 Country Report Egypt 2004”. 
 
 
Ministry of International Cooperation 
 
Ministry of International Cooperation. Nov. 2005. “Development Cooperation Report 2003”.  
Ministry of International Cooperation: Egypt. 
 
Ministry of International Cooperation. April 2005. “Development Cooperation Report 2002”.  
Ministry of International Cooperation: Egypt. 
 
Ministry of International Cooperation (2004). “Press Release”. Provided by Ministry of  
International Cooperation. 
 
Ministry of International Cooperation (2004). A timetable of the International Cooperation 
 domain’s placement within other Ministries in Egypt since 1982. Provided by 
Ministry of International Cooperation. 
  
 
 
141 
 
Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs (MSEA)/Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency 
(EEAA) 
 
EEAA. 1995. “EEAA Organization and Functional Structure - Part 1 - EEAA Organization 
Structure Components and general Functional Roles”  
 
“Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs - Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency – 
Fifth 5-Year Plan (2002-2007)”. 
 
Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs, UNDP and Capacity 21. 2002. “The National 
 Environmental Action Plan 2002-2017”. Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs: 
 Egypt. 
 
 
Effectiveness and Impact of aid 
 
Books/Chapters in Books 
Carlsson, Jerker, and others. 1994. “The Political Economy Evaluation: International Aid 
Agencies and the Effectiveness of Aid”. International Political Economy Series, St. 
Martin’s press: New York. 
 
Dichter, Thomas W.. 2003. ”Despite Good Intentions: Why Development Assistance to the 
 Third World has Failed”. University of Massachusetts Press. 
 
Maren, Michael. 1997. “The Road to Hell – The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and 
  International Charity”. The Free Press: New York.  
 
Rider, Barry (ed.). “Corruption: The Enemy Within”. Kluwer Law International: The 
 Netherlands. 
 
Roche, Chris. 1999. “Impact Assessment for Development Agencies: Learning to Value 
 Change”. Oxford : Oxfam : NOVIB.  
 
Sachs, Jeffrey D.. 2005. “Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the 
 Millennium Development Goals”. Earthscan Publications.  
 
Stokke, Olav (edi). 1996. “Foreign Aid Towards the Year 2000: Experiences and 
Challenges”.  EDDI Book Series: London.  
 
Articles 
Collier, Paul, and Dollar, David. 2004. “Development Effectiveness: What have we learnt?”, 
In The Economic Journal , Vol. 114, Iss. 496, Pp. 244-271.  
 
United Nations; Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. 1999.  
“Enhancing Effectiveness of Aid”. Least Developed Countries series, No. 2, United 
Nations Publications: New York.  
 
White, Louise G.. 1986. “An Approach to Evaluating the Impact of Projects”, Series: Aid 
 Program Design and Evaluation Methodology, No. 5, Pp. vi, 56. US Agency for 
 International Development: Washington, D.C.  
  
 
 
142 
 
 
World Bank. 1995. “Strengthening the Effectiveness of Aid: Lessons for Donors”, Series: 
 Development in Practice, World Bank: Washington D. C.  
 
World Bank. “Development Aid: Doing More and Doing It Better”, the World Bank’s 
Spanish website.  
 
 
Bureaucracy in Theory, and Bureaucracy and Politics in Egypt 
 
Books/Chapters in Books 
Andreski, Stanislav (ed.). 1983. “Max Weber on Capitalism, Bureaucracy and Religion – A
 Selection of Texts”, George Allen and Unwin: London. 
 
Gomaa, Salwa Sharawi. 1997. “Environmental Policy Making in Egypt”. University Press of 
Florida: United States 
 
Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. 2003 “Egypt, Islam and Democracy – Critical Essays”. The American 
University in Cairo Press: Cairo. 
 
Kassem, Maye. 2004. “Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule”. Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 
Mayfield, James B.. 1996. “Local Government in Egypt”. The American University in Cairo
 Press: Cairo. 
 
McDaniel, Thomas Robb. 1992. “Two faces of Bureaucracy: A Study of the Bureaucratic 
 phenomenon in the thought of Max Weber and Franz Kafka”, University Microfilms
 international (UMI): Michigan.  
 
Development and Aid in Egypt 
 
Reports 
EcoConServ. 2005. “Donor Assistance to Egypt in the Field of Environment” – Ten Years of 
 Donors’ Experience in Environmental Management - The Lessons Learned and the 
Way Forward. EcoConServ/Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency: Egypt.  
 
Genena, Tarek. 2003. “A Consultant Report on the Country Environmental Analysis (CEA)”. 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danida. 2000. “Evaluation – Danish Development Assistance to 
Egypt”. Danida series 1999/7. Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Denmark.  
 
UNDP. 2004. “The Egypt Human Development Report 2004”. Commercial Press: Egypt.  
 
World Bank. 2005. “Arab Republic of Egypt – Country Environmental Analysis (1992- 
2002)”. World Bank’s Water and Environment Department, The Middle East and 
North Africa Region.  
 
World Bank Staff. 2004. “Global Monitoring Report 2004 : Policies and Actions for 
Achieving the Millennium Development Goals and Related Outcomes”. Herndon, 
  
 
 
143 
 
VA, USA: The World Bank.  
 
World Bank. 2002. “Arab Republic of Egypt – Cost Assessment of Environmental  
Degradation”. World Bank’s Rural Development, Water and Environment  
Department,  Middle East and North Africa Region.  
 
Speeches 
Nazif, Ahmed. Dec. 2004. “Governmental Statement to the People’s Assembly”. The 
Cabinet, Information & Decision Support Center (IDSC). 
 
 
Environmental Sector Program, Empirical Documents provided by Danida 
 
2004. “Annual Progress Report. Annual Progress and Financial Report – Environmental 
Sector Programme ESP. Reporting period: January 2004 to December 2004”.  
 
Arab Republic of Egypt, and Danida. May 2005. “Aide Memoir from a Joint Review of the 
proposed Reshaped ESP 25th April – 5th May, 2005 - Complementary to the Review
 Aide Memoire of October 2004”. Egypt.  
 
Bayoumi, Gihan, and Anders Bjoernshave. September 2004. “ESP Strategic Management 
Plan – Environmental Sector Programme (ESP)” (Draft).  
 
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (referred to as DMFA), and Egyptian Environmental 
Affairs Agency. January 31th 2005. “Feasibility Note – The PMU / EPF Reshaping.  
The Environmental Sector Programme”. PEM Consult (Draft). 
 
“Agreed Minutes of the Development Cooperation Consultations between The Kingdom of 
Denmark and The Arab Republic of Egypt, 3-7 May 2003”.  
 
Danida. 2001. “Environment Sector Programme Support”. Danida: Denmark.  
 
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. March 2000. “Final Sector Programme Support 
Document - Danish Support to the Environment Sector. Egypt.  
 
Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency, and Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. June 2005. 
 
“Adjusted Sector Programme Support Document – Danish Support to the Environmental 
Sector, Egypt”. Egypt. 
 
Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency, and Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. June 2005. 
 “Draft Final Component Description - Support to Decentralisation of Environmental 
Management (SDEM). Egypt.  
 
Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency, and Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. May 2005.  
“Adjusted Sector Programme Support Document, Danish Support to the Environment 
Sector, Egypt”. Egypt.  
 
Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency, and Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. January 
  
 
 
144 
 
2005. “Feasibility Note – Reshaping Communication in Environmental Management 
& Environmental Management Decentralisation Components of the Environmental 
Sector Programme Support” (Draft). Egypt. 
 
Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency, and Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. July 2004. 
“Pilot Project of Support to Decentralisation of Environmental Management in 
Governorates and Environmental Management Units (EMUs)”. Egypt. 
 
Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency, and Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. June 2004. 
“Outline Sustainability Review for environmental decentralisation in the 
Environmental Sector Programme Support”. (Draft). Egypt.   
 
“First Joint Annual Sector Review Agreement, 09 April 2003 between The Government of 
the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark for the 
Environmental Sector Programme (ESP)”. 2003.  
 
“Second Joint Sector Review, Environmental Sector Programme Egypt. 
Review Aide Memoir”, October 2004. 
 
 
Websites 
http://www.eeaa.gov.eg 
 
State Capacity: Institution Building and Capacity Development 
 
Books/Chapters in Books 
Cassen, Robert and others. 1994. “Does Aid Work?”, Oxford University Press: New York. 
Ch. 4, VI:  Strengthening recipient capacities  
 
Kayizzi-Mugerwa, Steve (ed.). 2003. “Reforming Africa’s Institutions: Ownership, 
Incentives and Capabilities”. United Nations University Press. 
 
Stokke, Olav (ed.). 1996. “Foreign Aid Towards the Year 2000: Experiences and 
  Challenges”. EDDI Book Series: London.  
 
Articles 
Polidano, Charles. 2000. “Measuring Public Sector Capacity”. World Development, Vol. 28, 
Iss. 5, Pp 805-822.  
  
Reich, Michael R.. 2002. “Reshaping the State from Above, from Within, from Below: 
Implications for Public Health”, Social Science & Medicine, Vol. 54, Iss. 11, Pp. 
1669-1675.  
 
 
Methodology 
 
Books/Chapters in Books 
Premfors, Rune. 1989. Policyanalys. Studenterlitteratur: Lund.   
  
 
 
145 
 
APPENDIX 
 
A: Details on Short, Medium and Long Term Planning Documents in Egypt 
Development Objectives of “Long Term Development Vision 2022” 
(MoP 2002, 4-9). 
 
· Conservation of natural resources and directions of urban growth 
Towards desert land 
· Steady reduction of current population growth 
· Achievement of high and sustainable GDP growth  
· Gradual removal of balance of payments deficit 
· Alleviation of poverty and attenuation of income disparities 
· Development of human capital and attainment of full employment 
· Improvement of social services. 
 
Strategic elements of The Fifth Five-Year Plan for Socio-Economic Development  
(MoP 2002, 36). 
 
· Embracing an export promotion strategy to reduce balance of 
 payments and augment job opportunities 
· Deepening the industrialization process 
· Eliminating unemployment 
· Increasing competitiveness of Egyptian firms 
· Rationalizing investment incentives to maximize net economic 
benefits  
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· Directing development efforts towards desert land 
· Asserting equity considerations and lessening the poverty rate 
· Increasing women’s participation in the development process  
 
 
Focus of “The Economic and Social Development Plan for 2003/2004” 
(MoP 2003, 9) 
 
· Restoring the economic growth rate to its level before the negative impacts of 
international and regional events on the Egyptian economy 
· Concentrating on human resource development as the main driving force for 
development 
· Continuing the efforts to curtail the problems of population growth and 
unemployment 
· Spreading the development efforts to cover all geographical areas through the 
provision of infrastructure for ill-served areas, especially the South Valley 
governorates 
· Intensifying efforts aiming at boosting exports by focusing on areas where Egypt 
enjoys competing advantage, modernizing domestic industry, and opening new 
markets through regional and bilateral agreements  
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B: Details on Responsibilities and Functions of the Ministry of International 
Cooperation 
 
MIC’s responsibilities according to Presidential Decree 303 of year 2004  
(MIC April 2005, 3) 
· Preparation of draft laws and decrees that support the accomplishment of the 
Ministry’s goals and objectives in the field of international cooperation 
· Proposal of and formulation of criteria and monitoring guidelines for external 
borrowing 
· Preparation of bilateral and multilateral agreements in the fields of economic and 
technical co-operation, fulfilling ratification procedures, following up on the 
implementation of these agreements with concerned governments, international 
and regional organizations.  
· Preparation of agreements for loans, grants, and financial guarantees, and 
assuming responsibility for the allocation of ODA, guarantees, and facilities 
· Preparation of agreements on debt rescheduling, debt swaps with foreign 
governments and agencies, fulfilling ratification procedures, and following up on 
their implementation 
· Management of Egypt’s relationship with organizations, authorities, and 
institutions involved in economic co-operation and international and regional 
finance and investment guarantees, as well as with specialized United Nation 
agencies promoting economic cooperation 
· Preparation of compensation agreements with foreign governments and 
fulfillment of ratification procedures, as well as following up on their 
implementation and resolving all problems related to these 
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· Proposal of the participation of the Arab Republic of Egypt in establishing 
common economic co-operation projects with Arab and foreign countries and 
other donor parties  
· Supervising and monitoring the progress of development projects funded by the 
UNDP 
 
The main functions of the MIC strategy to fulfill its mandate  
(MIC April 2005, 3-4) 
· Act as the national coordinator between government sectors, Ministries, and 
foreign organizations in order to secure foreign resources required by the 
National Development Plan 
· Obtain the most concessionary assistance that does not burden the government’s 
budget 
· Undertake measures in increase the effectiveness of development co-operation 
and maximize the benefits thereof 
· Ensure that there is no duplication in the development assistance provided 
· Follow up on the progress of projects and programs, from inception to impact 
assessment, with particular focus on the impact of development, co-operation on 
services provided to Egyptian citizens 
· Identify and address problems faced during project implementation 
· Ensure that feasibility studies are reliable and effective 
· Expand debt swap arrangements aiming at transferring debts into local currency 
to be utilized in financing development projects 
· Monitor expenditures related to feasibility studies, expatriates, and consultants, 
to ensure cost-effectiveness 
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C: The immediate Objectives of the Components in the Environmental Sector Program
 
 
 
(“Agreed Minutes of the Development Cooperation Consultations between Denmark and 
Egypt”, May 2000, ix). 
 
· EEAA capacity for decentralized environmental management strengthened. 
· Selected Regional Branches Offices of the EEAA able to fulfill their mandates 
according to Law #4/94. 
· Dissemination of environmental information to support the priority [of] 
environmental strategies of the EEAA, Environmental Management Units of the 
Governorates (EMUs) and other partner stakeholders. 
· Awareness of environmental issues and capacity of decision-makers, 
implementers in the EEAA, governorates, and the industrial sectors enhanced. 
· The EMUs in Aswan and Beni Suef enabled to carry out their mandated 
environmental management functions. 
· Governmental Environmental Action Plan (GEAP) process functioning in Beni 
Suef and Aswan that involves people at the community level in identifying and 
rectifying local environmental problems through community based and 
replicable projects. 
· Awareness and usage of cleaner production in at least three sectors of the 
Egyptian industry. 
· Egyptian technical consultants promote and implement cleaner production in the 
industry. 
· Environmental Compliance Office at FEI serves as a link between the industry, 
the Egyptian technical consultants, EEAA, and financial facilities.  
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D: Collaboration between Components and Program Management Unit & between 
Program Management Unit and Program Coordination Committee  
 
Collaboration between the Components and the PMU 
This connection between the components and the PMU is the briefing conjunction, merging 
the technical knowledge from the components and the coordination effort in the PMU. 
Regular weekly meetings take place between the PMU and the different components of ESP, 
and follow-up meetings take place between PMU and the components SDEM and ACI every 
month. According to staff, the creation of SDEM enhanced the coordination between the 
different components387. Everyday the SDEM - the umbrella of the components EMU, DEM 
and EMG - consults the EEAA and the EMUs. Also, every month there is a “Management 
Forum Meeting” with all components. The PMU has a standard agenda for these meetings; 
however, there are also loose ad hoc meetings. Minutes called “Actions to Do” are made 
after these meetings. Permanent staff members in EEAA, regularly contact the responsible at 
the Royal Danish Embassy in Cairo, who most EEAA staff members perceive as a helpful 
person to go to. 
 The change from PSU to PMU is a favorable alteration that morphs the PSU from a 
reporting body to an implementing entity388. Subsequently, all the components present 
quarterly progress reports to PMU. Then the PMU presents progress reports from the 
different components to PCC when they meet three times a year. The PCC then takes 
decisions on how to move forward. The entirety of the ESP is checked annually by Joint 
Sector Reviews. In charge of this, there is a mission/international consultant who conducts 
this review together with an Egyptian from DIC, a representative from MIC and a local 
                                                 
387 (3.3) 
388 (3.5, 3.12) 
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consultant in the environmental sector389. This link of internal coordination in the program is 
described very positively. It appears as if the PMU’s coordination of the components work 
fine.  
 
Collaboration between PMU and PCC 
The PCC holds its meetings twice a year390. The PCC is where the overall assessment of the 
management of objectives, finance, and audits takes place. The PMU meets with the PCC 
three times a year. The PMU’s role is to present the results of monitoring the program. There 
is a standard agenda to these meetings regarding the ESP’s progress, budget, last meeting, 
arising matters. The PMU then asks the PSS for feedback on what could be done better. 
Minutes from these meetings then come out391. The PCC approves the new program 
document that describes how the program is changed in coherence with the previous Aide 
Memoirs. The responsible person for the ESP at the Royal Danish Embassy in Cairo looks 
after whether the Danida responsible for the PMU does the job, whereas the CEO looks after 
whether the Egyptian counterpart fulfills the requirements. A member of the PCC asserted 
that it would be beneficial if more donors participated in the PCC. Yet other members did not 
like the idea of more participants as they find that the forum should be responsible for taking 
care of coordination issues inside the ESP, not outside the program392. 
                                                 
389 (3.5, 3.12) 
390 (3.7) 
391 (3.12) 
392 (3.12, 3.14) 
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E: Tasks that the EEAA has to undertake to reach its objectives  
(http://www.eeaa.gov.eg) 
 
· Preparing draft legislation and decrees related to the fulfillment of its objectives 
· Preparing state of the environment studies and formulating the national plan for 
 environmental protection and related projects.  
· Setting the standards and conditions to which applicants for construction projects 
must adhere before working on the site and throughout operations. 
· Periodically collecting national and international data on the actual state of the 
environment and recording possible changes. 
· Setting the principles and procedures for mandatory Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) of projects.  
· Monitoring Programs and employing data and information gained thereof.  
· Coordinating with other empowered authorities for the control and safe handling 
of dangerous substances.  
· Listing of national establishments and institutions, as well as experts qualified to 
participate in the preparation and implementation of environmental protection 
programs, and coordinating measures with the Ministry in charge of 
international Cooperation to ensure that projects funded by donor organizations 
and states are compatible with environmental safety.  
· Preparing an annual report on the state of the environment to be submitted to the 
President and the Cabinet of Ministers.  
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F: Coordination between Department of International Cooperation and the Program 
Management Unit  
  
 Official Procedure  
 No official linkage is established between the PMU and the DIC though the two 
parties serve as the link between the pt. biggest environmental program in Egypt and the 
sector-coordinator of environmental programs. In the Agreed Minutes between Denmark and 
Egypt from 2003, PSU’s (later changed to the PMU) role as coordinator of the program 
internally within the EEAA, and with other related programs and activities is underlined393. 
However, factually speaking, the personnel from the PMU and the DIC only meet randomly 
in the corridors and on the staircases a couple of times every week. The coordination between 
these links must therefore be described as ad hoc. However, as conveyed by senior officials 
in the ESP, the responsible at the Royal Danish Embassy in Cairo would find out if this 
connection did not work at all394.  
 
Practical Implementation 
Some staff members in the ESP would like the DIC to hold meetings regularly for the 
reason that it is important that they know what is going on in the environmental field so that 
they can get the right funding and advice donors through MIC to support what is needed. It 
would be beneficial if the DIC were playing a stronger strategic and coordinating role, as the 
department is the responsible national body for coordination of environmental projects and 
programs.  
 
 
                                                 
393 (DFM 2003, 8) 
394 (3.12) 
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G: Environmental objectives in “The Economic and Social Development Plan for 
2003/2004” 
(MoP 2003, 33) 
 
· Improving air quality 
· Protection the River Nile from pollution 
· Protecting nature and preserving biological diversification 
· Expanding green areas and tree plantation 
· Increasing public environmental awareness  
· The policies in achieving the objectives are based on a pro-active approach, 
seeking to prevent pollution and environmental deterioration. The first two 
policies mentioned to attain this are: Strengthening the environment 
management systems 
· Supporting the institutional capabilities of Environmental Affairs Authority and 
its regional braches.  
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H: Interview Guide 
 
Professional and Academic info of the Interviewee 
a. Full name: 
b. Occupation, previous and current: 
c. Responsibility:  
d. Similar experience:  
e. Donor coordination: 
f. Academic standing:  
Introduction to Aid and Coordination 
 
Coordination of Aid and Impact of Aid 
0. What thoughts do you get in your head if I say the term aid coordination? What does it 
mean to you?  
 
- Definition of Aid Coordination: In my research I focus on the recipient’s government’s role 
in coordinating aid activities, so when I say aid coordination I mean the coordination taken 
on by the government. You can talk about other coordination affords just have in mind what I 
am referring to… 
 
National Coordination and Impact of Aid 
1. Do you think there is a relationship between that national coordination of Aid and Impact 
of Aid? 
 
Projects to Programs 
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2. Do you think coordination plays a different role in Projects as opposed to Programs?  
 
Coordination versus Competition of Aid  
3. Do you think aid programs better reach their goals through competition bw donors/donor 
programs than through coordination (the opposite)?   
 
Obstacles that impede Coordination of Aid Programs 
4. Have you faced any obstacles that impede coordination of aid programs? 
 
Methods of Coordination of Aid Programs 
5. Do you know any methods of National Coordination of Aid Programs – some you like, 
some you don’t like? 
 
5A. Do you know of any entity, which is currently trying to coordinate aid in Egypt? 
 
Coordination of Aid in Egypt  
 
Questions to people inside the MIC 
 
Coordination in Egypt before the Ministry of International Cooperation 
 
6. Were aid activities coordinated prior to the establishment of MIC?  
- If so, then how?  
 
  
 
 
157 
 
7. Do you know of any entity, which has been trying to coordinate aid in Egypt, before the 
MIC?  
- What do you think of these attempts? – Positive/negative comments… 
 
Ministry of International Cooperation (MIC) 
Goals, Vision and Objectives 
8. What are the MIC’s goals (general), vision (outlook) and objectives (specific)? 
 
Collaboration/coordination with other Ministries in Egypt 
9. How does MIC collaborate/coordinate with other Ministries in Egypt? 
 
National Development Strategy 
10.  Is there a national development plan?  
 
11.  Is there a holistic national development strategy?  
- Who wrote it? Who initiated it? Who feels an ownership of it? Is it long-term? Is it 
sustainable?  Is the plan being followed? 
- Is it well-acknowledged and known within entities working with development 
(governmental/NGO/Foreign bilateral/ IMF WB)? Who is more supportive than the other 
within these entities? 
 
12. What are the main problems and obstacles of implementing the coordination? 
 
13. How is the document being used in the planning of aid?  
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14. What is the difference between the aspired versus the actual role of the MIC? 
 
14A.  Is the program coordination on the macro level (national level in Egypt) in the Ministry 
of International Cooperation (MIC) beneficial to the output of aid programs? 
Yes, how?  Examples 
No, why not?  Examples 
 
15. Does the MIC follow a participatory approach, whether a sectoral or a grassroots one, in 
prioritizing aid activities? (Define participatory approach from your viewpoint). 
 
Impact on aid programs 
15A Does coordination take place between different sector experts in the forum of MIC to 
match foreign aid activities?   
- Examples? 
 
Questions to people outside the MIC 
 
17. What do you know about the Ministry of International Cooperation? What’s your 
feedback on their work? 
 
18. Do you know whether aid activities were coordinated prior to the establishment of MIC?  
- If so, then how?  
 
7A. Do you know of any entity, which has been trying to coordinate aid in Egypt, before the 
MIC?  
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- What do you think of these attempts? – Positive/negative comments… 
 
 
Overview of Environmental Sector Program (ESP) (within the context of the MSEA)  
Ministry of Environmental Affairs 
 
Questions to people inside the MSEA 
Role and level:  
18. What is the main role of the MSEA regarding ESP? 
19.  Is the MSEA playing a role in coordinating the ESP in Egypt?  
- If yes, how? In what ways – on what levels? – National? Sectoral? 
- If no, why not? 
 
19A. Is the afford to coordinate in the MSEA prioritized? 
- Examples 
19B. Does the employees in the MSEA view/witness that the coordination affords are 
detrimental for the outcome of the program? 
 
19 C. Is MSEA monitoring and coordinating environmental initiatives in other Ministries?  
(besides Ministry of Local Development (pays for EMUs) and Min. of Industries (ACI)) 
- If yes, how?  
- If no, why not? 
 
Phases:  
  
 
 
160 
 
20. What phases of the program are you more involved in?  
 
21. Does coordination play a more important role in a particular phase more than another?  
Why? /Why not? 
- Good impact on program? 
- Bad impact on program? 
 
 
Coordination’s impact on aid programs 
21B. Is the program coordination on the sectoral/ministerial level in the Ministry of State for 
Environmental Affairs (MSEA) beneficial to the output of the aid program? 
Yes, how? – Examples 
No, why not?  - Examples 
 
21B. Does the coordination set-up help or hinder the ESP program in reaching its goals?   
Yes, how? – Examples 
No, why not?  - Examples 
 
21C Is it good for the impact of the Ministry of Environmental Affairs that it doesn’t receive 
money directly to implement its programs, and therefore needs to coordinate environmental 
initiatives between other Ministries? 
 
Questions to people outside the MSEA 
Role and level:  
22. Do you think the MSEA plays a role in coordinating the ESP in Egypt?  
- If yes, how? In what ways – on what levels? – National? Sectoral? 
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- If not, why? 
 
23. Would it be beneficial for the impact of aid in Egypt if the MSEA coordinates more? 
 
24. Would it be better if the MSEA weren’t coordinating the ESP on a national or sectoral 
level? (Having their own money and spending it themselves)? Why? 
 
Phases:  
25. What phases of the program are you more involved in the program?  
 
26. Does coordination play a more important role in a particular phase more than the other? 
Why? / Why not?  
 
Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA) 
 
Questions to people inside the EEAA 
Role and level:  
27. What is the main function of the EEAA regarding ESP? 
28. Is the EEAA playing a role in coordinating the ESP in Egypt?  
- If yes, how? In what ways – on what levels? – National? Sectoral? 
- If no, why not? 
 
28A. Is the afford to coordinate in the EEAA prioritised? 
- Examples 
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28 B. Does the employees in the EEAA view/witness that the coordination affords are 
detrimental for the outcome of the program? 
 
28C. How does your function increase the chances of the ESP reaching its intended 
outcome?  
 
Phases:  
29. What phases of the program are you more involved in the program?  
30. Does coordination play a more important role in a particular phase more the other? 
Why? /  Why not?  
 
Questions to people outside the EEAA 
Role and level:  
31. Do you think the MSEA plays a role in coordinating the ESP in Egypt?  
- If yes, how? In what ways – on what levels? – National? Sectoral? 
- If not, why? 
32. Would it be beneficial for the impact of aid in Egypt if the MSEA was coordinating 
more? 
33. Would it be better if the MSEA wasn’t coordinating on a national or sectoral level? (i.e: 
Having its own money and spending it themselves) 
 
Phases:  
34. What phases of the program are you more involved in the program?  
35. Does coordination play a more important role in a particular phase more than the other? 
Why? / Why not?  
  
 
 
163 
 
Components of the Environmental Sector Program 
Role and level:  
36. Are the different components of the Environmental Sector Program coordinated together? 
37. What is the structure of this coordination?  
38. Does the Structure of the Environmental Sector Program help the coordination? 
-Is the structure useful?, If yes, how? / If not, why?  
-How often do people meet to coordinate?  
39. Who sets the agenda?   
-Physical placement of the different people involved in the Environmental Sector Program? 
- Promote coordination on national and sectoral level? 
 
Phases: 
40. What phases of the program are you more involved in the program?  
41. Does coordination play a more important role in any particular phase more than another? 
Why? / Why not?  
 
Department of International Cooperation (DIC) in the MSEA 
Questions for people inside the DIC 
Role and level:  
42. How does your function increase the chances of the ESP reaching its intended outcome?  
43. What is the main role of the DIC regarding ESP? 
44. Is the DIC playing a role in coordinating the ESP in Egypt?  
- If yes, how? In what ways – on what levels? – National? Sectoral? 
- If no, why not? 
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Phases:  
45. What phases of the program are you more involved in the program?  
46. Does coordination play a more important role in any particular phase more than the 
other? Why? / Why not?  
 
Questions for people outside the DIC 
Role and level:  
31. Do you think the DIC plays a role in coordinating the ESP in Egypt?  
- If yes, how? In what ways – on what levels? – National? Sectoral? 
- If not, why? 
 
32. Would it be beneficial for the impact of aid in Egypt if the DIC was coordinating more? 
 
 
Other stakeholders in the Environmental Sector Program 
 
47. Does outside stakeholders affect the ESP? In what manner? 
 
Role and level:  
48. What is the main role of the stakeholders regarding ESP? 
49. How does your function increase the chances that the ESP reaches its intended outcome?  
50.What is the main role of your organization regarding ESP? 
51.Are stakeholders playing a role in coordinating the ESP in Egypt?  
- If yes, how? In what ways – on what levels? – national? Sectoral? 
- If not, then why no? 
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Phases:  
52.What phases of the program are you more involved in the program?  
53. Does coordination play a more important role in any particular phase more than another?  
Why? / Why not?  
 
 
The coordination’s impact on the outcome of the ESP 
 
Illustrate the coordination all the way down 
 
A- Coordination between MIC & Department of International Cooperation in MSEA 
 
Action:  
54. Is there a scheme of coordination that is going on bw MIC and DIC? 
- If so, for how long has it been going on? 
- How often do the people from MIC and DIC meet? 
- Who sets the agenda?, do people prioritise going to these meeting? – Do people read the 
memos/documents launched after these coordinating meetings? – Does change happen as a 
result of these meetings? (Ask for examples) 
- Who monitors this connection and the success of the coordination? 
 
54A. Does the Department of International Cooperation in MSEA have good contacts to MIC 
in a way that influences how much money and to what activities donor funds are being used 
in the field of Environment? 
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Yes, examples, procedure? 
No, why not/ 
 
Structure:  
55. How is the structure of the coordination bw MIC and DIC? 
- Who is in charge of the Coordination? 
 
55A. Does the way of coordinating the program (between national and local level) have 
beneficial elements of the participatory approach? 
 
- Is the structure actually good, but practice or incentives are missing? 
- Has the structural and organizational changes of the ESP enhanced the coordination?  
 
 
B- Coordination between the Department of International Cooperation in MSEA and 
Program Support Unit (PSU)/Environmental Sector Program (ESP) Coordinator 
 
Action:  
56. Is there a scheme of coordination going on bw DIC and PSU? 
- If so, for how long has it been going on? 
- No, why not? And is MIC aware?  
56A How often do the people from DIC and PSU meet? 
- theoretically 
- in practice? 
 
56B. Who sets the agenda?  
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56C. Do people prioritise going to these meeting? - Do people read the memos/documents 
launched after these coordinating meetings? – Does change happen as a result of these 
meetings? (Ask for examples) 
56D. Who monitors this connection and the success of the coordination? 
 
Structure:  
57. How is the structure of the coordination bw DIC and PSU? 
- Who is in charge of the Coordination? 
- Is the structure actually good, but practice or incentives are missing? 
- Has the structural and organizational changes of the ESP enhanced the coordination?  
 
 
C- Coordination between the PSU (ESP Coordinator and Chief Advisor) and the 
Program Coordination Committee (PCC) 
Action:  
58. Is there a coordination going on bw PSU and PCC? 
- If so, for how long has it been going on? 
- How often do the people from PSU and PCC meet? 
- Who sets the agenda? Do people prioritise going to these meeting? – Do people read the 
memos/documents launched after these coordinating meetings? – Does change happen as a 
result of these meetings? (Ask for examples) 
- Who monitors this connection and the success of the coordination? 
 
Structure: How is the structure of the coordination bw PSU and PCC? 
59. Who is in charge of the Coordination? 
- Is the structure actually good, but practice or incentives are missing? 
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- Has the structural and organizational changes of the ESP enhanced the coordination?  
 
D- Coordination between the PSU + the Program Coordination Committee (PCC) and 
the Components  
 
Action: 
60. Is there a coordination going on bw PSU/PCC and Components? 
- If so, for how long has it been going on? 
- How often do the people from PSU/PCC and Components meet? 
- Who sets the agenda? Do people prioritise going to these meeting? – Do people read the 
memos/documents launched after these coordinating meetings? – Does change happen as a 
result of these meetings? (Ask for examples) 
- Who monitors this connection and the success of the coordination? 
Structure: 
 61. How is the structure of the coordination bw PSU/PCC and Components? 
- Who is in charge of the Coordination? 
- Is the structure actually good, but practice or incentives are missing? 
- Has the structural and organizational changes of the ESP enhanced the coordination?  
 
 
E- Coordination between outside stakeholders e.g. donor agencies and the ESP 
 
Action:  
62. Is there coordination going on bw donors and the ESP? 
- If so, for how long has it been going on? 
- How often do the people from other donor organizations and ESP meet? 
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- Who sets the agenda? do people prioritise going to these meeting? - Who monitors this 
connection and the success of the coordination? 
 
Structure:  
63. How is the structure of the coordination bw donors and the ESP? 
- Who is in charge of the Coordination? 
- Is the structure actually good, but practice or incentives are missing? 
Has the structural and organizational changes of the ESP enhanced the coordination?  
 
What are the incentives, norms, work chats, the perspectives on the structure of coordination, 
the aim of coordination, rewards for results? 
 
 
Findings and Conclusions  
 
64. Is National Coordination one of the answers to more effective Aid Programs?  
 
65. Would it be fruitful for the Donors in Egypt to support the MIC to make it capable of 
playing a stronger Role in the process of Coordination in Egypt?  
 
66. Would a stronger (planning, monitoring, training, evaluating) MIC be beneficial for the 
outcome of Aid?  
a. For example, is the MIC aware of the deficiencies in EEAA and, if so, is it capable of 
dealing with these deficiencies? 
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67. Can we induce Lessons about Aid Coordination in Egypt from this Case Study? 
 
68. Where in between the MIC and the Egyptians, do you think the coordination is working 
best? 
- where is it worse? 
WHY???  
 
69. Would the ESP had been managed and coordinated differently if there had been no MIC?  
- better or worse for the impact of the program? 
 
What are the biggest obstacles for the program to reach its intended outcome? 
